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To Kitty
This is a small episode in an unending argument between
those  who  know they  are  right  and  therefore  claim  the
mandate of heaven, and those who suspect that the human
race has nothing but the poor candle of reason by which to
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Figure 1: A planet moving on an epicycle, whose deferent is an ec-
centric  orbit,  from  a  1543  edition  of  Giovani  Sacrobosco,  De
Sphaera.
Figure 2: A Copernican explanation of the apparent retrograde mo-
tion of the planets, John Wilkins, A Discourse Concerning a New
Planet (1684).
Figure 3: A 1573 representation of Martianus Capella’s geohelio-
centric system, which was followed by Tycho Brahe. 
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INTRODUCTION
On 22 June 1633, Galileo Galilei was summoned to appear for the last
time before a special tribunal of the Roman Inquisition. For more than
two months he had appeared regularly  before  his ecclesiastical  judges,
charged with having disobeyed an injunction given to him seventeen years
earlier. That injunction, delivered personally by no less a figure than Car-
dinal Robert Bellarmine, had instructed Galileo not to ‘hold, teach, or de-
fend’ the Copernican view of the cosmos, the idea that ‘the sun stands still
at the center of the world and the earth moves’.1 In what his Inquisitors
judged to be a defiance of that prohibition, Galileo had published a work
on the Copernican view, his  Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief  World
Systems. While it claimed merely to discuss the Ptolemaic and Copernican
systems of astronomy, it  was clear to every reader just where Galileo’s
sympathies lay. To make matters worse, the work had been written, not in
a learned Latin accessible only to fellow scholars, but in a lively Italian
that could be read by all Galileo’s fellow countrymen.
Galileo was by then seventy years of age, and not a well man. His con-
dition had surely been made worse by the ordeal of the trial. He might
have expected to avoid the fate of his fellow Copernican, Giordano Bruno,
burned alive by the Inquisition only thirty-three years before, although
one of the judges at Bruno’s trial had been the very same Cardinal Bel-
larmine who had delivered the injunction to Galileo in 1616. By 1633 Ga-
lileo had incurred the hostility of the Vatican authorities, as well as some
leading Jesuit astronomers. But he continued to have friends and support-
ers in the Church hierarchy. Galileo’s suspected heresy was also less seri-
ous than those that found in the works of Bruno. More importantly, Bruno
remained defiant until the end, reportedly averting his face from a crucifix
even while being led out to meet his appalling death. Galileo, on the other
hand,  submitted,  with  at  least  apparent  piety,  to  the  authority  of  the
Church. Galileo might be remembered as a martyr for science, but he him-
self had no desire for martyrdom.
His submission surely provoked sighs of relief among his judges. Ga-
lileo’s trial did nothing for the reputation of the Catholic Church, but even
the Roman authorities must have realized that to put him to death would
1 M.  A.  Finocchiario  (ed.),  The  Galileo  Affair:  A  Documentary  History
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 147–48.
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be a step too far. Galileo was a well-known figure among the intellectual
élite of Europe. His trial merely contributed to his reputation. No less a
figure than John Milton would later speak of meeting ‘the famous Galileo,
grown old a prisoner of the Inquisition’.1 Galileo’s formal abjuration of his
opinions must have seemed to his judges a much happier solution.
It  was  not,  however,  a  happy  solution for  Galileo.  Although he had
reason to hope for a relatively mild verdict, his abjuration was elicited un-
der formal threat of torture.2 For victims of the Inquisition, the threat of
torture was terrifying enough. The first step was generally to show a sus-
pect the instruments of torture, in the hope that this would suffice.3 Even
leaving aside the possibility of torture, the outcome of the trial must have
seemed a humiliating end to a scientific career. Galileo was being forced to
disown an opinion he had vigorously defended, with arguments both theo-
logical and scientific, and supported by means of the first published tele-
scopic observations of the heavens. He had not submitted after being con-
vinced of the wrongness of his scientific views. Nor did his Inquisitors put
forward any theological arguments that he had not already considered.
Galileo was submitting because he had no choice, or, more precisely, be-
cause the only alternative was one that few of us would have the courage
to face.4
1 J. Milton,  Areopagitica: A Speech to the Parliament of England for the
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing  (1644), ed. C. W. Crook (London: Ralph,
Holland, & Co., 1906), p. 54.  Although Galileo was prohibited from re-
ceiving certain classes of visitor, Milton apparently did visit him, during
a stay in Florence in 1638. See J. L. Heilbron,  Galileo (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), p. 353.
2 M. A. Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair,
pp. 1–43, on p. 38; see also M. A. Finocchiaro,  Retrying Galileo, 1633–
1992 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), p. 11.
3 J.  Kirsch,  The Grand Inquisitor’s  Manual:  A History of  Terror  in the
Name of God (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 78.
4 On what might have happened to Galileo, had he defied Church author-
ity, see R. J. Blackwell,  Behind the Scenes at Galileo’s Trial, Including
the First English Translation of Melchior Inchofer’s Tractatus syllepticus
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), p. 23.
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As it happens, his trial did not mark the end of his career as a scientist,
a fact for which we can all be grateful. Sentenced to house arrest in his
villa at Arcetri, near Florence, Galileo would go on to produce what was, in
many respects, a still more important work for the history of science, his
Two New Sciences.1 That work would help revolutionize the study of mech-
anics and of motion, a revolution that would be brought to its conclusion
with the work of Sir Isaac Newton. Moreover, rather than diminishing his
reputation, Galileo’s forced submission would make him even more fam-
ous. For several hundred years, the trial of Galileo would appear as a sym-
bol of a supposed conflict between religion and science.
1.  The Old Conflict Thesis
The idea of a conflict between religion and science is often attributed to
two nineteenth-century writers, John William Draper and Andrew Dick-
son White. Their works are generally conflated and seen to be representat-
ive of a single thesis: the ‘Draper-White’ or ‘warfare’ thesis. But although
both Draper and White believed there had been conflicts between religion
and science, they had quite different ideas about the nature of those con-
flicts and their cause. 
1.1  John William Draper
Let  me  start  by  considering  Draper’s  work,  a  History  of  the  Conflict
between Religion and Science. There is, first of all, no doubt that about the
book’s immediate target. It is not religion, as such, but the Roman Cath-
olic  Church.  Indeed  many  of  Draper’s  arguments  are  strikingly  tradi-
tional, being drawn from centuries of Protestant Christian polemic. (This
may, of course, reflect his background as the son of a Methodist minister.)
Draper does not merely accuse the Catholic Church, in the form of its Ro-
man authorities, of an unbridled lust for power and a desire to dominate
all  forms of  human life.  He also  regards it  as  having  compromised its
1 G.  Galilei,  ‘Discourses  and  Mathematical  Demonstrations  Concerning
Two New Sciences Pertaining to Mechanics and Local Motion’ (1638), tr.
Stillman Drake, in Two New Sciences, including Centers of Gravity and
Force of Percussion, 2nd edition (Toronto: Wall & Emerson, 2000), pp. 5–
327.
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Christian origins by accepting pagan ideas, a decline that began with the
conversion of  the  emperor  Constantine.  The  doctrine  of  the  trinitarian
nature of God, for instance, Draper sees as Egyptian in origin. The venera-
tion of the Blessed Virgin Mary he sees as ‘the adoration of Isis under a
new name’. The rituals of the Roman Church he sees as nothing more than
the  adoption of  ‘heathen rites’,  which led  over  the  centuries  to  an  ex-
traordinary ‘depth of intellectual degradation’.1
Draper  admits  that  opposition  to  science  is  sometimes  to  be  found
within Protestant Christianity. But he is more sympathetic to Protestant-
ism, regarding the Protestant Reformation as the beginning of the process
by which human thought freed itself from dogmatic shackles. While he re-
gards  Roman  Christianity  and  science  as  ‘absolutely  incompatible’,  he
claims that a reconciliation between Protestant Christianity and science is
possible, if only Protestants would remain faithful to their original prin-
ciples, leaving individuals free to interpret not only Scripture but also ‘the
book of Nature’.2 
So despite the title of Draper’s book, it would be wrong to see its thesis
as one of a simple opposition between religion and science. Not all forms of
religion, he suggests, are equally opposed to scientific progress. Indeed one
striking feature of Draper’s book is its sympathy towards Islam, which he
regards  as  having  resisted  the temptation to  revert  to  pagan idolatry.
Draper highlights the development of  science within the Muslim world
and is sympathetic to the doctrines of the Muslim philosopher, Ibn Rushd
(1126–1198),  known in the West  as  Averroes.  While  Draper recognizes
that  there  have  been  occasional  outbreaks  of  what  he  calls  ‘fanatical
hatred against learning’ in the Muslim world,3 he does not dwell on these,
presenting them as exceptions to a general rule.
This seems surprising. One might think that Draper would be equally
opposed to any religion that looks back to an alleged divine revelation.
After all, he holds that there is a necessary tension between the idea of a
1 J. W. Draper,  History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, The
International Scientific Series 12 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1875),
pp. 47–48.
2 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 363.
3 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 142.
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divine revelation and the open-ended inquiry that is characteristic of sci-
ence.1 A divine revelation,  he argues, must be regarded as inerrant,
while science makes no such claims. It has what I shall later call a ‘fal-
libilist’ view of knowledge.2 
It is important to emphasize this contrast, for  James Moore suggests
that Draper claimed for ‘the church-militant scientific’ a degree of infallib-
ility ‘no less … than that which he denied the pope’.3 This is quite unfair.
Draper is  clear that  scientific  claims are  open to  revision,  that  science
would give up even the theory of gravitation, if it were found to be in con-
tradiction with the facts.4 So the clash between religion and science, as
Draper understands it, is a clash between two conceptions of knowledge.
Science stands opposed to the authority of tradition and holds that all
claims can be tested.5 So why is Draper so focused on the Roman Catholic
Church? It seems to be because of its political power. Belief in a divine
revelation is really dangerous only when it is coupled with political power,
for  then religious  authorities  can take  action to  suppress  scientific  re-
search.
Draper’s history has been rightly criticized, for its sweeping generaliza-
tion, oversimplifications, and outright errors. Among the last we might
note his repeated assertion that the Roman Catholic Church ‘had irrevoc-
ably committed itself to the doctrine of a flat earth’.6 This is simply false.
While a few Church Fathers did hold such a view, and others seem simply
confused,7 the idea that the earth was a globe was a commonplace of later
medieval thought. Similarly even a passing familiarity with Roman Cath-
1 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. vi.
2 See chap. 6, ‘The Criticism of Myths’.
3 J. R. Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study of the Protestant
Struggle to Come to Terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America
1870–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 29.
4 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 227.
5 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 303.
6 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 294.
7 W. H. Stahl, Roman Science: Origins, Development, and Influence to the
Later Middle Ages (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p.
218.
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olic theology would have saved Draper from repeatedly making the claim
that ‘infallibility means omniscience’.1 So I have no intention of defending
the details of Draper’s history.
I do, however, want to insist that his book be read in its historical con-
text. This is something that Draper’s recent critics (although themselves
historians) seem reluctant to do. The book first appeared in 1874, only ten
years after Pope Pius IX issued his notorious  Syllabus of Errors. Among
those alleged errors were that individuals should be free to follow their
conscience in religious matters, that educational institutions were exempt
from the authority of the church, that there ought to be a separation of
Church and State, and that where Catholicism is the official state religion
it should tolerate other religions in its territories. (Remember these were
condemned views.) As if that were not bad enough, only four years before
the publication of Draper’s book the Pope had summoned the first Vatican
Council, which had declared the Pope to be infallible in matters of faith
and morals, reaffirmed the Church’s right to reject scientific conclusions,
and condemned those who defended the right of  scientists to  hold doc-
trines that had been rejected by the church. This was, in other words, a
period when the highest Roman Catholic authority, feeling politically as
well  as  intellectually  under  siege,  was  adopting  a  particularly  uncom-
promising stance. If Draper saw that Church as a threat to human free-
dom, he had, at that time, some reason to do so. After all, even moderate
Catholics, such as John Henry Newman, were alarmed.2
1.2  Andrew Dickson White
What about our second representative of the so-called ‘warfare’ thesis, An-
drew Dickson White? His two-volume book,  A History of the Warfare of
Science with Theology in Christendom,  is  a much more careful and de-
tailed  study.  While  tendentious  at  times,  overly  reliant  on  secondary
1 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 225; also
pp. 352, 361.
2 J. H. Newman, A Letter Addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk (New
York:  Catholic  Publication Society,  1875),  § 7  (pp.  101–23).  I  cannot,
therefore, agree with  James Moore (The Post-Darwinian Controversies,
pp. 25–29), who draws attention to the historical context only to argue
that Draper had no reason to be anxious about papal power.
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sources, and containing some factual errors (as is inevitable in a work of
this scope), it does make an effort to be even-handed. In the course of the
work, White sets out a series of topics on which theology and science have
been in conflict. His discussion of each has a set form. White begins with
what he regards as the foolish and wrong-headed pronouncements of the
theologians.  But  he  then  notes  that  there  have  existed,  in  every  age,
thinkers who preserved the scientific spirit and refused to allow their reli-
gious beliefs to stand in the way of scientific progress. Such thinkers are
the heroes of his history, insofar as they initiated the process of reinter-
preting the Bible so as to avoid conflict with science.1
If opposition to nineteenth-century Roman Catholicism was the motiv-
ating force behind Draper’s work, what was motivating White’s book? It
seems to have been his own experience as the co-founder (with Ezra Cor-
nell) of Cornell University. Central to his vision of this new institution was
the idea that it would be strictly non-sectarian. As a young faculty mem-
ber at the University of Michigan, White had witnessed the struggle of its
chancellor, Henry P. Tappan, against denominational control of academic
posts.2 White shared Tappan’s view of these matters, holding that a uni-
versity should be ‘under the control of no political party and of no single
religious sect’.3 This does not mean that religion was to be excluded from
the newly established university. But it does mean that no one Christian
denomination was to exercise a dominant role. As it happens, even this
apparently moderate proposal met with religious opposition, a fact that
only hardened White’s resolve to keep his institution free from sectarian
influence.
When it comes to religion and science, White does not hold that there
exists an inevitable conflict between the two. Indeed he admits that the
1 A.  D.  White,  A  History  of  the  Warfare  of  Science  with  Theology  in
Christendom, 2 vols (London: Macmillan and Co., 1896), vol. 1, p. 247,
vol. 2, p. 359, et passim.
2 G. M. Marsden,  The Soul of the American University: From Protestant
Establishment  to  Established  Nonbelief  (New York:  Oxford  University
Press, 1994), pp. 108, 113.
3 White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,
vol. 1, p. vi.
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Christian  churches  have  often fostered  scientific  inquiry.1 Nor  does  he
write in an anti-religious spirit. On the contrary, he claims to be writing in
defence of religion, in order to preserve it from the ignominious defeats
that it faces when it sets itself in opposition to science. White’s target is
not religion, as such, but what he calls ‘dogmatic theology’. The phrase is
not particularly illuminating, but the theological tendency to which White
is opposed is clear. It is that of using the authority of Sacred Scripture to
make pronouncements on matters that fall within the scope of science. It
is, he argues, in the interests of neither science nor religion when theolo-
gians take it upon themselves to speak on scientific matters.2
We should probably take at face value White’s claim to defending reli-
gion. The idea is certainly consistent with what he said in his inaugural
address as President of Cornell.
We shall not discard the idea of worship. This has never been dreamed
of in our plans. The first plan of buildings and the last embraces the
university chapel. ... From yonder chapel shall daily ascend prayer and
praise.  Day after day it  shall recognize in man not  only mental and
moral, but religious want. We will labor to make this a Christian insti-
tution; a sectarian institution may it never be.3
It is consistent, too, with what we know of White’s own religious practice,
for he attended Episcopalian church services and professed a commitment
to religion, broadly conceived.4 
The key phrase here, however, is ‘broadly conceived’. What kind of reli-
gion was White defending? While he rarely makes positive affirmations
about God, White does speak about a ‘Divine Spirit’ that operates in hu-
man history.5 But in common with other nineteenth-century liberal Prot-
estants,6 White thinks of this Divine Spirit as an immanent power. It oper-
ates in and through the natural causes that bring about the evolution of
1 A.  D.  White,  The  Warfare  of  Science (London:  Henry  S.  King  & Co.,
1876), p. 10.
2 White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,
vol. 1, p. viii.
3 W. T. Hewett, Cornell University: A History (New York: University Pub-
lishing Society, 1905), vol. 1, p. 269.
4 Marsden, The Soul of the American University, p. 116.
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culture. The evolution of culture may give rise to ‘inspired’  individuals,
whose lives and teachings can be thought of as ‘revelatory’. But neither of
those terms – ‘inspiration’ and ‘revelation’ – refer to anything other than a
human capacity to grasp some fact about the world. As one critic of liberal
theology wrote, ‘what is called revelation from one point of view, may be
called human discovery from another.’1
Even if one identifies divine revelation with a certain kind of human know-
ledge, this does not make religion identical with science. After all,  religion
could involve non-scientific forms of knowing. The idea that the only legit-
imate form of knowledge is  scientific knowledge is sometimes known as
‘scientism’.2 I have found no evidence that White held to such a view. Nor,
incidentally, do I. There may be facts about the world that we understand
without employing anything like a scientific method. Think, for example,
of the ways in which we understand other people: their gestures, their ex-
pressions, the intended meanings of their words. Think, too, of the way in
which we grasp the meaning of a poem.3 Those who recognize such differ-
ences hold to a broad conception of human reason. William James, for in-
stance, speaks of four ‘dimensions’ of reason – the intellectual, the aes-
5 White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,
vol. 2, p. 288.
6 J. H. Roberts, ‘American Liberal Protestantism and the Concept of Pro-
gress, 1870–1930’,  Historically Speaking, 9:1 (Sept./Oct. 2007), pp. 15–
17, on pp. 15–16.
1 L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1959),
p. 38.
2 M. Stenmark, ‘What Is Scientism?’, Religious Studies, 33 (1997), pp. 15–
32, on pp. 18–19.
3 A number of nineteenth-century German philosophers – notably J.  G.
Droysen (1808 –84) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) – developed this
idea in terms of a distinction between ‘understanding’ (Verstehen)  and
‘explanation’ (Erklären); see K.-O. Apel, ‘The Erklären-Verstehen Contro-
versy  in  the  Philosophy  of  the  Natural  and  Human  Sciences’,  in  G.
Fløistad (ed.),  Contemporary Philosophy:  A New Survey,  vol.  2:  Philo-
sophy of Science  (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 19–49, on p.
19.
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thetic, the moral, and the practical1 – and there is no reason to regard his
list as exhaustive. 
What is clear, however, is that these are all forms of  human reason:
they involve natural human capacities.  Liberal religious thinkers such
as White believe  that these capacities  were  developed under divine
guidance. But this is a very different claim from that traditionally made
by religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Such religions have
traditionally laid claim to a  supernatural divine revelation, which comes
to us ‘from without’ (as it were), and which can inform us of matters that
lie beyond the capacity of  human reason.2 White’s  view of religion was
never going to be acceptable to those who embrace a theology of this kind.
Indeed the idea that  ‘all  truths of  religion are derived from the native
force of human reason’ had already been condemned by Pope Pius IX, in
the same Syllabus of Errors that had caused Draper such concern.3
1.3  Rejection of the Draper-White Thesis
I noted a moment ago that Draper and White are generally understood as
leading representatives of a ‘warfare’ thesis, one that holds that there is
some kind of inevitable conflict between religion and science. It should by
now be clear that neither holds to such a view. We may disagree with
Draper’s anti-Catholicism and lament his misrepresentations of history.
We may regard White’s liberal theology as hopelessly vague, an attempt
‘to defend some shadowy ghost of Christianity by yielding up all that has
hitherto been thought its substance’.4 But both Draper and White believe
1 W. James, A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College
on  the  Present  Situation  in  Philosophy (1909;  New  York:  Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1916), p. 112.
2 See chap. 7, ‘Religious Faith’.
3 H.  Denzinger  and  A.  Schönmetzer,  Enchiridion  symbolorum  defini-
tionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, 36th edition (Freiburg
im Breisgau: Herder, 1976), § 2904 (translation my own).
4 The words are those of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (1805–73), in his (an-
onymous) review of the work entitled Essays and Reviews (1860); see the
Quarterly Review 109 (1861), pp. 248–305, on p. 251.
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there are forms of religion that can avoid conflict with science. White vig-
orously advocates a religion of this kind.
Whatever Draper and White may have intended, the understanding of
religion and science that is attributed to them – the so-called ‘warfare’ or
‘conflict’  thesis – has become deeply unfashionable. A plethora of books
and articles have appeared arguing that it is badly mistaken. An unam-
biguous statement of this view is provided by the theologian Alister Mc-
Grath.
The idea that science and religion are in perpetual conflict is no longer
taken seriously by any major historian of science, despite its popularity
in the late nineteenth century. One of the last remaining bastions of
atheism survives only at the popular level – namely, the myth that an
atheistic, fact-based science is permanently at war with a faith-based
religion. Not only is this caricature clearly untrue in the present day,
but historical scholarship has now determined it to be misleading and
inaccurate in the past.  Yet the myth still  lives on in popular atheist
writings, undisturbed by the findings of scholars.1
When it comes to the trial of Galileo, for instance, such authors claim that
it was merely a tragic mistake, the result of theological misunderstand-
ings on the part of the Church and, on the part of Galileo, the pride of a
scientist who refused to admit that his conclusions were not as certain as
he claimed. 
Representative of this view is an essay by historians David Lindberg
and Ronald Numbers. ‘The trouble in which Galileo eventually found him-
self’, they write,
resulted  not  from  clear  scientific  evidence  running  afoul  of  biblical
claims to the contrary (as White tells the story), but from ambiguous
scientific evidence provoking an intra-mural dispute within Catholicism
over the proper principles of scriptural interpretations dispute won by
the conservatives at Galileo's expense. Galileo never questioned the au-
thority of scripture, merely the principles by which it was to be inter-
preted.2
1 A. McGrath,  The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in
the Modern World (New York: Doubleday, 2004), p. 87.
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As Lindberg and Numbers tell the story, the trial of Galileo was not so
much a dispute between religion and science as a dispute within the Cath-
olic community regarding the interpretation of the Bible.
This re-reading of the history has been encouraged by the fact that Ga-
lileo, unlike his predecessor Giordano Bruno, has been rehabilitated by
the Church.1 In a statement issued in 1992, Pope John Paul II noted that
a key issue in this debate had to do with the interpretation of the Bible.
He went on to endorse what he presented as Galileo’s view on these mat-
ters.
Paradoxically,  Galileo,  a sincere believer,  showed himself  to  be  more
perceptive  in  this  regard  than  the  theologians  who  opposed  him.  ‘If
Scripture cannot err’, he wrote to Benedetto Castelli, ‘certain of its in-
terpreters and commentators can and do so in many ways’.  We also
know of his letter to Christine de Lorraine (1615) which is like a short
treatise on biblical hermeneutics.2
The Pope also took the opportunity to repeat a view he had expressed in
1979, when he spoke about the ‘deep harmony which unites the truths of
science with the truths of faith’. On that occasion, too, he spoke highly of
Galileo, noting that ‘he who is rightly called the founder of modern phys-
ics,  declared explicitly  that  the two truths,  of  faith and of  science, can
never contradict  each other’.3 As John Heilbron has recently suggested,
with tongue firmly in cheek, perhaps Galileo is on his way to being canon-
2 D.  C.  Lindberg  and  R.  L.  Numbers,  ‘Beyond  War  and  Peace:  A  Re-
appraisal of the Encounter between Christianity and Science’,  Church
History: Studies in Christianity and Culture 55 (1986), pp. 338–54, on p.
346.
1 It was, perhaps, not a formal rehabilitation, but it was an informal one:
see Finocchiaro, Retrying Galileo, p. 359.
2 John Paul II, ‘Faith Can Never Conflict with Reason’, L’Osservatore Ro-
mano, weekly edition in English, 4 November 1992, pp. 1–2.
3 John Paul II, ‘Deep Harmony Which Unites the Truths of Science with
the Truths of Faith’, L’Osservatore Romano, weekly edition in English, 26
November 1979, pp. 9–10.
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ised. In four hundred years’ time, will we be celebrating the feast of St Ga-
lileo Galilei?1 
I suspect not. The disagreement between Galileo and his ecclesiastical
opponents was deeper than the Pope imagines. Galileo may have been a
more  or  less  conventionally  devout,  seventeenth-century  Catholic.2 As
such, he would freely have agreed that the truths of faith and those of sci-
ence cannot be in conflict.  But this was not the question at issue. The
question at issue was how one was to identify both sets of truths and what
was to be done when they appear to be in conflict. On these matters Ga-
lileo and the Church authorities were at loggerheads. More importantly,
the attitudes that brought them into conflict are still alive and well. Des-
pite the Pope’s attempts to rehabilitate Galileo, little has changed.
2.  The Relation of Religion and Science
But this is to jump ahead. As the debates regarding the work of Draper
and White show, there are different ways of characterising the relation
between religion and science. So before entering into an examination of
the ‘Galileo affair’, as it is often known, I shall step back for a moment and
examine the competing views. If the reader is impatient to know which of
these I will be defending, she could skip immediately to Section Three of
this chapter.
2.1  Ian Barbour’s Fourfold Typology
A popular way of classifying views regarding the relation of religion and
science was that put forward, some decades ago, by Ian Barbour.3 I shall
argue shortly that any simple classification of this kind – a ‘typology’ as it
is often known –  is ultimately unsatisfactory. But Barbour’s will make a
useful starting point.
The first view of the religion and science relation discussed by Barbour
is  that  often attributed to  Draper and White,  the so-called ‘conflict’  or
‘warfare’ thesis. Barbour notes that there are two groups likely to hold to
1 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 365.
2 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 105.
3 I. G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues
(San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. 77–105.
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such a view: scientific materialists and biblical literalists. Scientific ma-
terialists do so because they believe that only science represents a reliable
way of forming beliefs (an epistemological position) or because they be-
lieve that science shows that no non-material entities exist (a metaphys-
ical view). The latter is sometimes linked with the view that any other en-
tities of which we may speak are ultimately explicable in terms of physics
(a kind of reductionism). But at the other end of the spectrum are biblical
literalists, who see a conflict between science and religion because of their
particular way of interpreting Sacred Scripture. 
It is necessary to qualify Barbour’s comment about these so-called ‘bib-
lical literalists’. Such people cannot consistently believe that there is an
actual conflict between religion and science. After all, the ‘two books’ –
that of nature and that of Sacred Scripture – cannot ultimately contradict
each other, since God is the author of both.1 Any conflict must be merely
apparent. It follows that such people will not, strictly speaking, claim that
there is a conflict between religion and science. They will claim that there
is something faulty with the science, since it leads to conclusions that ap-
parently contradict the Bible. The ‘science’ in question is (as they often
say) ‘science, falsely so-called’.2 A better form of science, they argue, would
resolve this apparent conflict.
A second view, as outlined by Barbour, is an ‘independence’ view. This
tries simply to isolate religion and science, to keep each safely quarant-
ined, with distinct domains over which they have authority and distinctive
methods of inquiry. Again, this position can be defended by both believers
and non-believers. Evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, for example,
defends a strong version of this independence view. He speaks of the ‘non-
overlapping magisteria’ (NOMA) of religion and science, the term magis-
1 For the origin of this metaphor among the early Church Fathers, see P.
M. Blowers, ‘Entering “this Sublime and Blessed Amphitheatre”:  Con-
templation  of  Nature  and Interpretation  of  the  Bible  in  the  Patristic
Period’, in J. van der Meer and S. Mandelbrote (eds), Interpreting Nature
and Scripture:  History of a Dialogue in the Abrahamic Religions, Brill’s
Series in Church History 36.  Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2009, vol. 1, pp. 148–76.
2 The phrase is a biblical one, from 1 Tim 6:20, in the King James Version.
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terium being a traditional Roman Catholic one for ‘teaching authority’.1
But a similar view is defended by what Barbour calls Protestant neo-or-
thodoxy, which makes a sharp distinction between the domain of divine
revelation and that of history and science.2 A similar distinction is made
by those who appeal to the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, arguing
that religion and science represent distinct language games, rooted in dif-
fering forms of life.3 
A third position is what Barbour calls a ‘dialogue’ view.  This accepts
that religion and science answer different kinds of questions and have
distinct methods of inquiry,  but holds that there is room for dialogue
between the two. It might be argued, for instance, that religion lends sup-
port to the presuppositions of scientific work, such as the assumption that
the natural world is intelligible, or that it answers ‘limit questions’ that go
beyond the results of scientific inquiry.  Those who hold to this view may
also argue that there are methodological parallels between religion and sci-
ence, science not being as objective and value free as it is sometimes por-
trayed.4 A rather different version of this ‘dialogue’ view  sees the natural
world – the world as described by science – as itself sacred. This is some-
times described as a ‘religious naturalism’, which bases itself on those reli-
gious feelings that can be elicited by a scientific view of the world.5
A final position described by Barbour is what he calls the ‘integration’
view. This sets out to integrate religious beliefs and scientific knowledge
into an inclusive vision of reality. There are three ways in which this can
be done. Firstly, the old tradition of ‘natural theology’ seeks evidence in
the creation for the existence and nature of God. Arguments from design,
such as the modern ‘intelligent design’ theory, are of this kind. Secondly,
1 See ‘Goals and Means’, below.
2 For a critical analysis of both movements, under the heading of ‘dialetical
theology’, see G. W. Dawes, The Historical Jesus Question: The Challenge
of  History  to  Religious  Authority  (Louisville,  KY:  Westminster  John
Knox, 2001), pp. 203–96.
3 I shall come back to ‘Wittgensteinian’ views of religious belief in chap. 8.
4 See chap. 9, ‘Grand Narratives and Dodgy Metaphors’.
5 U. Goodenough,  The Sacred Depths of Nature (Oxford University Press,
1998), p. xvii.
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what Barbour calls a ‘theology of nature’ seeks to reformulate traditional
religious doctrines in the light of scientific knowledge. (One might, for in-
stance, reformulate the Christian doctrine of original sin in the light of
what we now know of human origins.) Finally, one can attempt to create a
new metaphysics – a comprehensive view of the kinds of entities that exist
– in the light of both scientific knowledge and religious belief. Barbour’s
example of  this trend is what  has become known as ‘process theology’,
which draws on the work of both Alfred North Whitehead and Charles
Hartshorne to develop a new vision of both the natural world and divinity.
2.2  Mikael Stenmark’s Analysis
There are other, more recent analyses of this kind, such as that of John
Haught, whose fourfold typology – conflict, contrast, contact, or confirma-
tion – resembles that offered by Barbour.1 But perhaps the most sophistic-
ated recent scheme is that of Mikael Stenmark. Stenmark notes that there
are ‘restrictive’ and ‘expansionist’ views of science, offering differing con-
ceptions of the scope of the scientific enterprise. A scientific expansionist
believes that science can (or will eventually be able to) fulfil many of the
functions now performed by religion. He may hold, for example, that an
‘evolutionary epic’,  drawn from biology,  is  able to  offer us ethical  guid-
ance.2 But on the other side there are ‘expansionist’ views of religious au-
thority, which broaden its scope.3 As we shall see, Galileo’s ecclesiastical
opponents held such a view of biblical authority, being reluctant to narrow
the range of matters to which it applied.4  They were not alone in this respect.
Indeed  to  describe  this  view  as  ‘expansionist’  is  questionable,  since  it  is
widely held by religious thinkers .
In any case, this analysis leads Stenmark to distinguish five different
ways of relating science and religion. Three of these are closely related to
Barbour’s  typology.  The  first  sees  religion and  science  as  independent,
1 J. F. Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (Mah-
wah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1995), pp. 9–26.
2 See chap. 9, ‘Grand Narratives and Dodgy Metaphors’.
3 M. Stenmark,  How to Relate Science and Religion (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 1–9, 183–94.
4 See chap. 4, ‘The Scope of Biblical Authority’.
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having no overlapping domain. On this view, for example, religion might
deal with purely ethical claims, about how we should live, while science
deals with factual claims, about the way the world is. (This is, of course,
Stephen Jay Gould’s ‘NOMA’ view.)  This stands in stark contrast with a
second, ‘monist’ view, which holds that religion and science deal with the
same kinds of problems. On the monist view, religion and science either of-
fer  contrasting  answers to  those  questions (the  ‘conflict’  version of  the
monist  view)  or  complementary  answers  (the  ‘harmony’  version  of  the
monist view). Finally, there is an ‘overlap’ or ‘contact’ view, which posits
an intersection between the concerns of religion and those of science.1 But
Stenmark adds two more categories, which he calls, firstly, the ‘complete
scientific expansionist’ view and, secondly, the ‘complete religious expan-
sionist’ view.2 These would retain the functions of religion and science, but
subsume one under the other. Either religion would become part of science
or science would become part of religion.
Mikael  Stenmark’s  contribution  goes  beyond  that  of  drawing  up  a
simple typology. He also offers what he calls a ‘multidimensional’ analysis.
The religion and science relation, he argues, can be analysed along at least
three different dimensions. The first of these is a  social dimension, since
both religion and science are sets of social practices (an idea that will be
central to the present study). But religion and science can also be com-
pared by reference to (a) the goals that each pursues (a ‘teleological’) di-
mension), (b) the methods employed to reach those goals (a ‘methodolo-
gical’ dimension), and (c) the content of the beliefs and theories to which
each gives rise (a ‘theoretical’ dimension).3
3.  What We Mean by ‘Religion’ and ‘Science’
It is this last aspect of Stenmark’s work that comes closest to the analysis
I am about to offer. But I shall approach the question a little differently.
What I am investigating is whether there is a conflict between science and
religion. One could answer this question, as Stenmark does, by thinking
about the ‘dimensions’ of both religion and science. But my own preference
1 Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion, p. 9.
2 Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion, p. 259.
3 Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion, pp. 260–69.
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is to think about the different ways in which the terms ‘religion’ and ‘sci-
ence’ can be defined. 
3.1 Defining Religion and Science
Both terms, of course, have fuzzy boundaries. What one counts as a reli-
gion and as a science will vary from context to context. For the sake of this
study, I am happy to understand ‘science’ very broadly, as embracing all
those fields customarily known as physical and social sciences. My histor-
ical case study will deal with a form of inquiry that was, until quite re-
cently, known as ‘natural philosophy’. Late medieval thinkers did use the
Latin term scientia, from which our modern word ‘science’ derives, but the
Latin term had a much broader scope. When medieval scholars wanted to
narrow its meaning to something akin to our modern one, they would use
a phrase such as scientia naturalis.1 I admit that it might seem anachron-
istic  to  use  the term ‘science’  when referring  to  medieval  scientia  nat-
uralis. But I do so unashamedly. Although very different from modern sci-
ence, it, too, was a form of inquiry that attempted to explain natural phe-
nomena by reference to principles derived from observation and experi-
ence.
The scope of the term ‘religion’ is even more vigorously contested, since
the diversity of the movements to which this word is applied seems baff-
ling. The point is strikingly made by a ‘Peanuts’ cartoon printed at the be-
ginning of a recent sociology of religion textbook. Lucy is saying to Charlie
Brown., ‘All religions are basically alike... You know, love your neighbour.
They’re  all  alike.  Just  name  any  two,  and  you’ll  see’.  Charlie  Brown
replies,  ‘Melanesian frog worship and Christian science?’2 As far  as  we
know, frog worship has never been a characteristic of Melanesian religion,
although it may have been practised in Nepal. But the point remains well
made. It is difficult to find any feature that all religions have in common. 
1 J. M. M. H. Thijssen, ‘The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De gen-
eratione et corruptione. An Introductory Survey’, in J. M. M. H. Thijssen
and H. A. G. Braakhuis (eds),  The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s
De generatione et corruptione. Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern, Stu-
dia Artistarum 7 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), pp. 9–21, on p. 17. 
2 M. Hamilton,  The Sociology  of  Religion:  Theoretical  and Comparative
Perspectives, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2001), p. x.
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My interest in this study, however, is in a very particular class of reli-
gions.  These  do  have  something  in  common.  They  are  all  scripturally
based religions, tracing themselves back to an alleged divine revelation.
This revelation, received by faith, represents a source of knowledge that is
not identical with human reason. The present discussion will focus on the
history of Christian thought, since Christianity is the scripturally based
religion that I know best. But much of what I have to say will also be ap-
plicable to Judaism and Islam. To what extent it will apply to other reli-
gions is a question I must leave to others. I am inclined to follow Émile
Durkheim in holding  that  all  religions have  certain  texts,  institutions,
practices, or persons that they consider ‘sacred’ and therefore unquestion-
able.1 But I cannot defend that broader claim here.
3.2 Locating the Conflict
I hope it is now clear how I shall be using the terms ‘religion’ and ‘science’.
But there is still a problem with the idea of a conflict between religion and
science. When people speak about such a conflict (even to deny it exists), it
is difficult to know what they are talking about. What kind of conflict are
they referring to? Where exactly is it to be located? Let me outline four op-
tions and indicate which of these I consider most promising.
(a)  Bodies of Doctrine
We might, first of all, think of the conflict in question as one between bod-
ies of doctrine: religious dogmas, on the one hand, and the theories of sci-
ence on the other. This seems, at first sight, a promising approach, since
there certainly have been conflicts of this kind, involving competing claims
about the world. Often-cited examples are the Church’s condemnation of
the Copernican hypothesis in the seventeenth century – the focus of the
present study – and the rejection by many Christians of Charles Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection. 
1 É. Durkheim,  The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), tr. J.
W. Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915), p. 37; see chap. 6, ‘The
Authority of Myths’. I am encouraged in this belief by the fact that a fel-
low citizen of mine, Philip Blackwood, is currently in a Burmese prison
for a perceived insult to Buddhism. (His offence was to post images of the
Buddha wearing headphones, in order to advertise a bar.)
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There are, however, two problems with this approach. The first is that a
conflict on the level of doctrine would hardly be conflict between religion,
as such, and science. As I have already suggested, if we focus on doctrines,
we could argue that there is no ‘religion, as such,’ since there are few, if
any, doctrines that religions have in common. Even a ‘belief in supernat-
ural beings’, which the early anthropologist E. B. Tylor regarded as the
mark  of  the  religious,1 is  not  universally  shared.  Take,  for  example,
Theravada Buddhism.  Most Buddhists believe in gods, but it can be ar-
gued that you do not need to believe in gods to be a Buddhist.2 Even what
I am calling scripturally based religions differ significantly in the kinds of
doctrinal claims they make. 
A similar remark may be made about science. The word ‘science’ is an
‘umbrella term’, covering a very diverse range of disciplines. Not only do
these have differing subject matters, but even when they have the same
subject matter,  they frequently offer competing theories about it. On some
matters, it is true, we can talk about a scientific consensus, so it may be
that the sciences have more in common that religions do. But even if we
concede this, the most we could claim is a conflict between particular reli-
gions doctrines and particular scientific theories.
Such conflicts surely occur. But the second problem with this approach
is that they do not seem to be inevitable; indeed in many cases they are
eventually resolved. We have already seen that from the believer’s point of
view a conflict between religion and science must be merely apparent. It is
the theologian’s task to resolve the apparent conflict, either by rejecting
the science (as somehow faulty) or amending the relevant religious beliefs.
Believers  have  often taken the  latter  course,  as  the  Catholic  Church’s
eventual  acceptance  of the  Copernican  opinion  reminds  us.  They  have
altered  their  understanding  of  their  faith  to  accommodate  the  science.
Even in the seventeenth century, there were many Catholics who believed
the Copernican view to be compatible with a nuanced reading of Sacred
Scripture. So while one can think of Galileo affair as a conflict between re-
1 E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 5th edition (London: John Murray, 1913),
vol. 1, p. 424. 
2 P. Williams and A. Tribe, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to
the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 4–5.
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ligion and science, one can also think of it as a dispute about the meaning
of Scripture, as Lindberg and Numbers remind us.1 Similar remarks may
be made about Christian debates in our own day regarding evolution and
the doctrine of creation. 
(b)  Distinct Communities
There is, however, a second option, which thinks of a conflict between reli-
gion and science as a clash between two  communities. Remarkably, this
seems to be a common view among historians, who repeatedly argue that
religion  and  science  cannot  be  in  conflict  because  many  scientists  are
themselves  religious  or  because  religious  communities  have  often been
supportive of science. There is, of course, some truth in this argument. Re-
ligious communities have not always been in favour of science, and the
Galileo affair is a reminder that institutional conflicts can, and do, occur.
It may be, too, that atheism is a more common position among scientists
than it is in the population at large, and that scientists as a body are be-
coming steadily less religious.2 But it remains the case that many scient-
ists have been, and continue to be, religious. So whatever conflict there
may be, it is a not a simple conflict between two groups of people. 
This observation,  however,  does not  tell  us  very much. The problem
here is that a lack of conflict on the communal or institutional level may
hide real conflicts in other respects. A believing scientist may think, for in-
stance, that her religious beliefs are compatible with her science and yet
be mistaken. After all, in complex matters people can hold inconsistent be-
liefs without aware of the inconsistency.3 It is at least conceivable, for in-
stance, that a Darwinian account of human origins cacnnot be reconciled
1 Lindberg and Numbers, ‘Beyond War and Peace’, p. 346.
2 E. J. Larson and L. Witham, ‘Leading Scientists Still Reject God’, Nature
394 (23 July 1998), p. 313; E. H. Ecklund,  J. Z. Park and P. Todd Veliz,
‘Secularization  and  Religious  Change  among  Elite  Scientists’,  Social
Forces, 86 (2008), pp. 1805–39, on p. 1806. One should not be misled by
the fact that scientists occasionally talk about ‘God’, because the deity to
whom they refer is often very different from the God of classical theism.
Albert Einstein’s professed belief in ‘the God of Spinoza’ should remind
us of that. See B. Hoffmann, ‘Albert Einstein’, Leo Baeck Institute Year-
book, 21 (1976), pp. 279–88, on p. 285. 
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with the Christian doctrine of original sin. If this is the case, then it does
not matter how many Christians attempt to bring the two into harmony.
The conflict would remain.
Such a conflict would be on the level of doctrine. But there could also
exist  conflicts  on  other  levels,  conflicts  of  which  individuals  might  be
equally unaware. Religion and science may represent differing  modes of
thought which the same individual may embrace, on different occasions: a
religious of thought employed in church and a scientific mode employed in
the laboratory. Alternatively religious and scientific communities may em-
ploy contrasting norms when dealing with knowledge claims, religious be-
liefs being treated quite differently from scientific theories. So the obser-
vation  that  many  believers  are  themselves  scientists,  or  that  religious
communities are supportive of science, does not take us very far.
(c)  Modes of Thought
Here’s a third option, at which I have just hinted. It may be that religion
and  science  represent  differing  ways  of  thinking. If  there  is  a  conflict
between religion and science, it would have to do with what an earlier gen-
eration  would  have  described  as  differing  (and  perhaps  irreconcilable)
modes of thought or, to use the French term, mentalités. 
The idea that different groups might employ differing modes of thought
was first  proposed by an early twentieth-century thinker,  Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl.  In  his  early  work,  Lévy-Bruhl  spoke  about  what  he  called  the
‘prelogical’ mentality of tribal societies,1 while his later work made a con-
trast between ‘causal’ and ‘participatory’ orientations to the world.2 The
causal orientation, he argued, is characteristic of science, while the parti-
3 There is an extensive body of philosophical literature on this topic. But
even those who argue that we cannot have self-contradictory beliefs ac-
cept that we can have inconsistent beliefs. See, for example, R. Foley, ‘Is
it  Possible  to  have  Contradictory  Beliefs?’,  Midwest  Studies  in  Philo-
sophy, 10 (1986), pp. 327–55, on p. 328.
1 L. Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think (1910), tr. L. A. Clare (New York: Al-
fred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 78.
2 L.  Lévy-Bruhl,  The  Notebooks  on  Primitive  Mentality (1949),  tr.  P.
Rivière, Explorations in Interpretative Sociology (New York: Harper and
Row, 1975), p. 92.
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cipatory  orientation  characterizes  religion  and  magic.  Note  that  the
phrase ‘modes of thought’, like its French equivalent  mentalités, can be
misleading. It can suggest too individualistic a conception of where the dif-
ferences are to be found. Lévy-Bruhl was clear that these ways of thinking
about the world were collective representations.1 They are inherited from
one’s society. He also came to recognize, in his later work, that the two
forms of thought – causal and participatory – exist in all societies and at
all times.2 
Lévy-Bruhl’s early work met with severe criticism and widespread re-
jection.3 But his later views have been more widely accepted, having been
adopted by a number of recent scholars of religion.4 Noteworthy in this
context is the work of  Donald Wiebe, who contrasts religion with science
by describing religious thought as ‘mythopoeic.’5 Wiebe not only regards
these two modes of thought as very different, he also argues that they are
ultimately  incompatible.6 If  true,  this  would  represent  a  real  conflict
between religion and science.
1 Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, pp. 98–99.
2 Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 101.
3 B. Malinowski, ‘Magic, Science and Religion’, in J. Needham (ed.),  Sci-
ence, Religion and Reality (London: Sheldon Press, 1925), pp. 20–84,  on
pp. 28–34; E. E. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Lévy-Bruhl’s Theory of Primitive Men-
tality’, Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, 1 (1970), pp. 39–
60.
4 See,  for  example,  R.  Needham,  Belief,  Language,  and  Experience
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 160–75 et passim; S. J.
Tambiah,   Magic,  Religion,  and  the  Scope  of  Rationality,  The  Lewis
Henry Morgan Lectures 1984 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 84–90.
5 D. Wiebe,  The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought,
McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas 15 (Montreal, Quebec &
Kingston,  ON:  McGill-Queen's  University  Press,  1991),  pp.  213–16  et
passim.
6 Wiebe, The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought, p. 226
et passim.
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A less polemical view has recently been defended by  Michael Barnes,
using ideas drawn from the psychology of Jean Piaget. On Barnes’s ac-
count, religious thought most commonly employs what Piaget calls ‘con-
crete operational’  thinking,1 a ‘commonsense’ attitude to the world that
collects and categorizes, but in a way that makes use of concrete images
and narratives rather than abstract ideas.2 Scientific thinking, by way of
contrast, is a type of ‘formal operational’ thought. It relies on ideas of ‘fit’,
making general claims about the world that it  tries to make consistent
both with the relevant evidence and with each other. Such thinking is crit-
ical thinking, in the sense that it gives you a ‘place to stand intellectually’
in order to judge inherited traditions.3 An advantage of Barnes’s work is
that it recognizes that forms of religious thought are not always the same.
They change over time. The ‘formal operational’ thought characteristic of
philosophy and  modern science  can influence  religious  thinkers,  giving
rise to critical and reflexive forms of theology. We might call such forms of
theology ‘scientific’, in a broad sense.4 
The most discussed recent contribution to this ‘modes of thought’ liter-
ature is that of Robert Bellah, whose Religion in Human Evolution makes
use of Merlin Donald’s distinction between mimetic, mythic, and theoretic
cultures. Donald argues that the earliest form of distinctively human cul-
ture was  mimetic. Mimetic actions are deliberate attempts to represent
some event or fact about the world, but in ways that do not (yet) involve
language.5 A clear example is that of the Australian aboriginal dance that
acts out the actions of a totemic animal. A second mode of thought and
culture is mythic. A myth is a ‘collectively held system of explanatory and
1 M. H. Barnes, Stages of Thought: The Co-Evolution of Religious Thought
and Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 203.
2 Barnes, Stages of Thought, p. 21.
3 Barnes, Stages of Thought, p. 95.
4 In chap. 7 (‘Religion without Faith’) I shall discuss the difficulties facing
a theology of this kind.
5 M. Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of
Culture  and  Cognition (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,
1991), p. 168.
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regulatory metaphors’.1 Myths do not merely bestow significance of the
lives of individuals and the tribe; they also aim at causal explanation, pre-
diction, and control. While mimetic actions represent particular events or
facts, myths models much larger states of affairs. A third form of thought
and culture is  theoretic. This also predicts and explains, but does so by
means of ‘argument, discovery, and proof’. Its distinctive ways of operat-
ing include ‘systematic taxonomies, induction, deduction, verification, dif-
ferentiation, quantification, idealization, and formal methods of measure-
ment’.2 
There is one aspect of Donald’s work that is of particular relevance to
the present discussion. It is his observation that any new application of
theoretic thought is inevitably ‘antimythic’:  it opposes the old, mythical
view. As Donald writes, ‘things and events must be stripped of their previ-
ous mythic significances before they can be subjected to what we call “ob-
jective”  theoretic  analysis’.3 This  process of  ‘demythologization’  is  often
strongly resisted. Robert Bellah touches on this idea,4 but also makes use
of  Donald’s  insights  to  argue that  tribal  religions employ mimetic  and
mythic modes of thought. Even when religions develop a theoretical di-
mension, he argues, mimetic and mythic forms of thought remain influen-
tial.5 
(d)  Epistemic Norms
The ‘modes of thought’ tradition looks promising. It may well be that reli-
gion and science can be distinguished in terms of their dominant ways of
thinking.  This  might  also  account  for  the  conflicts  that  occur  between
them, as science ‘demythologizes’ areas of the world that previously had
mythic significance. I shall draw on some insights arising from this tradi-
tion, when I examine the relations that exist between religious myths and
1 Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, p. 214.
2 Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, pp. 273–74.
3 Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, p. 275.
4 R. N. Bellah,  Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the
Axial Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011), p. 175.
5 Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, pp. xviii –xix et passim.
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the critical thinking characteristic of theoretic cultures.1 My focus, how-
ever, will be a different one. What I shall focus on are the epistemic norms
– the norms relating to knowledge – that are dominant within religious
and scientific communities. 
A norm is an ideal to which members of a community subscribe, and to
which they are expected to subscribe as a condition of membership. It is,
however, an ideal: it describes how members ought to behave, which may
or may not be how they actually behave. So what I am referring to here
are two differing sets of communal expectations regarding behaviour. My
central argument will be that religious and scientific communities have
different  ways  in  which  they  believe  knowledge  claims  ought  to  be
handled.  These  differing  norms  are  rooted  in  differing  epistemological
views, epistemology being the theory of knowledge. The key point here is
that  religious  communities  lay  claim  to  a  second  source  of  knowledge
alongside human reason. It is at this level – that of epistemology and epi-
stemic norms – that there seems to be an ineradicable conflict between sci-
ence and religion.
In making this suggestion, I am cautiously endorsing a version of Victor
Stenger’s recent proposal, for he also claims that religion and science rep-
resent ‘opposed epistemologies’.2 But I am locating this opposition on the
level of institutional norms: collective values and procedures. It is import-
ant to note that while individuals often act in conformity with the collect-
ive norms of a group to which they belong, they need not do so. Norms,
like mentalités, are not ‘ “ prisons” from which individuals cannot escape’.3
In a modern, liberal society religious communities are rarely, if ever, co-
extensive with the societies in which they are found. Because of this, indi-
viduals have choices regarding which group norms they will follow, even in
matters of religion. A particular person may, for instance, choose to apply
scientific norms to her religious beliefs,  as do (for example) religiously-
1 See chap. 6, ‘Religion and Criticism’.
2 V. J. Stenger,  God and the Folly of Faith: The Incompatibility of Science
and Religion (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2012), p. 26.
3 P. Burke, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities’, His-
tory of European Ideas, 7 (1986), pp. 439–51, on p. 444.
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committed sociologists of religion, when acting in their professional capa-
city. 
As this example suggests, communal norms are often associated with
particular social roles. In modern societies, individuals not only belong to
different  communities,  with their  own norms,  but  they also have a  di-
versity of roles. As sociologists have noted, these can involve very differ-
ent, even conflicting expectations.1 But because the roles are different, be-
ing exercised on different occasions with different communities, individu-
als may not notice the conflict. Take, for instance, a devout Christian lay
preacher who is also a scientist. There could be a real conflict between the
epistemic norms governing such a person’s scientific work and those gov-
erning her preparation of a sermon. But the individual may never notice
the difference, since the two activities are exercised on different occasions
and in very different contexts. From that person’s point of view, the two
activities may seem quite compatible. We can see, once again, why the ob-
servation that individual scientists are also believers is of little signific-
ance. It says nothing about the epistemic norms governing religious and
scientific  communities or about  the modes of  thought that characterize
each set of practices.
4.  Goals and Means
My aim in writing this book is to revive the old conflict thesis, in a some-
what more nuanced form, or at least to convince you it was not entirely
mistaken. There is a deep divide between the world of science and that of
faith, a fact that is illustrated by the clash between Galileo and his ecclesi-
astical opponents. That divide is not bridged by focusing on the doctrines
of religion and science and observing that the pronouncements of religious
authorities and scientists sometimes agree. The conflict between Galileo
and the Church was not resolved when the Church accepted Copernican
astronomy, any more than it had been resolved by Galileo’s apparent ac-
ceptance of the Church’s decree. Nor is the divide bridged by the observa-
1 R.  L.  Coser,  ‘The  Complexity  of  Roles  as  a  Seedbed  of  Individual
Autonomy’, in L. A. Coser (ed.),  The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in
Honor  of  Robert  K.  Merton  (New  York:  Harcourt  Brace  Jovanovich,
1975), pp. 237–63, on p. 238.
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tion that scientific and religious communities overlap. Yes, there are, and
have always been, scientists who are themselves religious. But so what?
The real divide is to be found on the level of epistemic norms: expectations
regarding claims to knowledge.
A distinction made by the sociologist Robert Merton may be helpful in
this context. Merton begins his essay on social structure and anomie by
discussing two of the elements that make up a social structure. The first
consists of what he calls the ‘culturally defined goals,  purposes and in-
terests’, which are ‘held out as legitimate objectives’ for the members of a
particular  society.  The second has to  do  with ‘the  acceptable  modes of
reaching out for these goals’.1 For the purposes of this essay I shall assume
that  religious  and  scientific  communities  form  identifiable  subgroups
within the wider society. I shall also assume that they have both distinct-
ive goals and recognized means of attaining those goals. My argument will
be that while religious and scientific communities have at least one epi-
stemic goal in common, they differ radically in their view of how that goal
may legitimately be attained. 
Let me begin with the common epistemic goal. The goals of religious
and scientific communities are by no means identical, but they do overlap.
One goal they have in common is that of attaining knowledge. If science
makes progress, it is by extending our knowledge of the world.2 Religious
communities may not think of themselves as ‘making progress’ – an inter-
esting difference in itself – but they do regard themselves as imparting
knowledge.  To  use  categories  derived  from  the  ‘speech  act’  theory  de-
veloped by John Searle,3 some utterances within the fields of both religion
and science function as assertives. They purport to be stating facts. In the
case of religious utterances, the facts they purport to state are not neces-
sarily facts about supernatural beings. A statement about the life of the
Buddha, for example, is a statement of fact, even if it is not understood as
1 R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Enlarged Edition (New
York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 186–87.
2 A. Bird, ‘What is Scientific Progress?’,  Noûs 41 (2007), pp. 64–89, on p.
67.
3 J. R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civiliza-
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 59.
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referring to a divine being. The statement that Jesus was put to death un-
der Pontius Pilate,  the Roman governor of  Judaea,  is  contained in the
creed established at the Council of Nicaea (AD 325). But if true, it refers to
a simple fact of history.
Religious  utterances  have,  of  course,  other  functions,  in  addition  to
their assertive role. Take, for instance, the Muslim  shahāda, the profes-
sion of faith:
I bear witness that there is no God but God, and Muhammad is the
messenger of God.
When a convert to Islam pronounces this formula, he is not only stating
what he believes to be a fact (making an assertion). He is also uttering a
commissive, committing himself to a certain way of life. Indeed when pro-
nounced formally before witnesses, it can also be what Searle calls a  de-
claration, bringing about a new state of affairs, for it is the act by which
one becomes a Muslim, with all the rights and duties this entails. (One is
now entitled, for instance, to make the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca.) But
the fact that religious utterances serve more than one function does not
undermine the claim that they are assertives. Insofar as they are assert-
ives, they have something in common with the statements of scientists.
They claim to be expressing and imparting knowledge.
Not only do religious and scientific communities have a common epi-
stemic goal, but their claims to knowledge sometimes overlap. Using a fa-
miliar philosophical distinction,1 we can say that some religious and sci-
entific utterances would (if true) have a common referent, even when that
referent is described very differently. In saying this, I  am rejecting the
strong version of the independence view I mentioned earlier: that defen-
ded by Stephen Jay Gould. Gould, you may recall, holds that religion and
science  have  ‘non-overlapping  magisteria’  (NOMA).  Religious  and  sci-
entific  claims,  on  this  view,  have  quite  distinct  referents.  ‘The  net  of
science’, Gould writes, ‘covers the empirical universe: what is it made of
(fact) and why does it work this way (theory)’, while ‘the net of religion
extends over questions of moral meaning and value’.2 
1 G.  Frege,  ‘Sense  and  Reference’  (1892),  The  Philosophical  Review 57
(1948), pp. 209–30, on p. 210.
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It is true that religious doctrines sometimes speak of a distinct, spir-
itual realm, with regard to which scientists claim no expertise. Religions
also make moral claims of a kind that scientists generally avoid. But on
other occasions religious doctrines make this-worldly claims, about realit-
ies that also fall within the domain of science. An alleged miracle, for in-
stance, will be an event for which scientists could attempt to offer a nat-
ural explanation. Similarly, a claim about a certain historical event (such
as the death of Jesus) will relate to facts with which secular historians
may also deal. The idea that religion and science have non-overlapping
magisteria is a popular one, with a venerable history. It  dates back at
least as far as Cardinal Baronius’s quip, cited by Galileo, that the inten-
tion of Scripture was ‘to teach us how one goes to heaven and not how
heaven goes’.1 But such separation of powers was not acceptable to the
Church in the seventeenth century, nor is it acceptable today.2
What  is  important  to  note  here  is  that  while  two communities  may
share a common epistemic goal, they may disagree about how that goal is
to be attained. One might think that communities having a common goal
would, over time, converge on the most efficient way of attaining it. But
even if there is a most efficient way of attaining knowledge, such as some
form of scientific method, a particular community may refuse to adopt it.
It  may be  considered unacceptable  for reasons related  to  what  Merton
calls a community’s ‘value-laden sentiments’.3 It may be, for instance, that
a critical attitude towards historical records is best way of attaining know-
ledge of the past. But a religious community may refuse to allow such an
attitude towards its Sacred Scripture. In other words, while technical effi-
ciency may play  some role in the choice of a means, so will the institu-
tional norms of the group in question. 
2 S.  J.  Gould,  ‘Nonoverlapping Magisteria’,  The Skeptical  Inquirer, 23:4
(Jul/Aug 1999), pp. 55–61, on p. 58.
1 G. Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’ (1615), in Finocchiaro
(ed.), The Galileo Affair, pp. 87–118, on p. 96.
2 See  chap.  4,  ‘The  Scope  of  Biblical  Authority’  and  ‘Has  Anything
Changed?’.
3 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 187.
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My argument will focus on one set of institutional norms, which have to
do with knowledge. These norms find expression in both the attitudes of
individuals and the collective procedures of the groups in question. My ex-
amination of the Galileo affair in the opening chapters of this work will re-
veal these collective procedures at work. The later chapters will uncover
the normative attitudes characteristic of each field through a study of the
writings of theologians, philosophers, and scientists. What I shall show is
that while religious and scientific communities may come into occasional
conflict on the level of particular doctrines, they are always at odds when
it comes to their differing epistemic norms.
It will not be enough, however, to show the existence of these differing
norms. We also need to understand what lies behind them. These differ-
ences, I shall argue, are rooted in a particular belief,  shared by all scrip-
turally based religions. It is the belief that the faithful have access to a
source of knowledge distinct from, and more reliable than, human reason.
The epistemic norms of scientific communities, by way of contrast, assume
that all we have is fallible human reason. What does this mean? It means
that religion and science represent two very different ways of thinking
about how we attain knowledge of ourselves and our world. These differ-
ences have led the religious and scientific communities into substantive
conflicts in the past, and they are likely to lead to more conflicts in the fu-
ture.
I expect this claim to meet with resistance. It will meet with resistance
from those fellow academics who have spent more than thirty years com-
bating what they see as Draper and White’s ‘warfare’ thesis. But it will
also meet with resistance from a wider audience, who both admire the
modern sciences and have a certain respect for religion. Not all these read-
ers will consider themselves religious, but they may suspect religion is, on
the whole, a good thing, at least for other people. Such readers will want
religion and science to be in harmony. They will resist the idea that reli-
gion and science represent irreconcilable attitudes to knowledge, whose
peaceful coexistence can never be guaranteed. 
I understand this view, since I once held it myself. I was quite confident
that there was no conflict between religion and science, or at least no con-
flict  that could not be eliminated,  with a  bit  of  goodwill  on both sides.
Sadly, however, merely  wanting something to be true does not make it
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true. The evidence I am about to present eventually convinced me I was
wrong. Will the same evidence convince you? It remains to be seen. But I
hope it will at least give pause for thought to those who so confidently re-
ject the conflict thesis.
5.  The Way Ahead
How, then, shall I argue my case? I shall begin by examining the view of
the universe that dominated medieval European thought. This cosmology
was, in its origins, pagan: it was developed by Greek thinkers before the
rise of Christianity. Despite an initial period of hostility towards Greek
philosophy, medieval Christians eventually came to incorporate this cos-
mology into their Christian faith. They achieved what appears (at first
sight) to be a remarkable marriage between religion and science. But it
was an uneasy marriage. By the late medieval period, natural philosoph-
ers – as scientists were then called1 – were operating in ways that were at
least partly independent of Church authority. In response to this, religious
authorities insisted that the claims of natural philosophy must be subser-
vient to those of theology. This led to a series of conflicts in the thirteenth
century, centred on the University of Paris, which hinted at the difficulties
to come.
In the sixteenth century this uneasy marriage began to fall apart. The
critical event here was the emergence of a new cosmology, that of Nicolaus
Copernicus (1473–1543),  whose astronomical  system involved a  central
sun and a moving earth. This proposal met with resistance from Coperni-
cus’s contemporaries. Only some of this opposition was religious, for there
were,  on the face of  it,  good scientific  reasons to reject  the Copernican
view. But it also met with religious opposition, the most famous instance
of which was the trial of Galileo. 
The Church’s objections to Copernicus’s theory centred on the interpret-
ation of  the Bible, since there were a  number of biblical  passages that
seemed irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  a  stationary  sun and  a  moving
earth. This gave rise to two questions. First, what is the scope of biblical
1 The term ‘scientist’ dates from a much later period, its first recorded use
being in 1834, apparently by William Whewell. See S. Ross, ‘Scientist:
The Story of a Word’, Annals of Science 18 (1962), pp. 65–85, on p. 71. 
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authority: does it cover scientific as well as religious questions? Second,
what is to be done in the case of such apparent conflicts? With regard to
apparent conflicts, there was one principle everyone accepted. It was that
if  the scientific theory in question had been conclusively demonstrated,
then it was permissible to reinterpret the Bible. If, on the other hand, the
scientific theory remained uncertain, then the literal sense of the Bible
should prevail.
There is, however, a problem with this view. If it comes to a competition
between the certainties of faith and the fallible theories of science, it is not
hard to see which is going to win. Galileo tried to find the demonstrative
proof of the Copernican view that the Church demanded, but seems to
have realized that it was, for the moment, unobtainable. Scientists today
do not even hope for demonstrative proof for their theories. Leading reli-
gious thinkers, on the other hand, continue to claim the same degree of
certainty for their beliefs that was claimed by Galileo’s opponents in the
sixteenth century. 
These  contrasting  attitudes  towards  knowledge  have  real-world  con-
sequences. The most important has to do with the role of critical thought
in  religion  and  science.  Religions  are  bound  to  what  I  shall  call  their
‘foundational myths’ in a way that finds no parallel in the world of the sci-
ences. Some religious believers do think critically about these narratives,
which are embodied in Sacred Scripture, but they are not permitted to
challenge their authority. In the world of the sciences, by way of contrast,
there are no beliefs that are sacrosanct: even the most fundamental prin-
ciples of science are open to criticism and revision. Indeed the sciences op-
erate on the assumption that our most well-established theories may one
day be overthrown. 
What lies behind these contrasting attitudes? It is, I shall argue, the
believer’s claim to be in a possession of a source of knowledge that is dis-
tinct from human reason. The beliefs drawn from this source are accepted
by an act of faith rather than on the basis of evidence and arguments.
Since they are thought to be of divine origin, they are regarded as having
a greater degree of certainty than any ‘merely human’ claim to knowledge.
To illustrate this idea, I shall outline a traditional Christian conception of
religious faith, as found in the work of the late medieval philosopher and
theologian, St Thomas Aquinas. 
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A critical reader will already be raising objections to this line of argu-
ment. But at least some of these objections will be addressed. There are
two, in particular, that I shall consider. The first objection is that religious
faith is not unique in this respect. There are many beliefs, it could be ar-
gued, that we hold in an equally uncritical manner. These are sometimes
described  as  ‘hinge beliefs’,  since  they  are  the basic  assumptions upon
which our lives turn. Is religious belief really so different from these? More
seriously, do scientists not also make acts of faith, different in content but
comparable in form to those made by religious believers?
The second objection is that my view of science is naïve, that it embod-
ies a false ideal of scientific openness and objectivity. Firstly, the scientific
community seems to have its own orthodoxy. It, too, one might argue, is
intolerant of heretics, having beliefs that members are not permitted to
question.  Secondly,  scientists  often  go  beyond  making  simple  factual
claims. They present their theories as grand narratives, which ought to
shape our view of what it means to be human. Science, in other words, of-
ten functions as a religion. But if this is true, then religion and science are
much closer than I am suggesting.
These are serious objections to my view, and addressing them will in-
volve some philosophical reflection. But as we shall see, they do not under-
mine my case. It remains true that religious and scientific communities
exhibit differing epistemic norms. Do these differences amount to a con-
flict? Yes, they do, but it is a very particular kind of conflict. The teachings
of science and those of religion can often be reconciled. Nor is there any ne-
cessary conflict between religious and scientific communities. Even today,
scientists and believers can achieve a  modus vivendi.  But the scientific
community operates on the assumption that we have no source of know-
ledge other than human reason. Reason may be a dim candle, but it is all
we have to light our way. Scripturally based religions, on the other hand,
claim a source of knowledge that is distinct from and superior to human
reason. When the knowledge derived from faith comes into conflict with
science, it is science that must give way.
This leads me to my conclusion: that scripturally based religions not
only claim a source of knowledge that is independent of human reason,
but regard that knowledge very differently. In particular, they are bound
by tradition, insist upon the certainty of their claims, and are resistant to
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criticism in ways that the sciences are not. It is this attitude that leads to
conflict between religion and science. There is no sign that these religious
attitudes are altering. Indeed what we see around us are increasingly vig-
orous reaffirmations of traditional religious claims to authority and cer-
tainty.  While  these  traditional  norms  remain  in  force,  new  conflicts
between religion and science could arise at any time.
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1. BEFORE COPERNICUS
Let me begin with a picture, a snapshot, as it were. It is taken about a
hundred years before the publication of the theory that would prompt the
trial of Galileo, that of Nicolaus Copernicus. The content of the snapshot is
late medieval cosmology: the view of the universe that was commonly ac-
cepted  among European Christians by  the fifteenth century.  What the
snapshot reveals is a remarkable marriage of pagan cosmology and Chris-
tian faith. This marriage took a long time to achieve and the relationship
had not always been a happy one. Yet by the mid-fifteenth century the
partners had found a way of living together, more or less in harmony.
1.1  Ptolemy and his Medieval Followers
The general outline of the late medieval view of the universe goes back at
least as far as the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–22 BC). It was
first worked out in detail by the astronomer Hipparchus of Nicaea (190–
120 BC). But it was given canonical expression in the second-century work
known as the Almagest, written by the astronomer Claudius Ptolemaeus
(AD 90–168).  Ptolemy,  as  he  is  known,  wrote  this  work under the title
Mathematical Treatise, an entirely appropriate title given its use of soph-
isticated geometrical arguments. At a later date, the book seems to have
become known as the Great Treatise:  in Greek,  megistē syntaxis. This, in
turn, gave rise to its Arabic title al-kitāb al-majastī, where the phrase al-
kitāb means simply ‘the book’. It is from this Arabic title that we have the
Westernized form Almagest.1 
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  think  that  most  late  medieval
Europeans were familiar with Ptolemy’s great work. Like many scientific
ideas  today,  his  conception  of  the  universe  was  widely  known only  at
second  hand.  Even a  highly  educated  thinker  like  the  Florentine  poet
Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) had probably never read Ptolemy’s work for
1 G.  J.  Toomer,  ‘Introduction’,  in  Ptolemy’s  Almagest,  tr.  G.  J.  Toomer,
Duckworth Classical, Medieval and Renaissance Editions (London: Duck-
work, 1984), pp. 1–26, on pp. 1–2.
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himself.1 Even if he had access to it,2 he would probably not have under-
stood its technical details, which were beyond the comprehension of those
lacking a specialised mathematical training. Neither Copernicus nor Ga-
lileo lacked mathematical skill and it is the more complex version of Ptole-
maic cosmology to which they were responding. But it is the simpler ver-
sion of the Ptolemaic vision that was influential in the wider culture.
1.1.1  Popular Cosmology
There  were  a  number  of  popular  works that  transmitted  the basics  of
Ptolemaic astronomy to a wider audience. So even if few people had read
Ptolemy himself, we should not underestimate how widespread this know-
ledge was. Mary Orr, for instance, writes that while ‘the average educated
man’ of Dante’s time would have had little of the technical details of astro-
nomy, there are many things he would have been aware of. These include
the idea
that the earth is a globe, motionless at the centre of the universe, and
smaller than any of the stars; he would know the names of the seven
planets (including among these the sun and the moon), and probably
also their colours, their periods, and their astrological significance; the
zodiacal constellations would be familiar, especially as they were often
used decoratively; and he would believe that stars and planets are set in
crystalline transparent spheres.3
We should remember, too, that pre-modern Europeans had neither street
lighting  nor  easily  accessible  timepieces.  As  a  result,  they  were  more
aware than we are of the appearance of the night sky, the phases of the
moon, and the daily and seasonal movements of the sun.
Among  the  popular  works  that  transmitted  Ptolemy’s  theory  to  the
wider culture was a book entitled  Tractate on the Sphere by Giovanni di
Sacrobosco. This was first published about 1230, and became a standard
textbook in the late medieval and early modern universities. It continued
to be printed and widely used even in the seventeenth century, well after
1 Mary A. Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers (London: Gall and Inglis,
1913) p. 223.
2 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 232.
3 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 219.
38
 1.1.1  Popular Cosmology
the development  of  Copernican astronomy.1 The  De sphaera (as  it  was
known) was an influential work, but it  was hardly a sophisticated one.
One scholar describes it as a ‘slavish copy’ of ‘an elementary Arabic treat-
ise’.2 But it also contains practically all the cosmological information ‘that
ever became common knowledge among nonastronomers’.3
The De sphaera begins with an overall description of the cosmos, which
it describes as consisting of nine spheres. (The precise number of spheres
varies, even in different editions of the work.) The outer sphere is that of
the primum mobile, or the first mover. The next, as we move inwards, is
that  of  the  fixed  stars.  Beneath  this  outermost  sphere  there  are  the
spheres of the seven planets, the largest being that of Saturn, followed (in
decreasing order of size) by Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and
the Moon. These spheres constitute the heavenly world, which is immut-
able, free from all change. At the centre of the cosmos is the earth, situ-
ated ‘in the middle of everything’. Surrounding the earth is a circle of wa-
ter, above which is a circle of air, and, above that, a circle of pure, undis-
turbed fire reaching to the orbit of the Moon. Outside the nine spheres
lay... Well, we shall come to that in due course, since it was natural philo-
sophy and theology, not astronomy, that shed light on what lay beyond the
observable universe.
1.1.2  The Universe of the Astronomers
Sacrobosco’s De sphaera offers a simplified view of the Ptolemaic vision of
the  cosmos  and  we  should  not  judge  pre-Copernican  astronomy  by  its
standards, To do so would be like forming an assessment of twenty-first
century physics by reading a popular introductory text. But even the De
sphaera contains some hint of the more complex mechanisms employed by
Ptolemaic astronomers. 
1 H. Nussbaumer and L. Bieri, Discovering the Expanding Universe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 7.
2 T. S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the De-
velopment  of  Western  Thought (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University
Press, 1957), p. 124.
3 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 54.
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Ptolemy was no fool. His view of the cosmos may have been mistaken,
but it rested on careful observation and sophisticated calculations. Hip-
parchus seems to have been the first to match a cosmological model with
numerical data regarding the movement of the heavens,1 and Ptolemy fol-
lowed in his footsteps. The systems to which his work gave birth could be-
come very complicated. But all I want to note here are three of the devices
that Ptolemy and his followers employed to reconcile this model of the uni-
verse with observations. 
Ptolemy and his followers had inherited from Plato and Aristotle the
belief that the movements of the heavenly bodies ought to be both circular
and uniform.2 The devices we are about to examine were ways of reconcil-
ing these  traditional  assumptions with the observed movements of  the
planets and stars. The devices seem awkward and we might wonder why
no one questioned the assumptions on which they were based.3 But in fact
no astronomer rejected the idea of uniform circular motion until the work
of Johannes Kepler, who was a contemporary of Galileo. (Kepler, of course,
discovered that the planetary orbits were elliptical.) Copernicus continued
to take the traditional view for granted and even Galileo did not abandon
it.4 Ptolemy and his  followers certainly  insisted  on it.  Ptolemy himself
1 J.  Franklin,  The Science of  Conjecture:  Evidence and Probability  (Bal-
timore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 135; see also A.
Jones, ‘The Adaptation of Babylonian Methods in Greek Numerical As-
tronomy’, Isis, 82 (1991), pp. 440–53, on p. 442.
2 Ptolemy, Almagest, III 3; ET: Ptolemy’s Almagest, tr. G. J. Toomer, Duck-
worth  Classical,  Medieval  and  Renaissance  Editions  (London:  Duck-
worth, 1984), p. 141.
3 E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (1950), tr. C.
Dikshoorn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 65.
4 G. Galilei,  Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems – Ptole-
maic and Copernican (1632), tr. S. Drake, 2nd edition (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1967), p. 32; ‘Reply to Ingoli’, p. 195. Maurice
Clavelin holds that Galileo had what seemed to him good physical reas-
ons for this assumption, but it remains a traditional assumption. See M.
Clavelin,  The Natural Philosophy of Galileo: Essay on the Origins and
Formation of Classical Mechanics (1968), tr. A. J. Pomerans (Cambridge,
40
 1.1.2  The Universe of the Astronomers
wrote that ‘uniform circular motions’ are the only motions that are ‘proper
to the nature of divine beings’,1 the heavens themselves being regarded
here as in some sense divine.
The first of the devices used by Ptolemy and his followers to reconcile
theory with observation – to ‘save the appearances’ (as they put it) – is the
eccentric orbit. The orbits of the planets were thought of as forming circles
that were ‘off-centre’, as it were, when seen in relation to the universe as a
whole. More precisely, they were circles that included the centre of the
universe but whose centre did not coincide with that of the universe.2 Ap-
plied to the sun, for instance, the idea that its orbit was eccentric could ac-
count for the fact that the seasons do not have equal length. In the north-
ern hemisphere, the sun takes approximately eight days longer to travel
through the summer half of the year (from the spring to the autumnal
equinox) than through the winter half of the year (from the autumnal to
the spring equinox). The proposed eccentric orbit meant that for part of
the year the sun was farther from the earth. Since it was assumed that it
travelled at constant speed, this could account for the differences in the
seasons.
Figure 1: Planet-Deferent & Epicycle (De Sphaera 1543) Cap-
tion: ‘An illustration of a planet (here resembling a star) moving on 
an epicycle, whose deferent is an eccentric orbit, from a 1543 edition 
of Sacrobosco’s De Sphaera.’
The second of the devices designed to reconcile theory with observation
is the epicycle. This is most simply thought of a circle upon a circle: as a
smaller orbit whose centre lies on a fixed point on the larger orbit, the
centre of which is (approximately) the earth. These epicycles were useful
in accounting for the apparent retrograde movement of the planets: the
fact that the planets occasionally stop their forward movement and re-
verse direction for a time before continuing their movement forward. But
minor epicycles were also used to account for other observed aspects of
planetary motion, including that of the sun and moon. 
MA: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 211–12) 
1 Ptolemy, Almagest, IX 2 (Ptolemy’s Almagest, p. 420).
2 Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, p. 55.
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The  final  and  most  radical  amendment  –  one  to  which  Copernicus
would  take  exception  as  a  matter  of  principle  –  was  the  equant.  This
device was used to preserve the assumption that the speed at which the
heavenly bodies revolved was uniform. The problem is that their speed is
often not uniform, when measured from the centre of their orbits.1 But it
can be seen as uniform with respect to an ‘equant point’, which is itself off-
centre. The equant is, therefore, a point in empty space, whose sole pur-
pose is that of preserving the principle of uniform motion. It is this device,
in particular, that pushes at the limits of the received Aristotelian cosmo-
logy. While it preserves the Aristotelian assumptions, it looks like a des-
perate expedient.2
1.2  The Marriage of Ptolemy and Christ
Once Ptolemy and his followers combined these various devices, their as-
tronomical systems could become exceedingly complex. Fortunately, the
complexity of their calculations need not detain us. At least until I come to
deal with Copernicus, it will suffice to keep in mind the simpler vision of
the Ptolemaic cosmos that  we find  expressed in works such as the  De
sphaera.  As  I  noted  a  moment  ago,  such introductory  works  were  the
means by which the Ptolemaic vision of the cosmos was introduced to the
wider culture, and an important part of that culture was religious. 
The Aristotelian and Ptolemaic conceptions of the cosmos were not de-
veloped by Christian thinkers, but late medieval Christian thinkers read-
ily adopted them. Indeed what is striking is how easily they found it to re-
concile pagan cosmology with Christian thought. In order to bring about
the marriage of Ptolemy and Christ, all they needed was a little exegetical
skill. This, of course, is something that theologians have never lacked.
1.2.1  Ptolemy and Genesis
Their exegetical skill was applied, above all, to the creation account found
in the first chapter of the biblical book of Genesis. Late medieval inter-
preters for the most part felt bound to a literal interpretation of the Gen-
1 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 71.
2 Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, p. 59.
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esis story.1 But even when insisting, wherever possible, on the literal sense
of the text, commentators found ways of bringing the Bible and natural
philosophy into some sort of harmony.
Genesis 1, for example, speaks of a ‘heaven’ created on the first day.
Some interpreters regarded this as the immobile ‘empyrean’ heaven. This
was thought to lie beyond the sphere of the fixed stars and, therefore, out-
side the bounds of the observable universe. Other commentators regarded
the  heaven  created  on  the  first  day  as  the  entirety  of  the  heavenly
spheres,  down  to  and  including  that  of  the  moon. Similarly,  Genesis
speaks of a ‘firmament’, which was established by God on the second of the
six days of creation. Medieval interpreters could understand this as either
the outermost mobile  sphere –  the sphere of  the fixed stars, as it  was
known – or as ‘that part of the air in which clouds condense’.2
A little more exegetical skill was required to deal with the biblical ‘wa-
ters above the firmament’ (Gen 1:7). Most late medieval commentators,
following St Augustine,3 believed that this reference must be understood
literally.4 If the firmament is that part of the air in which clouds condense,
there is not too much difficulty. The waters above the firmament could be
the very same waters that condense and come down as rain. But if the
firmament is the sphere of the fixed stars, then it is a little more difficult
to explain why there are waters in that place or what kind of waters they
are. Here medieval commentators were divided. Some held that these wa-
1 H. R. Lemay, ‘Science and Theology at Chartres: The Case of the Supra-
celestial  Waters’,  The  British  Journal  for  the  History  of  Science,  10
(1977), pp. 226–36, on p. 227–28, 231.
2 E.  Grant,  Planets,  Stars,  and  Orbs:  the  Medieval  Cosmos  1200–1687
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 95–96. The quoted
phrase is that of Thomas Aquinas, who speaks of illa pars aeris in qua
condensantur nubes (Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 96 n. 45).
3 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram book 2, chap. 5; ET: The Literal Mean-
ing of Genesis,  tr. J. H. Taylor SJ, Ancient Christian Writers 41 (New
York, NY: Newman, 1982), vol 1, p. 52.
4 Grant,  Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 103. An exception here was William
of Conches, who argued that the existence of such waters was physically
impossible (Lemay, ‘Science and Theology at Chartres’, pp. 231–32).
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ters, although perhaps unlike terrestrial water, were nonetheless fluid.1
Others held that they were crystallized, existing in a form similar to ice,2
an idea that gave rise to belief in an extra ‘crystalline sphere’.3 This, then,
was a theologically motivated addition to the Ptolemaic scheme.
The other theologically motivated addition to Ptolemy was one I have
already mentioned: the empyrean heaven. It was an addition in the sense
that whatever the number (n) of mobile orbs, ‘the empyrean orb was al-
ways numbered  n+1’.4 But  it  was an addition in the sense that,  while
adding to the pagan cosmology of Ptolemy, was not inconsistent with it.
The other addition I mentioned – the empyrean heaven – became particu-
larly important for Christian belief. Many commentators regarded this as
‘the dwelling of God and of all the elect’,5 although it was often thought of
as a dwelling-place for angels as well. (The angels were often regarded as
having another cosmological role, that of moving the heavenly spheres,6 so
they were not confined to heaven.) It follows that the addition of the em-
pyrean heaven gave the Christian God what was quite literally a home
within the Ptolemaic system.
But it is not just the structure of the ancient cosmos that could be un-
derstood  in  Christian terms.  A  theological  interpretation could  also  be
offered of  celestial  dynamics.  In his  Metaphysics,  Aristotle  had already
suggested that the outermost sphere, that of the fixed stars, was moved by
a mover who was himself unmoved.7 But this created a new puzzle: how
could something move the outermost sphere, if it were not moving itself?
Aristotle’s answer is to note that objects of desire move us in this precisely
1 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 333.
2 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 104.
3 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 332.
4 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 371.
5 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 371 n. 4.
6 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 527.
7 This was not  the only ‘Aristotelian’  view.  In  On the Heavens,  book 1,
chaps 2–3 (De caelo 268b-270b) Aristotle adopts a different conception of
heavenly movements, seeing these as ‘natural’. See R. C. Dales, ‘The De-
Animation of the Heavens in the Middle Ages’, Journal of the History of
Ideas, 41 (1980), pp. 531–50, on pp. 531–32.
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way, without being moved themselves. They move us by being both good
and beautiful: it is for this reason that we love them and seek to move to-
wards them. It follows, then, that the prime mover is a ‘final cause’, one
for the sake of which movement occurs, even though it does not itself move.
As Aristotle himself puts it, ‘the final cause... produces motion by being
loved’.1 This means, of course, that the spheres must either themselves be
thought of as living beings, having a soul, or they must be associated with
personal movers of their own, who can be attracted to the beautiful and
the good. Some combination of these two views was also possible.2
In any case, it was a relatively small step to identify Aristotle’s prime
mover  with  the  Christian  God.3 It  is  true  that  while  Aristotle’s  prime
mover was divine, he was a self-absorbed divinity, interested only in the
contemplation of his own perfection. This deity had little concern for hu-
man beings, a fact that distinguished him from the Christian God. (One of
the Aristotelian propositions condemned by Church authorities in 1277
was the idea that ‘God knows nothing other than himself’.4) But this was
no insuperable obstacle to the Christian appropriation of Aristotelian cos-
mology. God could not merely be loved by his creatures; he could (with a
little metaphysical sleight of hand) also be said to love them. 5 It was con-
venient, too, that Aristotle had located his prime mover on the circumfer-
ence of the cosmos, where he could move the outermost sphere.6 This could
now become the dwelling-place of the Christian deity, in the immobile em-
pyrean heaven.
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 12, chap. 7 (Metaphysica 1072b).
2 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 516–517.
3 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 519.
4 Proposition 3; see ‘The Debates regarding Aristotle’, below.
5 I say ‘with a little metaphysical sleight of hand’ because theologians in-
fluenced by Aristotle continued to deny that God was actually affected by
his creatures. A common view, which is reflected in Aquinas’s  Summa
contra Gentiles (book 2, chap. 12), was that while the creature has a real
relation (relatio realis) to God, God’s relation to his creatures can be only
conceptual (relatio rationis). I can still recall how shocked I was, as a stu-
dent of theology, to discover this doctrine.
6 Aristotle, Physics, book 8, chap. 10 (Physica 267b).
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1.2.2  The Christian Cosmos of Dante Alighieri
The apparent harmony between Christian belief and medieval cosmology
is beautifully illustrated in the work of Dante Alighieri. In his autobio-
graphical work, Vita nuova, Dante refers to the existence of the nine heav-
enly spheres that we find described Sacrobosco’s De sphaera. Revealingly,
he cites as evidence for their existence not merely Ptolemy but also Chris-
tian belief, as if the existence of these nine spheres were itself an article of
faith.1 ‘According to Ptolemy and according to the truth of Christianity’, he
writes, ‘nine are the heavens that move’.2 But the marriage between pa-
gan cosmology and Christian belief is particularly evident in Dante’s epic
poem, the  Divine Comedy. Here Dante is taken first by the Roman poet
Virgil and then – since Virgil is a pagan and cannot enter heaven – by his
former love, Beatrice, on a tour of the late medieval cosmos.
They descend, first of all, into hell (l’inferno), which is located in the
centre of the earth. As they approach the centre, the home of the devil, the
force of gravity increases as Aristotelian physics predicts.3 They emerge
from this journey through the earth in the Antipodes, where Dante (with
poetic  licence) has placed purgatory (il  purgatorio)  on an island in the
southern sea, which was created by the dry land that fled from Satan as
he fell from heaven.4 On that island there is a mountain reaching into the
upper regions of the sublunary sphere. At the top of this mountain is the
location of the Garden of Eden, raised above the disturbances of the lower
atmosphere  so  that  Adam and Eve (before  the Fall)  might  not  be  dis-
turbed. On the summit of that mountain Dante can feel a constant and
gentle breeze coming from the east. That breeze, it turns out, is caused by
the movement of the air being drawn around by the celestial spheres.5 A
more vivid depiction of the workings of the Ptolemaic cosmos could hardly
be imagined. Dante and Beatrice then proceed one by one through the
heavenly spheres, where they encounter the various grades of the blessed.
1 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 432.
2 Dante, Vita nuova, chap. 24 (30).
3 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 481.
4 Dante, La divina commedia, Inferno, canto 34, lines 121–24.
5 Dante, La divina commedia, Purgatorio, canto 28, lines 103–8.
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It is not merely the structure of the Ptolemaic universe that is reflected
in Dante’s writings; one can glimpse, too, features of its celestial dynam-
ics.  Dante believes, like many of his contemporaries, that the heavenly
spheres are moved by angels. In another work, the Convivio, Dante argues
that the ‘nine orders of spiritual creatures’ corresponds to the number of
the number of heavenly spheres. As he writes,
it is reasonable to believe that the movers of the heaven of the Moon are
of the order of the Angels, and those of Mercury are the Archangels, and
those of Venus are the Thrones; all of whom, receiving their nature from
the love of the Holy Spirit, perform their operation, which is which is
connatural to them, that is to say, the movement of that heaven, full of
love.1
Even if he had never read Ptolemy’s Almagest, Dante had more than a
cursory  knowledge  of  Ptolemaic  astronomy,  probably  derived  from the
writings  of  Alfraganus  (al-Farghani),  a  ninth-century  Persian  astro-
nomer.2 We see this in his descriptions of Venus, where Dante assigns an
individual angel to the each of the three movements of the planet.3 One
angel took care of the planet’s deferent (its circuit of the earth), another its
epicycle (the path it traces around a point on the deferent), and a third its
‘precession’ (the very gradual shift in its orbital path).4 
Ultimately, of course, these celestial dynamics require a prime mover,
who  moves  without  himself  being  moved.  When he  reaches  heaven (il
paradiso), Dante is moved to make a profession of faith, which begins
I believe in one God,
unique and eternal,
who moves the entire heaven,
being unmoved himself,
with love and with desire.5
1 Dante, Convivio, treatise 2, chap. 6 (translation my own).
2 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, pp. 233–34.
3 Dante, Convivio, treatise 2, chap. 6.
4 Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 483.
5 Dante, La divina commedia, Paradiso, canto 24, lines 130–32.
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He is then privileged with a vision of the divine essence, which he de-
scribes (memorably) as ‘the love that moves the sun and other stars’.1 It is
true that the term ‘love’ here apparently refers to God’s love for his cre-
ation, whereas in a pure Aristotelian physics it would refer to the love of
creatures for God. But these lines are not merely metaphorical: ‘the sun
and other stars’ are quite literally ‘moved’ by the love of God. It is difficult
to imagine a more striking expression of the marriage between religion
and science in late medieval Europe.
1.3  Between Athens and Jerusalem
This snapshot will be attractive to those who oppose the conflict thesis, for
it suggests that religion and science can live in harmony. But the history
of  their  relationship  shows that  the  marriage  had  not  always  been so
happy and that the modus vivendi was achieved at a price. A marriage, of
course, requires two partners. In this case the two partners represent two
sources  of  knowledge:  Christian  faith  and  natural  philosophy.  But  the
partners in any marriage must negotiate their relationship. So the ques-
tion facing medieval Christians had been: is this marriage to be an equal
partnership? Or is one partner to be the dominant one, whose word will be
decisive in any dispute? This question became increasingly urgent in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The answer given left no room for doubt:
if it came to a conflict, natural philosophy must give way to faith.
1.3.1  The Need for a Marriage
In the first few centuries of Christian history, it was far from clear that
any modus vivendi would be achieved. Christianity emerged in a society in
which non-scientific modes of thought were becoming increasingly influen-
tial. It could be argued that this was one of the secrets of its success.2 The
age in which Christianity appeared was, as one author remarks, ‘an age of
anxiety’,3 in which the confidence and optimism of the classical and Hel-
1 Dante, La divina commedia, Paradiso, canto 33, line 145.
2 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Sather Classical Lectures 25
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1951), p. 249.
3 E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of
Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge:
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lenistic ages had been replaced by darker moods. The author of the Hippo-
cratic treatise On the Sacred Disease (ca. 400 BC) had described the mater-
ial world as ‘both divine and human’.1 But that same world now came to
be seen as dominated by evil powers.2 The self, too, was increasingly seen
in a  negative  light.  Human beings  were  no  longer  ‘the  measure  of  all
things’, a view Plato attributes to Protagoras of Abdera,3 but were felt to
be in need of liberation or redemption.4 As E. R. Dodds writes, in the world
of late antiquity, people were
increasingly preoccupied with techniques of individual salvation, some
relying on holy books alleged dictated in Eastern temples or dictated by
the voice of God to some inspired prophet, others seeking a personal rev-
elation by oracle, dream, or waking vision; others again looking for se-
curity in ritual, whether by initiation in one or more of the now numer-
ous ‘mysteria’ or by employing the services of a private magician.5
This mood did not affect everyone and there was some first-rate science
done during these centuries.6 It was, after all, the age in which Ptolemy
produced his masterpiece. But it was also an age whose dominant mood
was, at best, ambivalent about scientific knowledge. It is hardly surprising
if the Church Fathers shared this ambivalence.
At times early Christian writers expressed hostility to philosophical in-
quiry  (including  natural  philosophy)  and  suggested  Christians  should
avoid it. The most extreme expression of this attitude is found in the writ-
ings of Tertullian (A.D. 160–225), for whom ‘Athens’ represents philosophy
and ‘Jerusalem’ the Christian faith.
Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 3.
1 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 68.
2 Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, pp. 13–14.
3 Protagoras, DK 80B1 (Plato, Theaetetus, 151e). ‘DK’ references are those
found in H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.
4 Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, pp. 27–28, 100.
5 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 248.
6 M. Clagett,  Greek Science in Antiquity (1955; New York: Collier Books,
1963), pp. 143–47.
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What, therefore, has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What agreement is
there between the Academy and the Church? ... We want no curious dis-
putation after Christ Jesus, no questioning after enjoying the gospel.
Having believed, we desire no further belief.1 
But less extreme versions of  this view are to  be found in the works of
many Church Fathers.2 Basil the Great (AD 329–79) regards ancient cos-
mological  writings  as  ‘idle  chatter’,  and  is  happy  to  leave  the  natural
philosophers to  ‘refute one another’.3 Ambrose of Milan (AD 340–97) de-
scribes natural philosophy as vain, ‘perishable knowledge’, which ‘deceives
and deludes us in our attempts to explain the unexplainable’.4 In a similar
way, St Augustine regards all pagan knowledge as of little value when
compared to that found in Sacred Scripture. Indeed he even suggests that
Christians could dispense with such learning, since Sacred Scripture con-
tains all that we need. ‘What a person learns independently of scripture’,
he writes, ‘is condemned if it is harmful, but found there if it is useful’.5 
Other writers, however, and even the same writers at different times,
could express a more positive attitude, holding that Christians could make
cautious use of pagan learning. This attitude is found even in the New
Testament, in Luke’s depiction of St Paul’s visit to Athens. In this account,
the apostle meets with some Stoic and Epicurean philosophers and, seeing
an altar dedicated to an unknown God, proclaims, ‘What you worship as
1 Tertullian, Liber de praescriptione haereticorum, book 8, chap. 9 (transla-
tion my own).
2 P. Harrison,  The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Modern Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),  pp. 12–13.
3 Basil, Hexaemeron, homily 1, section 11; ET: St Basil: Exegetic Homilies,
tr. A. C. Way, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (New York:
Fathers of the Church, 1961), p. 19.
4 Ambrose, Hexaemeron, day 6, chap. 2, section 8, in St Ambrose: Hexaem-
eron, Paradise, and Cain and Abel, tr. J. J. Savage, The Fathers of the
Church: A New Translation (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1961), p.
262.
5 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, book 2, chap. 42, in St Augustine: On
Christian Teaching, tr. R. P. H. Green, The World’s Classics (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1997), p. 67.
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unknown, this I proclaim to you’ (Acts 17:23). But it is more clearly ex-
pressed  in  the  words  of  Origen  (AD 185–254),  who  urges  his  convert
Gregory Thaumaturgus to accept
such parts even of Greek philosophy as may serve for the ordinary ele-
mentary instruction of  our schools,  and be  a  kind of  preparation for
Christianity: also those portions of geometry and astronomy likely to be
of use in the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures, so that, what the
pupils  of  the  philosophers  say about  geometry  and music,  grammar,
rhetoric, and astronomy, viz. that they are the handmaidens of philo-
sophy, we may say of philosophy itself in relation to Christianity.1 
This is an early mention of an idea that would become widespread: that
philosophy  should  be  nothing  more  than  a  handmaid  to  theology.2
Gregory, writes Origen, should make us of this learning for the sake of in-
terpreting Sacred Scripture. 
Along with the handmaiden metaphor, Origen employs another image
that would become commonplace: that of despoiling the Egyptians. Just as
the Hebrews, when leaving Egypt, took with them gold and silver that
they had appropriated from their former masters (Exodus 11:2, 12:35–36),
so Christians can appropriate the best of pagan learning. We find this im-
age in St Augustine, in the very same work in which he speaks dispar-
agingly of pagan philosophy. 
Any statements  by  those  who are  called philosophers,  especially  the
Platonists, which happen to be true and consistent with our faith should
not cause alarm, but be claimed for our own use, as it were from owners
1 Origen, Philocalia, chap. 13; ET: The Philocalia of Origen: A Compilation
of Selected Passages from Origen’s Work Made by St. Gregory of Nazian-
zus and St. Basil of Caesarea, tr. G. Lewis (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1911), p. 57.
2 The Latin phrase dates back at least as far as St Peter Damian (1007–
72), who (in his  De divina omnipotentia) wrote that secular knowledge
should act as a handmaiden (ancilla dominae), although the idea is much
older (as Origen’s comments remind us) and can also be found in the
writings of Clement of Alexandria (AD 150–215). See P. Jaroszyński, Sci-
ence in Culture,  Gilson Studies, Value Inquiry Books 185 (Amsterdam:
Editions Rodopi, 2006), p. 80.
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who have no right to them. Like the treasures of the ancient Egyptians,
who possessed not only idols and heavy burdens, which the people of Is-
rael hated and shunned, but also vessels and ornaments of silver and
gold, and clothes, which on leaving Egypt, the people of Israel … sur-
reptitiously claimed for themselves … – similarly all the branches of pa-
gan philosophy contain not only false and superstitious fantasies and
burdensome studies that involve unnecessary effort, … but also studies
for liberated minds which are more appropriate for the service of the
truth.1
The suggestion that pagan philosophers ‘have no right’ to this knowledge
is  ominous.  It  reminds  us  of  the  law  promulgated  by  the  emperor
Justinian in AD 529, which mandated that only orthodox Christians could
hold publicly funded teaching positions. This resulted in the dissolution of
the remaining philosophical schools in Athens.2
Why might pagan philosophy be useful? Well,  even the most hostile
Christian thinkers needed to study philosophy in order ‘to know their reli-
gious enemies’.3 They could not fight against a paganism influenced by
philosophical ideas without being familiar with pagan thought. Christians
also  needed philosophy in  order  to  settle  their  own doctrinal  disputes.
Those disputes required philosophical distinctions and categories, such as
‘nature’, ‘substance’, and ‘person’. (When the Council of Nicaea says that
Jesus is ‘of one substance’ with the Father, what does this mean?) But nat-
ural philosophy was also required in order to interpret Sacred Scripture,
for it dealt with matters that were also mentioned in the Bible, particu-
larly  in  the  opening  chapters  of  Genesis.  St  Augustine,  for  instance,
grapples with philosophical ideas when writing his commentary ‘on the lit-
eral meaning of Genesis’. So many Christian thinkers recognized the need
to come to terms with pagan philosophy. Some kind of a relationship was
required.
1 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, book 2, chap. 40, in St Augustine: On
Christian Teaching, pp. 64–65.
2 C. Wildberg, ‘Philosophy in the Age of Justinian’, in M. Maas (ed.),  The
Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), pp. 316–40, on pp. 330–31.
3 Wildberg, ‘Philosophy in the Age of Justinian’, p. 334. 
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For almost a thousand years, however, there was little need to spell out
the terms of this relationship. The Romans themselves had made little
contribution to science.1 With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the
West,  the tradition of scientific  learning quickly passed to the East,  to
those countries that in the seventh century came under Muslim rule. In
Western Europe,  little  remained  but  fragments  of  classical  knowledge,
carefully collected by writers such as Isidore of Seville and the Venerable
Bede. Such writers were aware of the possibility of something called ‘nat-
ural philosophy’. The sixth-century writer, Boethius (best known for his
work  The Consolation of  Philosophy),  had passed on to  early  medieval
thinkers a tripartite division of philosophy. There was natural philosophy
(also known as ‘physics’), which deals with matter and motion, mathemat-
ical philosophy, which deals with forms abstracted from matter, and theo-
logical philosophy, which deals with forms that have no material embodi-
ment.2 But  while  the  term ‘natural  philosophy’  survived,  there  was no
longer a living tradition of scientific inquiry. 
Given the context in which they were writing, the work of the scholars
of this period is admirable. Isidore of Seville, for instance, compiled a book
entitled  De natura rerum (‘On the Nature of Things’), the title of which
echoes that of a work by the Roman poet Lucretius (99–55  BC). Isidore’s
book is at least in part a response to recent lunar and solar eclipses. It
aimed to counter apocalyptic fears provoked by these striking events by
showing that such phenomena have what we would regard as ‘natural’
causes.3 But while admirable in its own way, Isidore’s work contains no
original scientific thought. Nor does it present a coherent, overall picture
of the cosmos. Its scope is more limited.
In this respect, it is not alone. Writers such as Isidore and Bede passed
on a portion of the learning of antiquity. But they did so in the form of ‘en-
1 A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science A.D. 400–1650
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 2.
2 J. A. Weisheipl O.P., ‘Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought’,
Mediaeval Studies, 27 (1965), pp. 54–90, on pp. 60–61.
3 S.  C.  McCluskey,  Astronomies and Cultures in Early Medieval Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 124.
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cyclopedias’, summaries of that learning intended for a general audience.
The most influential example of such works was Isidore’s masterpiece, the
Etymologies.  This uses the meanings of terms as way of presenting in-
formation on a bewildering variety of topics. Some of these are apparently
trivial, such as the entry on snakes.
‘Serpent’ (anguis) is the term for the family of all snakes, because they
can bend and twist; and thus it is anguis because it is ‘turned at angles’
(angulus) and never straight.
Others are more profound, such as that on arithmetic, which refers to the
dependence of other disciplines on mathematics.
Arithmetic (arithmetica)  is the study of  numbers,  for the Greeks call
numbers  (numerus)  ajriqmovV.  The  writers  of  secular  literature  would
have this discipline be the first among the mathematical disciplines, as
this discipline relies on no other for its existence. However, music, geo-
metry, and astronomy, which follow arithmetic, require its support in
order to exist and hold their place.1
While  such works deal  with natural-philosophical  topics,  they do  so  in
summary form. They no longer represent an active tradition of research.
What they present are snippets drawn from a few ancient authorities, col-
lected by people who sometimes barely understood what they were trans-
mitting. Not only was there no active scientific tradition, but the trans-
mission of scientific knowledge was generally motivated by religious con-
cerns. Bede’s cosmological writings, for instance, are related to the need
for calendar reform, the particular problem here being the date of Easter.2
In this situation, there was no need to define the appropriate relationship
of religion and science. It was never in doubt.
This situation began to change in the twelfth century. What happened
at that time did not immediately give rise to a tradition of natural philo-
sophy. Even in the early cathedral schools, the secular knowledge taught
1 Isidore,  Etymologiarum  sive  Originum  Liber, XII  iv, III  i;  ET:  The
Etymologies  of  Isidore of  Seville,  tr.  S.  A.  Barney,  W.  J.  Lewis,  J.  A.
Beach, and O. Berghof (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
pp. 255, 89.
2 Stahl, Roman Science, pp. 229–32.
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consisted of little more than the seven liberal arts: those of the  trivium
(grammar,  rhetoric,  and logic)  and  quadrivium (arithmetic,  music,  geo-
metry, and astronomy).1 But what we see in the twelfth century is a re-
vival of interest in the natural world, one that is often described as a ‘dis-
covery  of  nature’.2 It  is,  perhaps,  better  described  as  a  rediscovery of
nature,  analogous to  that  which occurred  (as  we  shall  see)  among the
earliest Greek philosophers.3 This involved a view of the natural world as
an  ‘ordered  collection  of  creatures’,4 which  enjoyed  some  degree  of
autonomy. No one doubted that the created order was ultimately depend-
ent on God, as its primary cause. But some twelfth-century thinkers came
to see it as a network of ‘secondary causes’,5 whose structure and function-
1 Weisheipl, ‘The Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought’, p. 66.
2 M.-D. Chenu O.P., ‘Nature and Man: The Renaissance of the Twelfth Cen-
tury’ (1957), in  Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, tr. J.
Taylor and L. K. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp.
1–48; T. Gregory, ‘La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au
XIIe siècle’, in J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds), The Cultural Context
of  Medieval  Learning, Synthese  Library,  Boston Studies  in the  Philo-
sophy of Science 26 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975), pp. 193–218.
3 See chap. 6, ‘The Criticism of Myths’. I say ‘analogous to’ because the late
medieval view of the natural order was not identical with the ancient
one. For the medievals nature was ‘a regular system of behaviors, but
unlike  the  ancient  Greek  view  it  was  not  made  up  of  self-regulating
quasi-divine forces. It was created out of nothing and given its character-
istics by its Creator’; see R. C. Dales, ‘A Twelfth-Century Concept of the
Natural Order’, Viator, 9 (1978), pp. 179–92, on p. 191.
4 The phrase (ordinata collectio creaturarum) is that of William of Conches,
in his Glossa in Timaeum, cited in Chenu, ‘Nature and Man’, p. 7, n. 14.
Aquinas would add that ‘the order of the universe’ is ‘made up of the or-
der and connection of causes’ (De veritate qu. 11 art. 1, Reply). 
5 As Aquinas writes (De veritate qu. 11 art. 1, Reply), ‘the First Cause, out
of the abundance of his goodness, has granted to other things not only
that they should exist, but that they should be causes’. The idea of a sec-
ondary causes seems to have come from the widely read Book of Causes
(Liber  de  causis),  which  was  at  first  attributed  to  Aristotle.  See  A.
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ing could be understood without immediate reference to its creator.1 On
this view, phenomena should be attributed to divine action only when no
natural cause can be found.2
A striking feature of  this twelfth-century renaissance was the emer-
gence of a critical attitude to traditional authorities. Adelard of Bath, for
instance, warns against simple reliance on authority, which he compares
to being led blindly, like an animal on a leash. In a dialogue addressed to
a nephew, who has been studying philosophy in Paris, he cites the Arab
philosophers as examples of a critical approach to knowledge, which he
contrasts with the reliance on authority in the West.
I learned one thing from my Arab masters, with reason as guide; you,
however, have learned another; taken captive by the pretensions of au-
thority, you are led by a bridle. For what else should authority be called
but a bridle? Just as brute animals are led around by any bridle at all,
not knowing where or why they are being taken and plodding after the
rope that holds them, so many of you, reduced and bound by an an-
imal’s credulity, are being led into peril by the authority of things you
read.3
Exhibiting this same critical spirit, William of Conches disagreed with the
Church fathers in his interpretations of Genesis. When criticised for doing
so, he responded that
in those things which concern the Catholic faith or morals it is not per-
missible to contradict Bede or any of the Church fathers... But in mat-
Maurer,  ‘Darwin,  Thomists,  and  Secondary  Causality’,  The  Review of
Metaphysics, 57 (2004), pp. 491–514, on p. 506.
1 A. Speer, ‘The Discovery of Nature: The Contribution of the Chartrians
to Twelfth-Century Attempts to Found a scientia naturalis’, Traditio, 52
(1997), pp. 135–51, on p. 138.
2 Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, chap. 4 (on p. 96). Page numbers
refer to the translation by H. Gollancz, which accompanies his transla-
tion of  the  Hebrew version by Berachya Hanakdan (fl.  ca.  1260);  see
Dodi ve-Nechdi (Uncle & Nephew) by Berachya Hanakdan (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1920), pp. 85–161.
3 Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, chap. 6 (p. 98); the translation is
that found in Chenu, ‘Nature and Man’, p. 13, n. 26.
56
 1.3.2  Negotiating a Relationship
ters of philosophy, if they commit any error, it is permissible to affirm
the contrary. For if they were greater than us, they were nevertheless
men.1
Other thinkers in this newly emerging tradition begin interpreting the
Bible in the light of  how the natural  world normally operates.  Thierry
(Theodoric) of Chartres set out to show how God created the heavens and
the earth ‘in accordance with physical reason’,2 creating the initial condi-
tions from which creatures could develop by way of natural causes.3 In a
similar way, William of Conches declares that the biblical claim that Eve
was made from the rib of Adam is ‘not to be believed literally’.4 He goes on
the say that if we attribute the creation of the human body to ‘the opera-
tion of nature’,5 this takes nothing away from God’s power. After all, God
is the creator of the world with its various causal powers. The reader will
not be surprised to know that William was bitterly attacked by another
William, the Abbot of St Thierry,6 which led him to renounce his bolder
opinions. But even his later work shows a desire to defend the autonomy
of natural philosophy.7
1 William of Conches, Dragmaticon, cited in Lemay, ‘Science and Theology
at Chartres’, p. 232.
2 Thierry of Chartres, Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, cited in T. Stiefel,
The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth-Century Europe (London: Croom
Helm, 1985), p. 83.
3 For a summary of Thierry’s account of creation, see É. Gilson, History of
Christian  Philosophy  in  the  Middle  Ages (London:  Sheed  and  Ward,
1955), pp. 145–47.
4 William of Conches, De philosophia mundi, cited in Stiefel,  The Intellec-
tual Revolution in Twelfth-Century Europe, p. 85.
5 Stiefel’s translation (see previous note) is a little misleading, so I have re-
translated this phrase from the Latin text she cites.
6 Lemay, ‘Science and Theology at Chartres’, p. 231.
7 I. Ronca, ‘Reason and Faith in the Dragmaticon: The Problematic Rela-
tion between  philosophica ratio and  diuina pagina’, in  S. Knuuttila, R.
Työrinoja, and S. Ebbesen (eds), Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval
Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval
Philosophy, vol 2, Publications of Luther-Agricola Society B 19 (Helsinki:
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So already in the twelfth century we have two of the conditions needed for
a scientific revival. We have a new interest in the natural world, under-
stood on its own terms, and a critical attitude to authority. But the emer-
gence of  a  new discipline, variously  known as  scientia naturalis,  philo-
sophia naturalis, or scientia de naturalibus,1 could occur only with the re-
discovery and translation of the those parts of the Greek inheritance that
had been lost. Twelfth century scholars began this work: Adelard of Bath,
for instance, travelled to Sicily and Syria (and perhaps Palestine and even
Spain) in order to learn Arabic and collect works for translation. It was at
this time, too, that Ptolemy’s Almagest was first translated from Greek to
Latin, preparing the way for the late medieval synthesis that found its ex-
pression in the work of Dante. For the development of natural philosophy
more generally, the key event was the translation of those works of Aris-
totle that deal with the natural world: his libri naturales. These transla-
tions enabled the revival of a living tradition of scientific research. With
his revival, the question of the proper relationship of faith and natural
philosophy became unavoidable.
The  threat  posed  by  Aristotle’s  work  was  clear.  As  Edward  Grant
writes, ‘for the first time in the history of Latin Christendom, a conceptu-
ally rich and methodologically powerful body of secular learning posed a
threat to theology and its traditional interpretations’.2 Aristotelian philo-
sophy was a threat not only because it was, in origin, entirely independent
of Christianity, but also because many of its conclusions seemed at odds
with Christian belief. The followers of Aristotle had held, for example,
Luther-Agricola Society, 1990), pp. 331–41, on p. 340.
1 J. A. Weisheipl, ‘The Interpretation of Aristotle’s Physics and the Science
of Motion’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds),  The Cam-
bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Ar-
istotle  to  the  Disintegration  of  Scholasticism  1100–1600 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 521–36, on p. 523.
2 E. Grant, ‘The Condemnation of 1277, God’s Absolute Power, and Phys-
ical Thought in the Late Middle Ages’, Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 211–44, on
p. 211.
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that the world could only be considered eternal, that there was but one
intellect for all men ...  ,  that men had no individual, immortal souls,
that God acted merely as an indirect mover, and that in place of his
providence were the celestial spheres acting directly on all creatures.1
It is not clear how many thirteenth-century thinkers actually advocated
such broadly ‘Aristotelian’ beliefs, but they were certainly being discussed.
It is hardly surprising that the Church’s initial reception was hostile. 
The history of this conflict was played out first of all at the University
of Paris, where the Faculty of Theology led a campaign to have the teach-
ing of Aristotle’s  libri naturales  banned.2 At first it looked as though it
might be successful. In 1210, the teaching of Aristotle’s metaphysical and
scientific works was prohibited, under pain of excommunication. This pro-
hibition was renewed in 1215 and then reinforced by a papal decree in
1231, which allowed some study of these works, but only after they had
been censored and purged of their errors. But the censorship was never
completed and by 1255 most of the books causing concern had found a
place in the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts.3
What religious authorities seem to have found particularly worrying
was  the  ‘Averroist’  view of  the  relation of  philosophy to  theology.  The
twelfth-century philosopher and legal scholar Averroes (Ibn Rushd) had
held that philosophy and theology were of equal status: reason and revela-
tion stood side by side as sources of knowledge. In practice, however, he
gave philosophers a privileged position in the interpretation of scriptural
texts, for they were, he claimed, the people ‘confirmed in knowledge’ men-
tioned  by  the  Qur’an  (3:5).4 The  late  medieval  European  thinkers  de-
scribed  as  Averroist  shared  the  master’s  esteem  for  philosophy.  They
1 G. Leff,  Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History, New Dimensions in
History (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 222.
2 Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Cen-
turies, p. 192.
3 G. R. Evans, Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages (London: Rout-
ledge, 1993), p. 21.
4 M.  Fakhry,  A History  of  Islamic  Philosophy,  2nd  edition  (New  York:
Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 277–78.
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wanted to be able to pursue philosophical inquiries in ways that were not
immediately constrained by theological  considerations. The philosopher,
they held, should be free to treat of any matter whatsoever, letting human
reason run its course and come to its own conclusions. 
We find this attitude exemplified in the work of Boethius of Dacia, who
wrote that ‘the philosopher investigates all being – natural, mathematical,
and divine.  Therefore  it  belongs to  the  philosopher to  determine every
question which can be disputed by rational arguments’.1 Note the inclu-
sion of ‘divine’ matters in this assertion: these, too, fall within the scope of
philosophy. Boethius insisted that this exercise posed no threat to the au-
thority  of  the  faith,  which went  beyond what philosophy could demon-
strate. He and his fellow Averroists professed themselves ready to accept
revealed truth, on account of its more authoritative source. But their in-
sistence on the relative autonomy of philosophy went too far for the reli-
gious authorities. The view put forward by Boethius was among the 219
Aristotelian propositions condemned by Étienne Tempier, the Archbishop
of Paris, in 1277.2 
The subordination of philosophical inquiry to theology had already been
made clear in a statute passed by the University in 1272. This states that
no master or bachelor of [the faculty of arts] should presume to determ-
ine or even dispute [discuss] any purely theological question, as concern-
ing the Trinity and incarnation and similar matters, since this would be
trangressing the limits assigned him.3
If  a  philosopher deals  with any philosophical  question that  touches on
theological issues, he may never settle the question ‘contrary to the faith’.
If he happens to come across an argument that appears to undermine the
faith, he may not simply present it as a philosophical argument, but must
1 From Boethius of Dacia, On the Supreme Good, cited in D. C. Lindberg,
The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600  B.C. to  A.D. 1450
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 235.
2 Proposition 145; see also propositions 150 and 151, cited in E. Grant, A
Source Book in Medieval Science, Source Books in the History of the Sci-
ences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), § 13.
3 Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, § 13.
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refute it. Indeed he should refrain from continuing to discuss arguments of
this kind. 
We have seen that when it came to cosmology the late medieval period
did achieve a marriage between religion and natural philosophy. But the
disputes of the thirteenth century made it clear that this was not a union
of two equal partners. The proper role of philosophy was to be nothing
more than the servant of theology.1 As the Dominican theologian Roland of
Cremona wrote in about 1234,
philosophy is the handmaid [ancilla] of theology; theology is the ruler
and queen of the sciences which must wait upon it as servants. … Theo-
logy is the science of sciences which is raised above all philosophical
speculation and surpasses all others in dignity.2
This did not mean that theologians dictated what philosophers were to
say. But it did mean that when it came to an apparent conflict, philosophy
must give way. Revealed truth had ‘absolute epistemic priority’.3 It was on
those terms that Aristotelian philosophy was eventually incorporated into
Christian  thought,  the  pioneering  figure  here  being  Thomas  Aquinas.
Dante would later refer to Aristotle as il maestro di color che sanno, ‘the
master of those who know’.4 But his philosophy could be accepted into the
world of Christian thought only by accepting its subordinate status. 
These events are important for our story insofar as they set the scene
for the conflict that occurred in the time of Galileo. The debates of the thir-
teenth century had made it clear that the authority of divine revelation
could and should take priority over the conclusions of natural philosophy.
1 J. Maritain,  An Introduction to Philosophy, tr. E. I. Watkin (1920; Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005),  p. 86.
2 Roland of Cremona, cited in Leff,  Paris and Oxford Universities in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, pp. 198–99.
3 G. Klima, ‘Ancilla theologiae vs. domina philosophorum: Thomas Aqui-
nas, Latin Averroism and the Autonomy of Philosophy’, in J. A. Aertsen
and A. Speer (eds),  Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la
philosophie au moyen âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?, Mis-
cellanea Mediaevalia 26 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), pp. 393–402,
on pp. 393–94.
4 Dante, La divina commedia, Inferno, canto 4, line 131.
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By the seventeenth century, this idea was coupled with an uncomprom-
ising view of the scope of biblical authority and a strong sense of the cer-
tainty offered by faith. These three factors, operating in tandem, made it
impossible for Galileo to persuade the Church of the need to accept the Co-
pernican view. Indeed it made the condemnation of the Copernican theory
all but inevitable. It is to those events that we must now turn.
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2. THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION
In 1543, a Polish mathematician, astronomer, and physician, Nicolaus Co-
pernicus,  published  a  book  that  would  initiate  a  revolution  in  human
thought. The book’s title –  On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres –
called to mind the traditional cosmology of Ptolemy, in which the heavenly
bodies circled the earth on more or less  solid  orbs.  But  the  De revolu-
tionibus (as the book is known) would eventually overturn that view. By
the end of the following century, European thinkers would no longer re-
gard the earth as the central feature of a vast but not immeasurable uni-
verse. Rather, they would regard it much as we do today: as merely one
planet  among many,  orbiting an apparently  undistinguished star,  in a
universe that was, as far as anyone knew, endless in extent.
Everyone knows this was a contested revolution, the trial of Galileo be-
ing the most notorious expression of the contest. But it has often been as-
sumed that while Copernicus stood for the cause of truth, those who op-
posed him were motivated by nothing more than blind allegiance to reli-
gious dogma. The actual situation was rather different. There were appar-
ently good scientific reasons for rejecting Copernicus’s view. But in cor-
recting the oversimplified views of the past, we must not be like Martin
Luther’s drunken peasant, who, ‘when you lift him up into the saddle on
one side, tumbles off on the other’.1 Religious dogma did play an important
role in the opposition to Copernicus. This is particularly the case in the
trial of Galileo, which was motivated by concerns about biblical authority.
But before I discuss the religious objections, it will be useful to examine
Copernicus’s achievement and to set out the non-theological reasons that
led so many of his contemporaries to reject it.
2.1  The Copernican Theory
Copernicus’s starting point is made clear in the introduction to the De re-
volutionibus, dedicated (it should be noted) to Pope Paul III. Here he ar-
gues that the old Ptolemaic system, centred on a stationary earth, was
beyond repair. In particular, it was unable to deal economically with the
movement of the seven planets, which in Copernicus’s day were thought to
1 Cited in E. M. Plass, What Luther Says (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Pub-
lishing House, 2006), § 4973.
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include the sun and the moon. The Ptolemaic system could be brought into
harmony with planetary observations only by adding an unwieldy array of
epicycles, eccentrics, and equants. Worse still,  Copernicus argued, there
was no single agreed way of doing this. Astronomers had merely come up
with a series of incompatible proposals, using quite different expedients to
deal with the same observations. It follows that the Ptolemaic system had
failed to offer that which it had promised: a single, consistent picture of
the structure of the cosmos. It is, Copernicus writes, as though a painter
were to create a portrait composed of 
hands, feet, head, and other limbs from different places, well painted in-
deed, but not modelled from the same body, and not in the least match-
ing each other, so that a monster would be produced from them rather
than a man.1
Faced with this ‘monstrous’ but ancient cosmology, Copernicus turned
to a solution that also had ancient authority on its side, going back to the
Pythagorean philosophers of the fifth century BC.2 It had been picked up by
Heraclides of Pontus (390–310 BC) and developed by Aristarchus of Samos
(310–230 BC).3 It begins with the idea that the movement of the fixed stars
is a merely apparent movement, being actually due to the rotation of the
earth,  which turns  on  its  axis  approximately  every  twenty-four  hours.
Given this  assumption,  we  can  understand  the  fixed  stars  to  be  truly
fixed, that is to say, motionless.4 It is the earth that is turning.
So far, so good. We can follow Copernicus and assume that the earth re-
volves on its axis daily. But the observed daily motion of the heavenly bod-
ies still seems to require that the earth remain in its traditional place, at
the centre of the universe. After all, only then would the stars even appear
to circling the earth. So the most plausible theory so far would seem to be
a simple two-sphere theory, corresponding in outline to that of Ptolemy,
1 Copernicus, ‘Letter to His Holiness Pope Paul III, Preface to De Revolu-
tionibus (On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, p. 25).
2 Copernicus, De revolutionibus, book 1, chap. 5.
3 G. E. R. Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle, Ancient Culture and Society
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), pp. 53–58. 
4 Copernicus, De revolutionibus, book 1, chap. 10.
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but one in which it is the inner sphere (the earth) that revolves, rather
than the outer sphere (that of the fixed stars).1 Yet Copernicus wishes to
go further and to attribute to the earth a second circular motion, in order
to account for the observed movements of the ‘wandering’ stars, i.e. the
planets. This second motion is the earth’s orbital motion around a new
centre of the universe, namely the sun.
This immediately creates a problem. If the earth is orbiting the sun,
then one would expect the relative positions of the heavenly bodies to vary
during the year, as the earth changes its position in the course of its orbit.
(There is a familiar analogy for this, namely the apparent movement of
fingers held in a straight line in front of the eyes, as you close one eye and
open the other.) But no such variation can be observed, at least with the
naked eye, or even with the telescopes that became available in the seven-
teenth century. This came to be known as the problem of ‘stellar parallax’.
How can this problem be resolved? It would be resolved if the earth is so
close to the centre of the universe that its orbital motion around the sun
has no observable impact on the relative positions of the heavenly bodies.2 
It follows that Copernicus is forced to posit a much larger universe than
even the medievals had considered. Contrary to a widespread modern per-
ception, the universe of  Ptolemy and his followers had not been small.
(Contemporary depictions of  that  universe  are misleading,  since no at-
tempt was made to draw them to scale.) A common medieval estimate of
its radius – the distance from the earth to the sphere of the outermost
planet (Saturn) – was 73 million miles.3 Copernicus, however, posited a
greatly enlarged universe. One estimate, based on his figures, suggests
that the distance from the earth to the fixed stars was 154 billion miles.4
Within that vast universe, the distance between the sun and the planets
was relatively small.  In the Copernican cosmos,  Saturn (the outermost
1 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 157.
2 Note that Copernicus’s solution to the problem of stellar parallax was not
a new one. Already in the third century  BC, Aristarchus seems to have
been aware of the problem and to have adopted a similar solution (Lloyd,
Greek Science after Aristotle, p. 57).
3 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 438.
4 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 443.
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planet) was no more than 39 million miles from the sun.1 So although Co-
pernicus gives no precise figure for the distance of the earth from the sun,
it is easy to see that it is insignificant in comparison with the size of the
cosmos as a whole.
Copernicus’s  scheme  is  considerably  more  complex  than  this  simple
presentation suggests. He attributes, for instance, a third motion to the
earth, that of its axis,2 which means that a line extending from either the
north or south terrestrial poles would carve out a conical shape over the
course of  a  year.  Copernicus (mistakenly)  believed that  he needed this
third  movement  to  account  for  the  progression of  the  seasons.3 It  also
helped him offer an explanation for the puzzling ‘precession of the equi-
noxes’,  as it  is called: the fact that the celestial pole around which the
stars appear to move very slowly shifts its position, tracing out a circle
every  26,000 years.  Copernicus  could  offer  an explanation of  this  phe-
nomenon by making the period of this third movement ‘very, very slightly
less than a year’.4 But for our purposes we can ignore these further com-
plications.
If the Ptolemaic system was, as Copernicus argues, unable to deliver on
its promises, did Copernicus’s model do any better? We think of our cur-
rent model of what we call the solar system as Copernican, and insofar as
it is heliocentric (‘sun-centred’), it  does follow Copernicus. Furthermore,
we know that our current model is enormously successful. Not only does it
explain the movements of the heavenly bodies, as observed from the earth;
it has also allowed for interplanetary space flight. What more could one
ask?  But our model of the solar system has been transformed by the later
work of Kepler and Newton, so it is not identical with Copernicus’s view.5
Were there good reasons to prefer the Copernican hypothesis at the time it
was first proposed? 
1 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 442.
2 Copernicus, De revolutionibus, book 1, chap. 11
3 Kuhn,  The Copernican Revolution,  164–65;  see also P.  H. Michel,  The
Cosmology of  Giordano Bruno (1962),  tr.  R.  E.  W. Maddison (London:
Methuen, 1973), pp. 194–96.
4 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 270 note.
5 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 212.
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It is important to note that Copernicus had no new observational evidence
with which to support his proposal.1 In the decades following the publica-
tion of his work, the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe would gather a large
body of new and more accurate data. But not only were these unavailable
to  Copernicus;  they did  not  necessarily  support  the  Copernican theory.
(Tycho himself was to reject it.) Even after the invention of the telescope
in the first decade of the seventeenth century, the evidence remained am-
biguous.2 The Copernican scheme was not the only one that could explain the
observable movements of the heavenly bodies.
Nor did the Copernican system, as first proposed, succeed in eliminat-
ing the old Ptolemaic devices of epicycles and eccentrics. The problem here
was Copernicus’s (false) assumption that planetary orbits must be circu-
lar. This meant that although Copernicus could get rid of the major epi-
cycles, he still needed minor epicycles (‘epicyclets’,3 if you like) and eccent-
ric orbits. To deal with the observed movements of the moon, for instance,
1 I. Lakatos and E. Zahar, ‘Why Did Copernicus’ Research Program Super-
sede Ptolemy’s?’, in R. S. Westman (ed.),  The Copernican Achievement,
UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Berkeley, CA: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1975), pp. 354–83, on p. 357.
2 Empirical confirmation of the Copernican view came only with the obser-
vation of stellar parallax in 1838. One could choose James Bradley’s dis-
covery of stellar aberration in 1728,  since this was a fact inconsistent
with Tycho’s hypothesis but consistent with the Copernican view. But as
Bradley himself noted, even at that time the absence of observable stel-
lar parallax remained a problem. See J. Bradley,  ‘A Letter from the Rev-
erend Mr. James Bradley Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford, and
F.R.S. to Dr. Edmond Halley Astronom. Reg. &c. Giving an Account of a
New Discovered Motion of the Fix’d Stars’, Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society (1683–1775), 35 (1727–28), pp. 637–61, on p. 660.
3 K. P. Moesgaard, ‘Copernican Influence on Tycho Brahe’, in J. Dobrzycki
(ed.), The Reception of Copernicus’s Heliocentric Theory: Proceedings of a
Symposium organized by the Nicolas Copernicus Committee of the Inter-
national Union of the History and Philosophy of Science  (Dordrecht: D.
Riedel, 1972), pp. 31–55, on p. 36.
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Copernicus required not just one but three circles,1 which in this particu-
lar case was a more complex mechanism than that posited by Ptolemy.
What Copernicus could do, however, was to provide an account of the
movements of  the  heavenly bodies  that  was both simpler,  overall,  and
more coherent than its predecessor.2 Its first advantage was that it posited
what we might call ‘fewer moving parts’,3 the daily apparent motion of all
the  heavenly  bodies  being  explained  by  a  single  motion  of  the  earth.
Secondly, Copernicus’s system offered a more coherent cosmology. It could
explain, for example, the relationship between the size of a planet’s orbit
and the time it took to revolve around the sun: roughly speaking, the big-
ger the orbit, the longer the time. Thirdly and most importantly, Coperni-
cus’s system offered a unified account of phenomena that could previously
be  explained  only  by  positing  unrelated  mechanisms.  The  clearest  ex-
ample of this is the Copernican account of the retrograde motion of the
planets: the fact that they apparently stop their forward movement and
reverse direction for a time before continuing. While Ptolemaic astronomer
could explain this only by positing a series of epicycles, the Copernican
could explain the apparent retrograde motion of the planets as a natural
consequence of the fact that all the planets, including the earth, are orbit-
ing a central sun.4
Figure 2: Retrograde Motion-Copernicus (J Wilkins 1684) Cap-
tion: ‘A Copernican explanation of apparent retrograde motion, the 
upper-case letters representing the earth’s orbit and the correspond-
ing lower-case letters the orbit of Jupiter, seen against the sphere of 
the fixed stars (n–z), from John Wilkins, A Discourse Concerning a 
New Planet (1684)’
1 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, pp. 170–71; De revolutionibus, book 4,
chaps. 1–16.
2 M. A. Finocchiaro, Defending Copernicus and Galileo: Critical Reasoning
in  the  Two  Affairs, Boston  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Science  280
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), P. 22. My discussion of the arguments in fa-
vour of the Copernican view are drawn largely from this work.
3 Finocchiaro, Defending Copernicus and Galileo, p. 22.
4 Copernicus, De revolutionibus, book 5, chap. 35.
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It follows that Copernicus’s theory did have considerable advantages, even
at the time it was proposed. But it was not the case, as popular writers
sometimes suggest, that Copernicus ‘incontestably established the helio-
centric  theory’.1 There  were good  arguments  in  favour  of  Copernicus’s
geokinetic (‘moving earth’) and heliocentric theory. But those arguments
were far from decisive and his theory faced weighty objections. 
If we are inclined to overlook how serious those objections were, Galileo
is at least partly to blame, for in his Dialogue he places them on the lips of
a character named Simplicio. The name is not necessarily disparaging: it
is  apparently  an allusion to  Simplicius of  Cilicia,  a  sixth-century  com-
mentator on Aristotle.2 But the Simplicio of Galileo’s Dialogue is the least
sophisticated thinker of the three characters involved.3 This is quite un-
fair, for the opponents of the Copernican hypothesis were often very soph-
isticated thinkers, who had what seemed to them good reasons for their
opposition. Some of those reasons were religious, but not all were. There
were arguments against Copernicus that were drawn from both astronom-
ical observations and the best natural philosophy (or physics, as we would
call it) of the day.4
1 Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, p. 168.
2 Galilei,  Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems,  p.  7.  As it
happens, the historical Simplicius was already aware of the difficulties
facing Aristotelian doctrine, for he reported the opinions of those ancient
astronomers who saw in the non-Aristotelian expedients of Ptolemaic as-
tronomy  (such  as  eccentrics  and  equants)  an  argument  against  Aris-
totelian physics (Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, p.
65).
3 Simplicio’s thinking has become a little more sophisticated by the time of
Galileo’s Two New Sciences (1638).
4 These are conveniently summarised by Finocchiaro in the introduction to
The Galileo Affair, which my discussion largely follows, as well as in the
same author’s Defending Copernicus and Galileo, pp. 24–34.
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A first astronomical argument against the Copernican view was the objec-
tion  that  stemmed  from  the  apparent  differences  between  earth  and
heaven.1 If  Copernicus is correct,  the argument goes,  then the earth is
simply another planet, and its features should resemble those of the other
heavenly bodies. But so far as one could tell, before the invention of the
telescope, the features of the heavenly bodies are very different from those
of earth.2 Given the observable differences between heaven and earth, the
idea that the earth was just another heavenly body seemed deeply im-
plausible.
In Galileo’s  Dialogue, Simplicio puts forward precisely this argument,
noting that on earth there exists continual change, with generation of new
entities and the corruption of old ones. But nothing like this, he continues,
has ever been observed in the heavens. Similarly, the heavenly bodies are
luminous, giving light, while the earth is dark and without light.3 For such
reasons we must assume that the heavens are the earth are essentially
different,  being  made  of  different  materials  and  governed  by  different
laws.
A  second  astronomical  argument  against  the  Copernican  theory  is
based on the appearance of the planet Venus. Since, on the Copernican
theory, the earth and Venus have different periods of revolution around
the sun, their relative positions would alter continuously. This means that
Venus should exhibit a full range of phases, like those of the Moon, as dif-
ferent aspects of the planet, illuminated by the sun’s rays, become visible
from earth. When it is on the far side of the sun, it should appear full, like
the full moon. When it comes between the earth and the sun, none of the
illuminated surface would be visible. At intermediate positions, it would
vary from nearly full to a narrow crescent.4 But before the invention of the
telescope, no such phases could be observed.
A third astronomical argument against Copernicus comes from observa-
tions of both Mars and Venus. On the Copernican view both planets are, of
1 Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, p. 18.
2 Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 1, chap. 3 (De caelo 270b).
3 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, p. 47.
4 Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, pp. 18–19.
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course, also orbiting the sun, but at  a  different speed from that of  the
earth. It follows that sometimes they will be relatively close to one an-
other, and sometimes much further apart. One would, therefore, expect to
see a significant variation in their observed size and brightness. In the
case of Mars the variation would be by a factor of about eight and in that
of Venus by a factor of about six. But naked eye observation yields a much
smaller difference: in the case of Mars the size varies by a factor of two,
while in the case of Venus the difference is negligible.1 Galileo also records
this objection and tries to answer it.2 As he suggests, telescopic observa-
tions resolve this difficulty, but they were not available until more than 50
years after Copernicus.
A fourth argument was one I have already mentioned, namely the argu-
ment from the absence of an observable stellar parallax.3 If, as Copernicus
suggests, the earth were orbiting the sun, then we would be viewing what
were regarded as the fixed stars from very different positions over the
course of the year. It follows that each star should change its apparent po-
sition, when viewed from earth, in a way that is regularly predictable, on
an annual cycle. But no such changes are observed. As the figure of Simp-
licio in Galileo’s Dialogue writes, on the Copernican view
the earth’s orbit would necessarily cause changes and variations in the
stellar sphere similar to the observable changes produced by the earth’s
radius in regard to the sun. No such changes, or even smaller ones, be-
ing observed among the fixed stars, it appears to me that by this fact
the  annual  movement  of  the  earth  is  rendered untenable  and  over-
thrown.4
This remained a serious objection long after Copernicus and Galileo had
attempted to answer it, for the traditional Copernican response – that the
fixed  stars  were  much  further  away  than  was  previously  believed5 –
seemed suspiciously ad hoc, introduced for no other reason than to answer
1 A. Chalmers, ‘Galileo’s Telescopic Observations of Venus and Mars’, The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 36 (1985), pp. 175–84, on p.
176.
2 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, p. 334.
3 Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, pp. 18–19.
4 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, pp. 364–65.
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the objection. In any case, the existence of an actual stellar parallax was
not detected until 1838.1
2.3.2  Physical Arguments
What about the natural-philosophical or (as we would say) ‘physical’ argu-
ments against the Copernican view? Copernicus’s initial insight was not a
new one. Ancient and medieval thinkers were already well aware of the
possibility of the earth’s rotation. They realized that the apparent move-
ment of the stars could be explained either by the actual movement of a
heavenly sphere or by the movement of the earth.  But almost universally
they rejected the idea that the earth moved.  Arguments in support of this
view are already to be found in Aristotle.2 But the key arguments – those
repeated in medieval times and to which Galileo would respond – date
from the time of Ptolemy, being found in his second-century Almagest.
Ptolemy notes that there are those who hold that it is the earth that is
turning,  rather than the heavens,  making one revolution each day.  He
readily concedes that the apparent movement of the heavens could be ac-
counted for in this way. It would be precisely that: an apparent movement.
But the decisive evidence against this opinion relates to what would hap-
pen on earth, if it were true. If the earth were revolving, Ptolemy writes,
this would involve ‘the most violent of all motions’. It would mean, for in-
stance, that any object not actually attached to the earth would be left be-
hind by the earth’s movement. 
Neither clouds nor any other flying or thrown objects would ever be
seen moving towards the east, since the earth’s motion towards the east
would always outrun and overtake them, so that all other objects would
seem to move in the direction of the west and the rear.3
One might respond to this that the air is also carried around with the
earth, being in a certain sense attached to it. But then objects in the air
would still be left behind. If, on the other hand, such objects are thought to
be fixed in the air, then it would follow that they would never be seen to
5 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 442.
1 Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, p. 19.
2 Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 2, chap. 14 (De Caelo 296b–297a).
3 Ptolemy, Almagest, I.7 (Ptolemy’s Almagest, 45).
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move at all. What is Ptolemy’s conclusion? It is that the idea of the move-
ment of the earth is ‘quite ridiculous’.
Late medieval thinkers were also aware that there was an alternat-
ive to the Ptolemaic, geocentric view.  In the fourteenth century, for in-
stance, Nicole Oresme offered a number of apparently persuasive argu-
ments in favour of the rotation of the earth. Oresme’s discussion is particu-
larly interesting, since it offers a way of reinterpreting the relevant Biblical
passages: those that suggest the earth is at rest and the heavens move. He
suggests that the passages in question could be understood as conforming
‘to the customary usage of popular speech’, as in the case of those biblical
texts that speak of God ‘repenting’ or ‘becoming angry’. (God, of course,
cannot have such emotions or change his mind.) Oresme also cites Psalm
147:8, which said that ‘God covers the heavens with clouds’. This, too, can-
not be understood literally, since the heavens are above the clouds.1 But
after casting doubt on the capacity of human reason to settle the question,
Oresme backs away from such reinterpretations and opts for the traditional
view.
Oresme’s teacher, John Buridan, had also examined the idea that the
earth, rather than the heavens, might be rotating. He, too, notes the argu-
ments in its favour, remarking (for example) that the rotation of the earth
seems more plausible than that of the heavens. After all, the relatively
small earth could be moved more easily than the heavens. It also requires
a  much  slower  rate  of  rotation.2 Remember  that  even  the  medievals
thought the universe was very large,3 so that on the Ptolemaic view the
speed of the outermost sphere would have been truly ‘astronomical’. Des-
pite such arguments, Buridan also opts for the traditional view of a sta-
1 N. Oresme, Le Livre du ciel et du monde, tr. A. D. Menut, Publications in
Medieval Science (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), book 2,
chap. 25, p. 531; Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, § 67.
2 J. Buridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor de caelo et de mundo, book
2,  question  22,  cited  in  M.  Clagett,  The  Science  of  Mechanics  in  the
Middle Ages, Publications in Medieval Science (Madison, WI: University
of Wisconsin Press,  1959), p.  595;  see also Grant,  Planets, Stars, and
Orbs, p. 640.
3 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 438.
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tionary earth. He notes, for instance, that although a rotating earth would
move more slowly than the heavens, this is of little significance, since the
heavens are more easily moved than the earth, being made of a quite dif-
ferent material. In support of this conclusion Buridan cites the arguments
put forward by Ptolemy, but he adds an argument drawn from his own
theory of ‘impetus’. 
It  is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian physics that ‘everything
that is in motion must be moved by something’.1 But this immediately
raises a question. If every object in motion must be moved by something
else, then what keeps a projectile (such as a javelin) in motion once it has
left the arm of the thrower? There were two ways of understanding Aris-
totle’s rather obscure answer to this question. According to the first view,
it is the  force of the displaced air that moves the projectile. According to
the second, it is the force of the air alongside the projectile that moves it.
Buridan rejects both of these views, which he regards as contrary to exper-
ience.
What solution does he offer? His solution resembles that of John Philo-
ponus, who already in the sixth century had suggested that ‘a projectile
moves on account of a kinetic force which is impressed on it by the mover
and which exhausts itself in the course of the movement’.2 In a similar
way, Buridan argues that the force imparted by the original mover some-
how remains at work in the projectile. As he writes,
in the stone or other projectile there is impressed something which is
the motive force (virtus motiva) of that projectile ... But that impetus is
continually decreased by the resisting air and by the gravity [heaviness]
of  the  stone...  Thus  the  movement  of  the  stone  continually  becomes
slower, and finally that impetus is so diminished or corrupted that the
gravity of the stone wins out over it and moves the stone down to its
natural place.3
1 Aristotle, Physics, book 7, chap. 1 (Physica 241b).
2 C. Wildberg, ‘John Philoponus’, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), § 2.2.
3 Buridan,  Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros  Aris-
totelis, book 8, question 12, cited in Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in
the Middle Ages, pp. 534–35; see also Grant, A Source Book in Medieval
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Elsewhere Buridan takes this idea further by arguing that the movement
of a projectile would be ‘of infinite duration were it not diminished and
corrupted by a contrary force resisting it’.1 
How does Buridan use this impetus theory to argue against the idea of
a moving earth? He makes reference to a variant of Ptolemy’s argument,
which holds that if the earth were rotating an arrow shot directly upwards
would not fall to the same spot, but would fall to the west of the point at
which it was launched. One could argue, Buridan continues, that the air
being carried along with the rotating earth also carries along the arrow.
But, he responds, the impetus impressed into the arrow would enable it to
resist the motion of the air, so that it would still fall to the west. Since ar-
rows do not act in this way, it follows that the earth does not rotate.2
This  might  seem  a  puzzling  argument,  particularly  to  those  of  us
brought up with the modern conception of inertia. We are inclined to think
that Buridan’s idea would allow him to overcome the very objection that
he himself raises. He could have argued that the arrow, once it had re-
ceived an impetus from the rotation of the earth, would continue to be car-
ried along by that impetus. In the course of defending Copernicus, Giord-
ano Bruno would later take this step.3 But Buridan had not yet, it seems,
broken with the Aristotelian view that bodies have ‘a spontaneous tend-
ency to rest’.4 He continues to believe, with Aristotle, that ‘everything that
is in motion must be moved by something’. He has not yet arrived at the
Science, § 48.
1 Buridan,  Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros  Aris-
totelis, book 12, question 9, cited in J. Zupko, ‘Buridan, John’, in E. N.
Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition),
§ 6.
2 Buridan,  Quaestiones super libris quattuor de caelo et  mundo,  book 2,
question 22,  cited in  Clagett,  The Science of Mechanics in the Middle
Ages, p. 596; see also Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, § 67.
3 G. Bruno, La cena de le ceneri, Third Dialogue; ET: La Cena de le Ceneri:
The Ash Wednesday Supper, tr. E. A. Gosselin and L. S. Lerner (1977),
Renaissance  Society  of  America  Reprint  Texts  (Toronto:  University  of
Toronto Press, 1995), p. 164.
4 Clavelin, The Natural Philosophy of Galileo, p. 95.
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idea that a body set in motion will simply continue to move, unless it is
impeded. It is only with Galileo that physics takes its decisive step to-
wards the modern view of motion.
2.3.3  A Philosophical Argument
A final  argument against  the Copernican system is more philosophical
than empirical. More precisely, it is an epistemological argument, one that
draws on a theory of knowledge. It can be described as the objection from
the  deception  of  the  senses.  This  takes  the  form of  a  reductio  ad  ab-
surdum: an argument that discredits a position by showing that it has un-
acceptable consequences. The argument runs like this. Our senses tell us
that we, and the earth on which we stand, are stationary: we have no feel-
ing of movement. Although perceptual illusions are common – a straight
stick partly immersed in water appears bent, for example – if the Coper-
nican hypothesis were true, this feeling of being stationary would be ‘a gi-
gantic and radical deception’.1 If we allowed that our perceptions could be
so radically deceived, then all our claims to knowledge would be called
into question. But since we are convinced we do know many things, we
should not accept that the earth is turning.
While a philosophical rather than a scientific argument, this view is
also reported in Galileo’s Dialogue. Once again, it is placed in the mouth of
Simplicio, who argues that if the Copernican theory were true, then what
hope can we have of knowing anything at all. If Copernicanism is true,
then
we must necessarily suspect our own senses as wholly fallible or stupid
in judging sensible things which are  very  close  at  hand.  Then what
truth can we hope for, if it derives its origin from so deceptive a faculty?2
This may not have been a decisive argument, but even Galileo recognized
it as having a certain force.
1 Finocchiaro, ‘Introduction’, p. 17.
2 Galilei,  Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, pp. 255–56;
see also p. 248.
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There were, then, apparently good non-religious reasons for rejecting Co-
pernicus’s view, at least in the decades before the invention of the tele-
scope. If Copernicus’s theory had been clearly supported by astronomical
observations even before 1610, we might expect it to have been embraced
by the man who was the greatest astronomical observer of the age, Tycho
Brahe. Tycho was a Danish nobleman turned astronomer, who belonged to
a  breed  of  scientist  of  which,  alas!  there  are  few surviving  specimens.
Sporting a prosthetic nose to cover an injury sustained in a duel, Tycho
was a lavish entertainer, whose meals were legendary for the quantity of
alcohol consumed as well as for the food. He also kept a pet elk, which is
said to have died after climbing the steps to the room where a banquet
was in progress and drinking too much beer.1
It is not, however, Tycho’s personal life that concerns us here, but his
reaction to Copernicus. Tycho was impressed by Copernicus’s mathemat-
ical achievements and very sympathetic to his attempts to get rid of the
embarrassing Ptolemaic equant.2 Yet Tycho refused to accept Copernicus’s
theory, for reasons that were astronomical and physical as well as theolo-
gical. From the point of view of astronomy, Tycho was particularly dissat-
isfied with the Copernican attempts to account for the absence of stellar
parallax.3 While he appreciated the mathematics that lay behind Coperni-
cus’s account, he also seems to have regarded the idea of a moving earth as
physically absurd.4 As he wrote, the Copernican hypothesis
1 J. L. E. Dreyer, Tycho Brahe: A Picture of Scientific Life and Work in the
Sixteenth Century (Edinburgh, A. & C. Black, 1890), p. 210.
2 R. S. Westman, ‘Three Responses to the Copernican Theory: Johannes
Praetorius, Tycho Brahe, and Michael Maestlin’, in R. S. Westman (ed.),
The Copernican Achievement,  UCLA Center  for  Medieval  and  Renais-
sance Studies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), pp.
285–345, on p. 307.
3 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 201.
4 V. E. Thoren, The Lord of Uraniborg: A Biography of Tycho Brahe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 250. For more details, see
Moesgaard, ‘Copernican Influence on Tycho Brahe’, pp. 51.
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expertly and completely circumvents all that is superfluous or discord-
ant in the system of Ptolemy. On no point does it offend the principles of
mathematics. Yet it ascribes to the Earth, that hulking, lazy body, unfit
for motion, a motion as fast as the aetherial torches, and a triple motion
at that.1
Theological objections may also have played in role in Tycho’s rejection of
Copernicus’s solution,2 although these probably played a lesser role than
the physical arguments.3 In any case, he had what seemed to him good
reasons to try to find an alternative view, which would enjoy the mathem-
atical advantages of the Copernican theory without suffering from what
he saw as its physical defects.
Figure 3: Geoheliocentrism-Martianus Capella (1573) Caption: 
‘A 1573 representation of Martianus Capella’s geoheliocentric system,
which was followed by Tycho Brahe.’
So what was Tycho’s alternative? His starting point may well have been
a brief statement in the work of the fifth-century Roman writer Martianus
Capella. This writer makes reference to the view that ‘the stars of Mer-
cury and Venus ... do not go around the earth at all, but around the sun in
freer motion’.4 Copernicus himself singles out this work for praise.5 Tycho,
however, not only admires it; he develops it into an alternative cosmology.
His cosmology can be described as geoheliocentric. It is ‘geocentric’ (earth-
centred) insofar as the central position was held by a stationary earth,
around which revolve both the moon and the sun. But it was also ‘helio-
centric’ insofar as the remaining planets – Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter,
and Saturn – orbited the sun rather than circling the earth.
1 T. Brahe,  Tychonis Brahe Dani opera omnia iv, 156: 14–18, cited in O.
Gingerich  and  J.  R.  Voelkel,  ‘Tycho  Brahe’s  Copernican  Campaign’,
Journal for the History of Astronomy, 29 (1998), pp. 1–34, on pp. 23–24.
2 Gingerich and Voelkel, ‘Tycho Brahe’s Copernican Campaign’, pp. 1, 24;
Moesgaard, ‘Copernican Influence on Tycho Brahe’, p. 50.
3 E. Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, Journal of the
History of Ideas, 46 (1985), pp. 13–31, on p. 25.
4 Westman, ‘Three Responses to the Copernican Theory’, p. 321.
5 Westman, ‘Three Responses to the Copernican Theory’, pp. 321–22.
78
 2.4  Tycho Brahe’s Compromise
The major objections to this scheme were not astronomical but physical.
Tycho’s proposal entailed that the orbit of Mars intersected with that of
the sun.1 This seemed a  fatal  objection to those who believed that  the
heavenly bodies were carried around on solid (in the sense of impenet-
rable) orbs. As it happens, medieval authors were far from clear on this
question, which does not seem to have been a live issue before the four-
teenth century.2 But Tycho had still to face the objection that intersecting
orbs were in some sense a physical impossibility and therefore no less ‘ab-
surd’ than the Copernican idea of a moving earth. 
It seems that this objection led Tycho initially to doubt his own pro-
posal. As he wrote to a friend in 1588,
I was still steeped in the opinion, approved and long accepted by almost
all,3 that the heavens were composed of certain solid orbs which carried
around the planets, and ... I could not bring myself to allow this ridicu-
lous penetration of the orbs; thus it happened that for some time this,
my own discovery, was suspect to me.4
What led Tycho to overcome these scruples was the new information that
had become available regarding comets, particularly the one observed in
1577. Aristotle had held that comets were phenomena in the upper atmo-
sphere, that is to say, below the orbit of the moon.5 Not all later astro-
nomers agreed,6 but many did. But Tycho’s measurements of the location
and movement of the comet of 1577 suggested not merely that it was a ce-
1 In fact, the same was true of the orbits of Mercury and Venus, but this
did not seem to be so obvious a problem (Thoren, The Lord of Uraniborg,
p. 254).
2 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 342.
3 As my remarks suggest, Brahe may be overstating his predecessors’ com-
mitment to solid (i.e. impenetrable) orbs (Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of the
Solid Celestial Spheres’, p. 22). But it would have been for precisely that
reason that he saw this as an objection to his proposal.
4 Cited in Westman, ‘Three Responses to the Copernican Theory’, p. 329.
5 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 343–44; Aristotle, Metereology, book
1, chap. 7 (Meteorologica 344a).
6 Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, p. 23.
79
 2.4  Tycho Brahe’s Compromise
lestial phenomenon, but that it had passed ‘right through ... the Ptolemaic
spheres of Mercury and Venus’.1 It followed that if there were heavenly
spheres, they were certainly not impenetrable. 
Tycho may not have been the first to realize this,2 but he quickly em-
braced the idea of fluid heavens, whose fine ‘aetherial’ substance would
pose no obstacle to his intersecting orbits. (The ‘aether’ was thought to be
the fine,  fluid-like  substance,  composed of  a  fifth essence –  the ‘quint-
essence’ – quite unlike any substance known on earth.) This was a view
later  embraced by  Galileo’s  opponent,  Cardinal  Bellarmine,  who  wrote
that the heavenly bodies move through the aether ‘like birds in the air and
fish in the sea’.3 While this rendered the fixed orbits of the heavenly bodies
puzzling – if they were not restrained by solid spheres, why did they not
wander all over the place?4 – it seemed required to explain the movement
of comets.
The major  disadvantage of  Tycho’s scheme emerges when it  is  com-
pared to that of Copernicus. The Copernican theory offered a unified ac-
count of phenomena, in which apparently complex motions (such as those
of the planets) which could be explained relatively simply. Tycho’s system,
on the other hand, involved a whole series of  complex,  interacting mo-
tions.5 (This was one of Kepler’s objections to Tycho’s idea.6) After 1616 it
would be a useful refuge for Roman Catholic thinkers who had long rejec-
ted the Ptolemaic view, but who were forbidden to defend the Copernican
1 Thoren, The Lord of Uraniborg, p. 257.
2 Rosen, ‘The Dissolution of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, p. 31.
3 Grant,  Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 348. While words are those of Bel-
larmine, the analogy goes back to Ptolemy himself (Rosen, ‘The Dissolu-
tion of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, p. 18), who seems to have been less
attached to the idea of solid spheres than some of his later followers.
4 Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 349 n.76, p. 369; Rosen, ‘The Dissolu-
tion of the Solid Celestial Spheres’, p. 24. Keep in mind that before New-
ton’s formulation of a law of universal gravitation, no one knew what
caused the planets to maintain their orbits around the sun.
5 H. Margolis, ‘Tycho’s System and Galileo’s Dialogue’,  Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science, 22 (1991), pp. 259–75.pp. 268–70.
6 Margolis, ‘Tycho’s System and Galileo’s Dialogue’, p. 271
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alternative.1 But it is hard to imagine that they would have preferred Ty-
cho’s scheme if they had not been under pressure from Church authorities
to reject the Copernican one.
But this is to jump ahead. At least in the late sixteenth century it was
by no means clear that the Copernican view would prevail. Between the
publication of Copernicus’s  De revolutionibus and the telescopic observa-
tions of Galileo, there was no clear answer to the question of which cosmo-
logy a rational observer ought to embrace. While the Ptolemaic system
may have seemed unsatisfactory, for the reasons Copernicus gave, there
were good reasons for being cautious about the Copernican alternative.
Even when Galileo finally observed the phases of Venus, with his newly-
invented telescope, in 1610, this did not prove the Copernican system to
be correct. It did show the Ptolemaic system to be false, but Galileo’s ob-
servations were compatible with Tycho’s geocentric alternative, as at least
one of his contemporaries reminded him.2 So at what point did Galileo
come to embrace the Copernican view and how did the Church react to his
doing so?
1 I. Pantin, ‘New Philosophy and Old Prejudices:  Aspects of the Reception
of Copernicanism in a Divided Europe’, Studies in the History and Philo-
sophy of Science, 30 (1999), pp. 237–62, on p. 247.
2 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 169.
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There are two aspects of what has come to be known as ‘the Galileo affair’.
The first has to do with Galileo’s embrace of the Copernican hypothesis.
When did he become a Copernican and how did he defend this view? The
second has to do with the Church’s reaction to his position. How did this
well-known mathematician and natural philosopher, who never ceased to
consider himself a loyal Catholic, come to be suspected of heresy?
 3.1  Galileo and Copernicus
During his years teaching mathematics at the universities of Pisa (1589–
92) and Padua (1592–1610), Galileo gave lectures on astronomy as part of
his regular duties. During his time at Pisa, he apparently defended the
traditional, Ptolemaic view of the cosmos, repeating the traditional argu-
ments against the idea of a heliocentric, geokinetic cosmology.1 We do not
know for certain when he embraced the Copernican view. Indeed, he may
have done so only gradually, so that it would be misleading to assign a
single date to the event. In a letter to Johannes Kepler in 1597, he claimed
to have accepted the Copernican theory ‘many years ago’, but it is difficult
to know exactly what this means.2 In that same letter he notes that he
was initially reluctant to express this view publicly, for fear of ridicule. It
may be for this reason that it did not feature in his teaching.
Interestingly,  it  does not  seem to  have been ecclesiastical  opposition
that worried Galileo at that time; it was more the general scepticism of his
contemporaries. As he wrote,
I adopted Copernicus’s opinion many years ago, and deduced from it the
cause of many natural effects doubtless inexplicable on the ordinary hy-
pothesis. I’ve written out many reasons for it and many responses to
reasons against it, which I have not dared to publish as I’ve been de-
terred by the fate of our master Copernicus. For although he has gained
1 S. Drake, ‘Galileo’s Steps to Full Copernicanism, and Back,  Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 18 (1987), pp. 93–105, on p. 94.
2 It may mean, as Drake suggests (‘Galileo’s Steps to Full Copernicanism,
and Back’, p. 105), that he first adopted the Copernican view as a mere
mathematical  instrument,  and only gradually became convinced of  its
physical reality.
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immortal  fame  among  a  few,  he  has  been  ridiculed  and  derided  by
countless others (for such is the number of fools). I would venture to dis-
close my thoughts if there were more like you; but as there are not, I
will forbear.1
The reasoning here is also interesting. What seems to have persuaded Ga-
lileo was the explanatory power of  the Copernican hypothesis,  the fact
that it allowed one to account for phenomena that would otherwise remain
mysterious. Even at this early date, Galileo may have been believed that
the theory would explain the movements of the tides. In fact, it was an in-
adequate explanation of tidal motions, as Kepler soon realized.2 But Ga-
lileo found the argument irresistible and it later featured prominently in
his Dialogue.
What other evidence do we have of Galileo’s conversion to Copernican
astronomy? In lectures given before the University of Padua in 1604, Ga-
lileo addressed the question of the nova, the new star, which had recently
appeared in the heavens. He argued that the nova existed beyond the or-
bit of the moon, an assertion that already challenged the traditional, Aris-
totelian cosmology. This held that the heavens were made of a fifth element,
which unlike the earthly elements (earth, air, fire, and water) was thought to
be unalterable.3 But if the nova was indeed beyond the orbit of the moon,
then it formed part of the heavens, and since the nova had just appeared
it showed that the heavens were not, in fact, unchanging.4 This was an im-
portant observation. Yet even if it suggested that the traditional cosmo-
logy was false, it offered no direct support to the Copernican theory.
Galileo’s  support  for  the  Copernican view only  became public  know-
ledge  with the  work entitled  the  Starry  Messenger,  which appeared  in
1610. The aim of this work was to report Galileo’s observations with his
newly invented telescope. Those observations included the irregular sur-
face of the moon, so closely resembling that of earth, the vastly increased
1 Galileo to Kepler, 4 August 1597, in Heilbron, Galileo, pp. 112–13.
2 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 116.
3 Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 2, chap. 7 (De caelo 289a).
4 Galileo coupled this observation with a false theory of the nature of the
nova itself, which he did not regard as a star (Heilbron, Galileo, p. 120),
but this fact need not detain us here.
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number of stars that were revealed by means of the telescope, and (per-
haps most importantly), four of the moons of Jupiter. 
Once again, none of these observations proved that the Copernican view
was correct. But the discovery of the Jupiter’s moons did remove one objec-
tion to it: that our moon would be left behind if the earth moved. In point-
ing this out, Galileo indicates his own support for Copernicus.
Here we have a fine and elegant argument for quieting the doubts of
those who,  while accepting with tranquil mind the revolutions of the
planets about the sun in the Copernican system, are mightily disturbed
to have the moon alone revolve around the earth … But now we have
not just one planet rotating around another while both run through a
great  orbit  around the  sun;  our  own eyes  show us  four stars  which
wander around Jupiter, as does the moon around the earth, while all to-
gether trace out a grand revolution about the sun.1
The people whose doubts he is trying to quiet here would seem to be fol-
lowers of Tycho Brahe, since no Ptolemaic astronomer would ‘accept with
a quiet mind the revolutions of the planets about the sun’.2 There is an-
other place in the same work in which Galileo indicates his support for Co-
pernicus,  promising that he will  one day prove the earth itself  to be a
‘wandering body’, that is to say, a planet.3
Galileo’s  History and Demonstrations Concerning Sunspots, published
in 1613, also reports observations consistent with the Copernican view.
These include the phases of Venus and the evidence, from sunspot obser-
vations, that the sun itself revolves. Galileo is puzzled by the appearance
of Saturn, which he at first takes to be an ‘aggregate of three stars’, 4 not
having  understood  the  nature  of  Saturn’s  rings.  But  he  suggests  that
whatever the explanation turns out to be, it too will harmonize admirably
1 G. Galilei, ‘The Starry Messenger’ (1610), tr. S. Drake, in S. Drake (ed.),
Discoveries and Opinions of  Galileo (New York:  Doubleday,  1957),  pp.
21–58, on p. 57.
2 Margolis, ‘Tycho’s System and Galileo’s Dialogue’, p.265.
3 Galilei, ‘The Starry Messenger’, p. 45.
4 G. Galilei,  ‘History and Demonstration concerning Sunspots and their
Phenomena’ (1613), tr. S. Drake, in S. Drake (ed.), Discoveries and Opin-
ions of Galileo (New York: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 87–144, on p. 143.
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with ‘the great Copernican system’.1 Even if this turned out to be true, how-
ever, ‘harmonize with’ is not the same as ‘prove’. The same can be said of
Galileo’s observations of the phases of Venus. These constitute evidence
against the Ptolemaic system and are consistent with that of Copernicus.
But  since  they  were  also  consistent  with  Tycho  Brahe’s  cosmological
scheme, they did not yet prove the Copernican view.
The threat to the Copernican view posed by Tycho’s alternative may
partly  account  for  the  Discourse  on  Comets,2 which  Galileo’s  follower,
Mario Guiducci, published in 1619. As the preface to the work suggests,
the work may be attributed to Guiducci but the ideas are those of Galileo. 3
Just as Galileo’s work on sunspots had been directed against one Jesuit
astronomer, Christopher Scheiner, so the apparent target of this work was
another Jesuit astronomer, Horatio Grassi. Its other target, however, was
the work of the Danish astronomer. By this time, Galileo had been forbid-
den to defend the Copernican theory, which only three years earlier had
been condemned by the Church. But while he cannot defend Copernicus,
he can make assumptions that are inconsistent with the Ptolemaic view,4
while also indicating his distaste for Tycho’s alternative. These moves con-
stitute implicit support for Copernicanism.  
This work was followed by a vigorous response by Grassi and a further
response by Galileo,  The Assayer, published in 1623. The awkward posi-
tion in which he now found himself is very evident in this work. He makes
reference to the Copernican theory to point out the importance of his own
telescopic observations,5 to remind readers that he had refuted an objec-
1 Galilei, ‘History and Demonstration concerning Sunspots and their Phe-
nomena’, p. 144.
2 Heilbron,  Galileo, p. 240; M. Biagioli,  Galileo, Courtier: The Practice of
Science in the Culture of Absolutism, Science and its Conceptual Founda-
tions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 285–86.
3 S. Drake, ‘Introduction’ to S. Drake and C. D. O’Malley (eds),  The Con-
troversy  on  the  Comets  of  1618 (Philadelphia,  PA:  University  of  Phil-
adelphia Press, 1960), pp. vii–xxv, on pp. xvi–xvii.
4 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 238.
5 G. Galilei, ‘The Assayer’ (1623), in S. Drake and C. D. O’Malley (eds),
The Controversy on the Comets of 1618, pp. 151–336, on p. 184.
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tion to that theory,1 and to point out its explanatory power in relation to
comets.2 But  on two of  these  occasions  he feels  obliged  to  refer  to  the
Church’s position,3 and to claim that ‘as a pious and Catholic person’ he
considers the Copernican theory ‘most false and vain’.4 It  is difficult  to
take this statement at face value. But while neither this work nor the Dis-
course on Comets played an important role in the defence of the Coper-
nican theory, they did play an important role in alienating the Jesuits of
the Collegio Romano, who had previously been sympathetic to Galileo and
had confirmed some of his telescopic observations.5
The clearest defence of Copernicanism is to be found Galileo’s Dialogue
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, which remains the best known
of Galileo’s writings. Published in 1632, this is the work that would pro-
voke Galileo’s final conflict with the Church authorities. Once again, Ga-
lileo must keep up the pretence of merely discussing and not defending
the Copernican theory. What allowed him to do this in so lengthy a work
was the dialogue style, in which the different participants could present
arguments for and against the Copernican view. The choice is presented
as one between  two world systems, the Copernican and the Ptolemaic,
which is odd. Firstly, it practically ignores Tycho’s theory, the strengths
and weaknesses of which are never directly addressed.6 Secondly, it as-
1 Galilei, ‘The Assayer’, pp. 285–87.
2 Galilei, ‘The Assayer’, pp. 268–69.
3 Galilei, ‘The Assayer’, p. 184.
4 Galilei, ‘The Assayer’, p. 269.
5 R. Ariew, ‘Theory of Comets at Paris During the Seventeenth Century’,
Journal of the History of Ideas, 53 (1992), pp. 355–72, on p. 357.
6 In a work published in 1625, Kepler complained about Galileo’s neglect
of Tycho’s hypothesis. It is not that Kepler was himself a follower of Ty-
cho in this respect. He had a close, although sometimes difficult, relation-
ship with Tycho, but was himself a convinced Copernican. See J. Kepler,
‘Appendix’  to  The Shieldbearer  to  Tycho Brahe the Dane (1625),  in S.
Drake and C. D. O’Malley (eds), The Controversy on the Comets of 1618,
pp. 339–55 (§§ 3–8).
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sumes that the Ptolemaic view is still a live option, when in fact it was
already widely regarded as discredited.1 
It is possible that the reason for this also lies in the pressures being ex-
erted by the Church authorities.2 We have no direct evidence of this, but
Galileo may have been initially permitted to publish this work on the un-
derstanding that it  would leave Tycho’s system as a viable alternative.
This seems a plausible suggestion, for Tycho’s work was already being
used by Catholic thinkers.3 In any case, while the Dialogue presents itself
as merely a discussion of the Copernican view, it was widely seen as a de-
fence  of  that  opinion.  This  is  certainly  how it  was  understood  by  the
Church authorities.
3.2  The Church’s Response
There are several stages in the Church’s response to Galileo’s defence of
the Copernican theory. An initial reaction containing a veiled warning was
followed by a decision against the theory and an injunction to Galileo not
to defend it. It was these events that led, in due course, to Galileo’s fam-
ous trial.
3.2.1  An Initial Reaction
The attitude of the Church authorities towards the Copernican view first be-
came clear in 1615. The key document was a letter written by Cardinal
Robert Bellarmine, a Jesuit theologian who was also a member of the Ro-
man Inquisition, the body responsible for ensuring doctrinal orthodoxy. (It
still exists, today called the ‘Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’.)
Bellarmine wrote his letter to the Carmelite priest Paolo Foscarini. Fo-
scarini had written a work whose content  is  clearly  summarized in its
wonderfully descriptive title: 
Letter on the Pythagorean and Copernican opinion of the earth’s motion
and the sun’s rest and on the new Pythagorean world system, in which
1 Margolis, ‘Tycho’s System and Galileo’s Dialogue’, pp. 261, 264.
2 Margolis, ‘Tycho’s System and Galileo’s Dialogue’, p. 273.
3 By 1620 Tycho’s system was being taught even in the introductory Jesuit
astronomy  text  (Margolis,  ‘Tycho’s  System and  Galileo’s  Dialogue’,  p.
274).
88
 3.2.1  An Initial Reaction
are harmonized and reconciled those passages of the Holy Scripture and
those theological propositions that could ever be adduced against this
opinion.1
Apparently confident he could convince Bellarmine of his views, Foscarini
had sent him a copy. Galileo had also been forwarded a copy. But Bel-
larmine’s reply left no doubt that Foscarini’s attempts at persuasion had
failed.
Since Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini also mentions Galileo, it can be seen
as a veiled warning to both thinkers. It makes three main points. The first
is that the Copernican view is acceptable if taught ‘suppositionally’ (or ‘hy-
pothetically’), but would be unacceptable if it were taught as a matter of
fact. I shall come back to this idea in a moment. Bellarmine’s second point
is that it would not be enough to show the Copernican view to be consist-
ent with Scripture; one must, as a Catholic, show the Copernican view to
be reconcilable with Scripture as interpreted by ‘the common consensus of
the Holy Fathers’.2 This was consistent with the principle laid down, not
long before, by the Council of Trent (1545–63). The target of the Council’s
decree had been Protestant claim that individual Christians were entitled
to interpret Scripture for themselves.3 Catholics, the Council insists, are
not permitted to do this, but must interpret Scripture in ways that are
consistent with the teaching of the Church. What this entails is also a
question to which I shall return.4 
Bellarmine’s third point is an important admission. He admits that ‘if
there were a true demonstration’ of the Copernican view, then we would
have to hesitate before invoking the authority of Scripture against it. In
these circumstances, Bellarmine notes, it would be better to concede that
we do not know the true meaning of Scripture than to invoke Scripture
1 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 333 n.44.
2 R. Bellarmine, ‘Letter to Foscarini’ (1615), in Finocchiaro (ed.),  The Ga-
lileo Affair, pp. 67–69, on p. 67.
3 Council of Trent, Session 4, ‘Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible
and on the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture’, in Denzinger and
Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de
rebus fidei et morum, § 1507.
4 See chap. 4, ‘The Scope of Biblical Authority’.
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against Copernicus. This,  too, is an issue  with which I  shall  deal  later,1
since it spells out the condition that Galileo had to meet to make the Co-
pernican view acceptable. He was obliged to show it had been conclusively
demonstrated. Bellarmine clearly believed that Galileo could not offer a
demonstration of this kind, but it is not clear that Galileo thought he could
either.
Let me come back for a moment to Bellarmine’s first point: that the Co-
pernican view would be acceptable if taught ‘suppositionally’ (or ‘hypothet-
ically’). To understand what this means, we need to examine the circum-
stances surrounding the publication of Copernicus’s work in 1543. Coper-
nicus  had  been  encouraged  to  publish  his  De  revolutionibus  by  Georg
Joachim Rheticus, from Wittenberg. But at the last minute, the oversight
of  its publication was left  to  a  Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander.
Osiander inserted an anonymous preface, stating that the view of the uni-
verse put forward in the book need not be considered as true, or even prob-
ably  true,  but  as  merely  a  useful  instrument  for  calculating  heavenly
movements. This almost certainly misrepresented Copernicus’s intentions,
as Galileo would later argue.2 But what Bellarmine was suggesting was
that if the Copernican theory were interpreted in this way, it would be en-
tirely acceptable.
To appreciate what Bellarmine was suggesting, it might be useful to
take a modern example. Works on celestial navigation – navigating by ref-
erence to the sun and stars – customarily begin by asking the reader to as-
sume something like the Ptolemaic view of the universe. The stars are to
be imagined as fixed to a celestial sphere, revolving around the earth. The
same books will immediately note that this is not, of course, the way the
universe is really structured. But the task of navigating by the stars will
be made easier if we pretend that it is while we are doing our calculations.
This  closely  parallels  the  ‘instrumentalist’  interpretation of  Copernican
theory that Bellarmine was endorsing: the Copernican theory was to be
regarded as merely an instrument for calculation rather than a reflection
of the way the world is.
1 See chap. 4, ‘Dealing with Apparent Conflict’.
2 G. Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’ (1615), in Finoc-
chiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, pp. 70–86, on pp. 78–79.
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It is customary to speak about ‘the trial of Galileo’, but there is a sense in
which the Galileo affair involved two trials.1 The first was a trial of the Co-
pernican theory itself, to decide if it was compatible with the Christian
faith. Bellarmine had already indicated that it was not, but his 1615 letter
was merely an informal response by an influential individual. It was not
yet  a  formal  verdict  on the basis  of  which disciplinary action could be
taken. The first formal verdict on the Copernican theory arose from a re-
port presented on 24 February 1616 by the consultants of the Holy Office.
The consultants condemned two propositions. The first had to do with the
position and immobility of the sun. It held that 
(1) the sun is the center of the world, and is completely devoid of local
motion.
The consultants rejected this view as ‘foolish and absurd in philosophy’
and ‘formally heretical’, 
since it explicitly contradicts in many places the sense of Holy Scripture,
according to the literal meaning of the words and according to the com-
mon interpretation and understanding of the Holy Fathers and doctors
of theology.
The second condemned proposition had to do with the position and motion
of the earth. It held that
(2) the earth is not the center of the world, nor motionless, but it moves
as a whole and with diurnal motion.
The consultants describe this view as ‘absurd in philosophy’, but as far as
its theological status is concerned, it receives the lesser censure of being
‘at least erroneous in faith’.2 
1 R. J. Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 111; see also E. McMullin, ‘Galileo
on Science and Scripture’,  in P. Machamer (ed.),  The Cambridge Com-
panion to Galileo (Cambridge: University Press, 1998), pp. 271–347, on
p. 276.
2 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 146.
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Based on this report, on 6 March 1616 the Vatican’s Congregation of
the Index prohibited the continued or future publication of any book that
taught these two propositions. Their decree demanded that Copernicus’s
work be emended before being republished and condemns the pro-Coper-
nican work of Foscarini. Galileo’s work was not explicitly mentioned, but
he had been formally notified of the condemnation of the Copernican the-
ory in a meeting with Bellarmine on 26 February. What we might think of
as the second trial  –  that  of  Galileo himself  in 1633 – was focused on
whether he had obeyed the instructions given him on that occasion.
The wording of these decisions makes it very clear what was at stake.
We have seen that there were apparently good arguments against the Co-
pernican view drawn from natural philosophy. But the key issue identified
in these documents is that of biblical authority. The differences between
Galileo and his opponents were religious, or, more precisely,  theological
differences. Galileo and his supporters believed that the Copernican view
was both supported by the evidence and compatible with Scripture and
Catholic tradition. His opponents disagreed, believing that whatever sup-
port it enjoyed was insufficient to warrant a reinterpretation of the plain
sense of the Bible. In addition to this, Catholics were obliged to maintain
the interpretation of Scripture that was established by the teaching of the
Church or the consensus of the Church Fathers. As the consultants’ report
makes clear, the problem with the Copernican view was not merely that it
was contrary to the literal sense of Scripture. It was also that this literal
sense of Scripture was backed up by Church tradition: it was in accord
with ‘the common interpretation and understanding of the Holy Fathers
and doctors of theology’.
3.2.3  The Trial of Galileo
The second of these historic events, the trial of Galileo himself, arose from
the publication of his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems.
In 1630 Galileo had travelled to Rome to obtain the  imprimatur for the
book, the official statement that would allow it to be printed. He had ob-
tained what he understood to be approval for publication, subject to some
minor amendments.1 But almost immediately following its publication in
1632,  questions  were  raised  in  Rome  regarding  its  content.  The  Pope
1 Heilbron, Galileo, pp. 298–99.
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(Urban VIII) prohibited the further distribution of the book and appointed
a commission to investigate it. In September, that commission reported
back and the Pope decided, as a result, to refer the matter to the Inquisi-
tion. They, in turn, summoned Galileo to Rome for examination, where he
arrived on 13 February 1633.
The key issue in the trial that followed was whether Galileo had obeyed
the terms of the injunction given to him by Cardinal Bellarmine in 1616.
There was some uncertainty as to just what that injunction had deman-
ded. Bellarmine had died in the meantime, so could not be consulted. At
the time, however, Galileo had asked Bellarmine for a letter summarizing
their meeting.  That  letter seemed a little  less severe than the account
found in the minutes of the Holy Office. But whatever the details, it was
clear that he had been prohibited from defending the Copernican theory.
The key question was: had he defended it? 
In the course of the trial, Galileo denied that he had; the work was,
after all, a dialogue, in which various points of view were presented. More
importantly, it ended with an argument which the Pope himself favoured.
Put in slightly more modern terms, the argument ran this way. It is true
that the Copernican theory seems the best available explanation of the as-
tronomical phenomena. But to insist that it is the only possible explana-
tion is to limit the power of God. God may, in fact, have chosen to bring
about the same phenomena by other means, unknown to us.1 As we shall
see,2 this is a difficult argument to answer,  if what one is looking for is
demonstrative proof of a scientific theory. 
In any case, the Roman tribunal was not convinced, holding that Ga-
lileo’s denials were disingenuous, if not outright dishonest. As they wrote
in their judgement,
the said book was diligently examined and found to violate explicitly the
above-mentioned injunction given to you; for in the same book you have
defended the said opinion already condemned..., although ... you try by
means of various subterfuges to give the impression of leaving it unde-
1 M. A. Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art of Reasoning: Rhetorical Founda-
tions of Logic and Scientific Method, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science 61 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 8–12.
2 See chap. 5, ‘Galileo’s Quest for Certainty’.
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cided and labeled as probable;  this is still  a  very serious error since
there is no way an opinion declared and defined contrary to Holy Scrip-
ture may be probable.1
Note the final argument here. If a view has been defined by the Church as
contrary to Sacred Scripture, then one may not hold it to be true. But nor
may one hold it to be even probably true. If it contradicts the authority of
Scripture, it can only be described as false. 
This verdict led to the tribunal’s sentence against Galileo, which con-
tained a dire threat, but also offered him a way out.
Consequently you have incurred all the censures and penalties imposed
and promulgated by the sacred canons and all particular and general
laws against such delinquents. We are willing to absolve you from them
provided that first, with a sincere heart and unfeigned faith, in front of
us you abjure, curse, and detest the above-mentioned errors and heres-
ies.
He could, in other words, escape the penalties imposed on heretics by re-
nouncing the views attributed to him. He would still be imprisoned for an
indefinite period as a punishment for his crime, a sentence that was later
commuted to house arrest.
Since Galileo had no wish for martyrdom, he had little choice but to un-
dergo this humiliating procedure. ‘The ailing old man knelt down pain-
fully before his judges and twenty witnesses and read out, lighted candle
in hand, the statement prepared for him’.2
With a sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and detest the
above-mentioned errors  and  heresies  and  in  general  each  and every
other error, heresy, and sect contrary to the Holy Church; and I swear
that in the future I will never again say or assert, orally or in writing,
anything that might cause a similar suspicion against me; on the con-
trary,  if  I  should  come to  know  any  heretic  or  anyone  suspected  of
heresy, I will denounce him to this Holy Office.3
1 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 289.
2 Heilbron, Galileo, p. 317.
3 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 282.
94
 3.2.3  The Trial of Galileo
The story that as he rose from his knees he muttered the words eppur si
muove (‘and yet it moves’) is surely a myth. But it contains an element of
truth. Galileo had not been convinced by scientific evidence or theological
arguments. He had been forced to submit his judgement to the authority
of the Church, behind which was the authority of Sacred Scripture, which
was regarded as the voice of God himself.1
Were the Church authorities wrong to do what they did? Given the logic
of their beliefs, there is a sense in which they were not justified. When con-
sidering the Copernican view, they may have made a wrong judgement
about the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, as Pope John Paul II would
suggest in 1992. But they had made a judgement and issued an order.
Given their assumptions regarding the authority of the Bible and the role
of the Church in interpreting it, they had every right to expect obedience.
On these grounds, their condemnation of Galileo seems entirely appropri-
ate.
One might argue that their case against Galileo should not have men-
tioned heresy. After all, the Church had not formally condemned the Co-
pernican view, but ‘merely’ prohibited its teaching or defence.2 But in a
Roman Catholic context, heresy is  defined as a departure from what the
Church holds and teaches. So the question of heresy is inseparable from
that of obedience. The wording of the charge on which Galileo was con-
victed – that of ‘vehement suspicion of heresy’ – does not imply that the
case against Galileo was thought to be unproven. Far from it. ‘Suspicion of
heresy’ was itself a crime, less serious, admittedly, than formal heresy,
1 William Wallace argues that Galileo, as a loyal son of the Church, may
have agreed with his judges that he should reject the Copernican view,
since he did not yet have the demonstrative proofs that would warrant a
reinterpretation of Scripture. But this implies that Galileo sincerely be-
lieved the Copernican view to  be  mistaken (on the basis  of  his faith)
while also sincerely believing that it was true (and would one day be
demonstrated). I cannot believe that this represents his state of mind at
the end of the trial. See W. A. Wallace, ‘Galileo’s Science and the Trial of
1633’, The Wilson Quarterly, 7:3 (Summer 1983), pp. 154–64, on p. 164.
2 Finocchiaro, Defending Copernicus and Galileo, p. 302.
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but more serious than some other religious offences.3 It may be that defi-
ance of the injunction not to teach or defend the Copernican view would
have been sufficient to  attract  this charge.4 The Inquisitors apparently
thought that it was.
Those are the facts of the Galileo affair, at least in broad outline. It is
time now to look behind the facts at the issues that were involved, to see
what light they shed on the relation of religion and science. Underlying
the  immediate  disagreement  between  Galileo  and  his  accusers were
deeper disagreements, regarding both the scope of biblical authority and
what was to be done when secular knowledge comes into conflict with the
Bible. It is to these deeper disagreements that we must now turn.
3 Finocchiaro, Retrying Galileo, p. 12.
4 Heilbron, Galileo, pp. 322–23.
96
4. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY
When Copernicus first proposed his revolutionary theory, there were ap-
parently good scientific reasons – arguments drawn from both astronomy
and natural philosophy – to reject it.1 It seemed, as the Vatican’s consult-
ants put it, ‘absurd in philosophy’. Nonetheless, the conflict between Ga-
lileo and his ecclesiastical opponents was primarily a theological one. The
Church authorities were persuaded by the scientific arguments, but it was
the authority of the Bible they invoked in order to condemn the Coper-
nican view.
No one in this debate rejected the authority of the Bible, as a divinely
inspired text. The Galileo affair was certainly not a clash between atheism
and religion. The disagreements had to do with two questions. The first
had to do with the scope of biblical authority. On what kinds of questions
should the Bible be understood to speak reliably? The second had to do
with how to deal with apparent conflicts. Under what circumstances was a
Catholic permitted to reinterpret the Bible so as to bring its teachings into
conformity with science ?
4.1  The Scope of Biblical Authority
We know Galileo’s view of the scope of biblical authority, for it is set out in
a work that he wrote in 1615 as a letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of
Lorraine. The Grand Duchess was the mother of Galileo’s patron Cosimo
II de’ Medici, who ruled over the lands of Tuscany between 1609 and 1621.
I shall not attempt an exegesis of the entire letter, a task that has been
undertaken by others.2 All I wish to do is to highlight one of Galileo’s her-
meneutical principles, the principles he thought should be employed in in-
terpreting Scripture.
The principle Galileo is attempting to defend is sometimes called a ‘prin-
ciple of limitation’, since it sets limits on the scope of biblical authority.  Only
once does he set this out in an explicit manner, but elsewhere it seems to
be the position he would like to endorse. If  we were to set it  out more
openly, it would read as follows.
1 See chap. 2, ‘Arguments against Copernicus’.
2 Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible, pp. 75–82; McMullin, ‘Ga-
lileo on Science and Scripture’, pp. 302–25.
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Principle of Limitation:  Since the primary concern of  Scripture is
with human salvation, texts of Scripture should not be taken to have a
bearing on questions of natural science.1
Galileo seems to have believed that this principle has behind it the au-
thority of St Augustine. I think he was mistaken in this respect,2 but I
shall not pursue that question here. Galileo does, however, begin with a
point  that  both  St  Augustine  and  Bellarmine  would  have  accepted,
namely that it was not the primary intention of the writers of Scripture to
teach natural philosophy. As Galileo writes in his letter,
it is the opinion of the holiest and most learned Fathers that the writers
of Holy Scripture not only did not pretend to teach us about the struc-
ture and motions of the heavens and the stars, and their shape, size,
and distance, but that they deliberately refrained from doing so, even
though they knew all these things very well.3
And again, in the same context, he writes:
The Holy Spirit  did not  want  to  teach us whether heaven moves or
stands still, nor whether its shape is spherical or like a discus or exten-
ded along a plane, nor whether the earth is located at its center or on
one side.4
This claim – that the purpose of Sacred Scripture is different from that of
the natural sciences – is relatively uncontroversial. But Galileo goes on to
draw a conclusion which Bellarmine and the consultants of the Holy Office
were unable to accept. He suggests that the authority of the Bible is lim-
ited to matters with which the natural sciences cannot deal.
In his letter to the Grand Duchess, Galileo at first does this only ob-
liquely, merely hinting at his principle of limitation.
1 McMullin,  ‘Galileo  on  Science  and  Scripture’,  p.  298.  I  have  adapted
McMullin’s wording here, in the light of what I argue elsewhere (see the
following note).
2 G. W. Dawes, ‘Could There Be Another Galileo Case?’,  The Journal of
Religion and Society, 4 (2002) [online], §§ 11–14.
3 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 94.
4 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 95.
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I would say that the authority of Holy Scripture aims chiefly [principal-
mente] at persuading men about those articles and propositions which,
surpassing all human reason, could not be discovered by scientific re-
search or  by  any  other  means than through the  mouth  of  the  Holy
Spirit.1
It becomes more explicit later in the letter, where Galileo makes reference
to the Council of Trent’s teaching. The Council had insisted that in mat-
ters of faith and morals no one should interpret the Bible in a way that is
contrary to the teaching of the Church or to the consensus of the Church
Fathers.2 In paraphrasing this passage Galileo makes a significant addi-
tion: the ruling applies, he writes, to ‘those passages alone which are mat-
ters of faith or of morals’.3 
For a  more explicit  statement of  Galileo’s  principle of  limitation,  we
need to turn to a letter he wrote to the Benedictine priest Benedetto Cas-
telli, ‘The authority of the Holy Writ’, Galileo insists, 
has merely [solamente] the aim of persuading men of those articles and
propositions which are necessary for their salvation and surpass all hu-
man reason, and so could not become credible through some other sci-
ence or any other means except through the mouth of the Holy Spirit it-
self.4
1 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, pp. 93–94.
2 Council of Trent, Session 4, ‘Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible
and on the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture’, in Denzinger and
Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de
rebus fidei et morum, § 1507.
3 Emphasis mine. This is not so evident in Finocchiaro’s translation (‘Let-
ter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 109), but it is clearer in Drake’s
version; see Drake (ed.), Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, p. 203.
4 G. Galilei, ‘Letter to Castelli’ (1613), in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Af-
fair, pp. 49–54, on p. 51. For discussions of this change, see McMullin,
‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, p. 343 n. 136 and M. Pera, ‘The God of
Theologians  and the  God of  Astronomers:  An Apology  of  Bellarmine’,
Machamer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Galileo, pp. 367–87, on p.
376.
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The implication is that if some truth is not necessary for salvation and is
attainable by human reason, it does not fall under the authority of Scrip-
ture.
It is precisely such a ‘principle of limitation’ that Galileo’s opponents
were unable to accept. Indeed it is expressly rejected in Bellarmine’s letter
of 1615 to Foscarini. Bellarmine first reminds Foscarini of the Council of
Trent’s decree and then rejects the very restriction for which Galileo ar-
gued.
Nor can one answer that this is not a matter of faith, since if it is not a
matter of faith ‘as regards the topic’ [ex parte objecti], it is a matter of
faith ‘as  regards the  speaker’  [ex  parte  dicentis];  and  so  it  would be
heretical  to  say that  Abraham did not  have two children and Jacob
twelve, as well as to say that Christ was not born of a virgin, because
both are said by the Holy Spirit through the mouths of the prophets and
the apostles.1
Richard Blackwell refers to this as the de dicto (‘by virtue of being said’)
doctrine of biblical authority: something is covered by biblical authority
simply by virtue of being recorded by the inspired authors.2 This seems to
interpret the Council’s decree in such a way that it imposes no limits at
all at all on the scope of biblical authority, as Galileo quickly realized.3 
It is clear that this is what Bellarmine intended, for he had already en-
dorsed this view of biblical authority in his earlier work, the De controver-
siis, written between 1586 and 1593. We find in that work the following
statement.
In Scripture there are many things which of themselves do not pertain
to the faith, that is, which were not written because it is necessary [for
salvation] to believe them. But it is necessary to believe them because
they were written.4 
1 Bellarmine, ‘Letter to Foscarini’, p. 68.
2 Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible, pp. 32, 105.
3 Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’, 84; Blackwell,  Ga-
lileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible, p. 108.
4 Bellarmine, Disputationes de controversiis, controversy 1, book 1, chap. 4,
cited in Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible, p. 32.
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In a word, whatever is written in Scripture is to be believed. It does not
matter how apparently trivial a fact it is or whether it seems to bear any
relation to our salvation. As Galileo pointed out, it would mean that Cath-
olics are obliged to believe that Tobias had a dog,1 because it is mentioned
in the book of Tobit (11:4).2 This means that ‘whatever the piece of inform-
ation is, and whatever God’s purpose may have been in including it, the
very  fact  that  something  is  written  in  Scripture  determines  that  it  is
true’.3 It  follows that if the Bible speaks of a miracle in which the sun
stands still (Joshua 10), Christians are obliged to believe that the sun nor-
mally moves, and this is inconsistent with Copernicus’s theory.
It is worth noting the similarity of this view to that held by modern
evangelical Christians.4 Protestant Christians do not, of course, consider
themselves  bound  to  the  Council  of  Trent,  or  even a  consensus  of  the
Church Fathers. Nor do they reject Copernican cosmology. But like Bel-
larmine, many reject the idea that biblical authority is to be limited to ex-
pressly  theological  matters.  This  is  certainly  true of  the  more than 300
evangelical theologians who drafted the Chicago Statement on Biblical In-
errancy in 1978.
Being wholly and verbally God-given, Scripture is without error or fault
in all its teaching, no less in what it states about God’s acts in creation,
about the events of world history, and about its own literary origins un-
der God, than in its witness to God’s saving grace in individual lives.5
1 Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’, p. 84
2 For Catholics, but not Protestants, this forms part of the biblical canon.
3 Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible, p. 32.
4 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Joseph  Smith,  the  nineteenth-century
founder of Mormonism (the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints),
avoided this problem, for the new Scriptures he produced revised the bib-
lical  cosmology.  Referring  to  Joshua’s  miracle,  the  Book  of  Mormon
states:  ‘Yea,  if  he  say  unto  the  earth  –  Thou  shalt  go  back,  that  it
lengthen out the day for many hours – it is done; And thus according to
his word the earth goeth back, and it appeareth unto man that the sun
standeth still; yea, and behold, this is so; for surely it is the earth that
moveth and not the sun’ (Helaman 12:14–15).
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Just in case the significance of that statement was not evident, the au-
thors added a clarification, which suggests that this view of biblical au-
thority supports young-earth creationism.
We deny that Biblical infallibility and inerrancy are limited to spiritual,
religious, or redemptive themes, exclusive of assertions in the fields of
history and science. We further deny that scientific hypotheses about
earth history may properly be used to overturn the teaching of Scrip-
ture on creation and the flood.1
Here, too, we find a vigorous rejection of a principle of limitation, of the
kind that Galileo had sought to defend. Mikael Stenmark would call this
view of biblical authority ‘expansionist’.2 But as I noted earlier, it is odd to
describe it in this way when it so widely shared by Christian thinkers. 
4.2  Dealing with Apparent Conflict
So the first question that lay behind Galileo’s conflict with the Church au-
thorities had to do with the scope of biblical authority. The second ques-
tion had to do with apparent conflicts between science and the Bible. How
should the Christian respond if the best natural philosophy of the day ap-
pears inconsistent  with something that  Scripture seems to  teach? This
was a question to which there was a well-established answer, already to
be  found  in  the  writings  of  St  Augustine.3 After  examining  this  ‘Au-
5 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Short Statement § 4, cited in R.
C. Sproul,  Can I Trust the Bible? (1980),  Crucial Questions 2 (Orlando,
FL: Reformation Trust Publishing, 2009), pp. xv–xvi.
1 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Article XII (Sproul, Can I Trust
the Bible?, p. xix)
2 Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion, pp. 183–94 (see my Intro-
duction, ‘The Relation of Religion and Science’).
3 Note that such principles are not unique to Christianity: they seem to
have  been  shared,  for  instance,  by  the  medieval  Jewish  philosopher
Moses Maimonides; see E. McMullin, ‘How Should Cosmology Relate to
Theology?’,  in A.  R.  Peacocke (ed.),  The Sciences  and Theology in the
Twentieth Century (Stocksfield, Northumberland: Oriel Press, 1981), pp.
17–57, on p. 29 and  M. Maimonides,  The Guide for the Perplexed  (ca.
102
 4.2  Dealing with Apparent Conflict
gustinian solution’, I shall outline a modification of it that has emerged in
more recent times, which broadens its scope.
4.2.1 The Augustinian Solution
The Augustinian solution to an apparent conflict between religion and sci-
ence took the form of two principles. The first is what Ernan McMullin
calls a ‘principle of priority of demonstration’.
Principle of the Priority of Demonstration: When there is conflict
between a proven truth about nature and a particular reading of Scrip-
ture, an alternative reading of Scripture must be sought.1
The key phrase here is ‘a proven truth about nature’, since if something is
indisputably true, then it cannot be the case that Scripture would teach
otherwise. After all, God is the author of both the book of nature and the
book of Scripture and they cannot disagree. Bellarmine had already ac-
knowledged this principle in his letter to Foscarini, where he had noted
that a decisive proof of Copernicanism might lead to a reinterpretation of
the relevant biblical passages .2
There is, however, another principle that forms part of this tradition. It
holds that in the absence of a proven truth about nature that apparently
contradicts Scripture, the literal sense of the biblical text ought to be ac-
cepted. This is a ‘principle of the priority of Scripture’.
Principle of the Priority of Scripture: Where there is an apparent
conflict between a Scripture passage and an assertion about the natural
world grounded on sense or reason, the literal reading of the Scripture
1190), tr. M. Friedländer, 4th edition (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.,
1904), part 2, chap. 25 (pp. 176–77).
1 McMullin, ‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, p. 294.
2 These debates are not unique to Christianity. Ibn Rushd (better known
as Averroes; 1126–98) applies exactly the same principle to the interpret-
ation of the Qur’an. As he writes, ‘whenever the conclusion of a demon-
stration is in conflict with the apparent meaning of Scripture, that ap-
parent meaning admits of allegorical interpretation’ (cited in Brożek, The
Double Truth Controversy, part 1.1).
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passage should prevail as long as the latter assertion lacks demonstra-
tion.1
Oddly enough, Galileo does not reject these principles; indeed he appears
to accept them. One might expect him to support the principle of the prior-
ity of demonstration, which would urge the reinterpretation of Scripture
given sufficient scientific evidence. But Galileo seems to support even the
principle of the priority of Scripture, which urges the priority of Scripture
when such reasons are lacking. As he writes in the letter to the Grand
Duchess,
even with regard to those propositions which are not articles of faith,
the authority of the same Holy Writ should have priority over the au-
thority of any human writings containing pure narration or even prob-
able reasons but no demonstrable proofs. This principle should be con-
sidered  appropriate  and  necessary  inasmuch  as  divine  wisdom  sur-
passes all human judgement and speculation.2
With regard to the principle of the priority of demonstration, Galileo
and his opponents may have had different ideas about what would consti-
tute ‘a proven truth about nature’. It is not clear, however, that he thinks
the Copernican theory falls into this category.3 In the opening paragraphs
of the letter to the Grand Duchess, Galileo does make some strong claims
in favour of the Copernican view.4 But in his own notes on Bellarmine’s
letter to Foscarini he takes a remarkably modest view of the evidence in
its support. The Ptolemaic theory, he writes, ‘is undoubtedly false’, while
the Copernican ‘may be true’.5
4.2.2  Two Forms of Prudence
There is, however, a problem here. If Galileo really held to the principle of
the priority of Scripture  and believed the Copernican view to be not yet
1 McMullin, ‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, p. 295.
2 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 94.
3 See chap. 5, ‘Galileo’s Quest for Certainty’.
4 McMullin, Galileo on Science and Scripture’, pp. 311–12; Galilei, ‘Letter
to the Grand Duchess Christina’, pp. 88–89.
5 Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’, p. 85.
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demonstrated, he should have agreed that the literal sense of Scripture
should be preferred. But in fact he does not. He argues that even if the Co-
pernican view is not yet proven, we should not invoke biblical authority
against it. Why not? Because we may in the future have decisive proof it is
true. If we do come to have such proof, then the Church’s condemnation of
the theory would be a cause of scandal.1 A view of this kind does find some
support  in  Christian tradition,  for  even St  Augustine articulated  what
McMullin calls a  principle of prudence. But Galileo gives this principle a
new twist, leading to a position his opponents were unable to accept.
Let me begin with St Augustine’s principle. What St Augustine argues
is  that  Christians  should  be  careful  about  claiming  there  is  a  conflict
between Scripture and natural philosophy, for if they are mistaken they
risk bringing the faith into disrepute. As he writes,
even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens,
and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the
stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable
eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and the seasons,
about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this know-
ledge he holds to as being certain from reason and experience. Now, it is
a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian,
presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on
these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embar-
rassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian
and laugh it to scorn.2 
Now Galileo’s view is not identical with this, so in order to distinguish Au-
gustine’s principle from Galileo’s, I shall label it the principle of prudence1
(note the subscript). As expressed by Ernan McMullin, it reads as follows.
Principle of Prudence1: When trying to ascertain the meaning of a
difficult Scriptural passage, one should keep in mind that different in-
terpretations of the text may be possible, and ... should not rush into
1 Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’, p. 81.
2 Augustine, De Genesis ad litteram, book 12, chap. 19 (The Literal Mean-
ing of Genesis, vol. 1, p. 44).
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premature commitment to one of these, especially since further progress
in the search for truth may later undermine this interpretation.1
But when Galileo urges prudence in the interpretation of Scripture, he
does so in a rather different way. 
Galileo’s principle of prudence is best understood as a modification of
the principle of the priority of demonstration. This holds, you may recall,
that one should not insist on the literal sense of Scripture if it contradicts
something  that  has been scientifically  demonstrated.  This  implies  that
propositions with evidence in their support fall into two categories, which
we might call ‘the demonstrated’ and ‘the (merely) probable’, But Galileo
introduces a third category, that of propositions that are demonstrable in
principle but which have not yet been demonstrated.2 He argues that one
should not give priority to the literal sense of Scripture if it is even pos-
sible that natural philosophy will later demonstrate this to be false.
This is clearest in another passage in the letter to the Grand Duchess.
Galileo first of all makes the traditional distinction. There are, he writes,
propositions about which we cannot be certain: the most we can have is
probable opinion.3 There are also propositions about which we can have
‘complete certainty on the basis of experiments, long observations, and ne-
cessary demonstrations’.4 What about the Copernican hypothesis? This, he
suggests, falls into the third category of matters about which we  could
have certain knowledge, even if we do not yet have the required evidence.
His suggestion is that one should not invoke Scriptural authority in oppos-
ition to propositions of this kind.
This amounts to a very different kind of principle of prudence from that
which St Augustine defended. I shall describe Galileo’s principle as the
principle of prudence2.
1 McMullin, ‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, p. 292.
2 McMullin, ‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, p. 310.
3 A modern philosopher might hold that the whole of science falls into the
first category, since we can never be certain about any scientific theory
(see chap. 5, ‘Science and Certainty’), but this was not Galileo’s view.
4 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 104. 
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Principle of Prudence2: Where a proposition about the physical world
apparently conflicts with the literal sense of Scripture, a literal reading
of Scripture should not take priority if it is possible that the truth of
that proposition will one day be demonstrated.
As Galileo writes,
I should think it would be very prudent not to allow anyone to commit
and in a way oblige scriptural passages to have to maintain the truth of
any physical conclusions  whose contrary could ever be proven to us by
the senses and demonstrative and necessary reasons.1
The problem is that, on the assumption that scientific theories could be
proven in this way, this is equivalent to Galileo’s principle of limitation. It
entails that the authority of Scripture should not be invoked against any
promising scientific hypothesis.
Bellarmine and the consultants of the Holy Office may well have be-
lieved that decisive proof of the Copernican view was impossible.2 If so,
they would have had little fear that the Church’s judgement on this mat-
ter would later be  overturned.  After  all,  they regarded the Copernican
view as ‘foolish and absurd in philosophy’ as well as ‘formally heretical’.3
But even if they had not believed this, they could not have accepted Ga-
lileo’s  modified principle of  prudence (the  principle of  prudence2)  or his
principle of limitation. Their starting-point was the authority of Scripture,
of which at least Bellarmine took (as we have seen) a particularly strong
view. All other beliefs, in their view, had to be brought into conformity
with the established interpretation of Scripture. Galileo’s starting point,
by way of contrast, was what he called ‘physical and mathematical argu-
ments’,4 with which our interpretation of Scripture ought to be brought
into conformity. With such different starting-points, it  seems inevitable
that the two sides would come into conflict.
1 Galilei, ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’, p. 96 (emphasis mine).
2 McMullin, ‘Galileo on Science and Scripture’, pp. 283, 323.
3 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 146.
4 Galilei, ‘Considerations on the Copernican Opinion’, p. 81.
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The views I have outlined are those held by participants in the Galileo af-
fair. But what about Christian thinkers today? Someone wanting to adopt
the Augustinian solution in our own time may wish to modify it a little, for
the way in which I have presented that solution overlooks a key question.
The literal sense of Scripture may well take priority, when the science is
in doubt, but how confident can we be about the literal sense of Scripture?
St Augustine was certainly not unaware of this problem. His first attempt
at writing a commentary on the literal meaning of Genesis, between  AD
393 and 395, was left unfinished. We know it as the De Genesi ad litteram
imperfectus liber: the ‘unfinished book’. His completed commentary took
him about fourteen years, being finished only around AD 416, and he made
no secret of the difficulty of the task. 
Oddly enough,  this  hermeneutical  question appears not  to  have fea-
tured prominently in the Galileo affair. The reason may be that Roman
Catholics were bound to a tradition of interpretation, stemming from the
Fathers and finding its most recent expression in the Council of Trent,
which to some degree settled the issue. It was this tradition that revealed
the literal sense of Sacred Scripture and Catholics were expected to hold
to it without hesitation. But an Augustinian in our own time may not ac-
cept the Roman Catholic view.
One way in which this question might be addressed has been outlined
by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga shares with other Protestant thinkers the
idea that in matters relating to salvation, the meaning of the Bible is ‘per-
spicuous’, that is to say sufficient clear to the rightly disposed reader.1 But
he recognizes that Christians do disagree about the meaning of the bib-
lical text. It follows, he says, that we cannot assume we have understood
what God is intending to convey. (This is, of course, an expression of St
Augustine’s ‘principle of prudence’, the principle of prudence1.) Note that if
there is any doubt here, it is not about the authority of the Bible, as such.
That God is speaking in and through the words of Sacred Scripture is a
non-negotiable claim, as we shall see.2 But there may be some doubt as to
whether we have understood his revealed word correctly. 
1 See chap. 5, ‘The Claimed Certainty of Faith’ (section 5.1.3).
2 See chap. 5, ‘The Claimed Certainty of Faith’.
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It may be helpful at this point to introduce an idea which comes from
the work of Dan Sperber. It has to do with what Sperber describes as ‘re-
flective beliefs’. Such beliefs are not simply particular ways of represent-
ing the world; they are also held in association with what Sperber calls a
‘validating context’.1 This might involve reference to some authority who
guarantees the truth of this belief or it might involve reference to some
line of argument that lends support to it. Sperber’s examples include the
following.
[1] I remember that, the day we first met, it was raining.
[2] There are indubitable signs that someone has been searching the
house.
[3] It is a scientific fact that a glass of wine a day is good for the heart.
We might add a fourth, namely
[4] The Bible teaches that Jesus rose from the dead.
Phrases such as ‘I  remember that’, ‘it is a scientific fact that’, and ‘the
Bible teaches that’ place the proposition believed in a validating context.
If we think of the proposition believed as a representation of an (actual or
merely imagined) state of affairs, we can symbolize it  as  R.  If  we then
symbolize the validating context as V, we can think of a reflective belief as
having the form V(R).
Using this terminology, we can express Plantinga’s idea by saying that
there is no doubt about  V, the validating context. Christians have tradi-
tionally regarded biblical authority as beyond question. But there can be
doubt about R, the content of the belief, since we cannot be entirely confid-
ent we have understood it correctly. What, then, can we do in the case of
an apparent conflict between religion and science, between what we take
to  be  the  meaning  of  the  biblical  text  and  some  scientific  theory?
Plantinga’s answer is that we must ‘weight up the relative warrant, the
relative backing or strength, of the conflicting teachings’, for on both sides
‘we will have much more warrant for some apparent teachings than for
others’.
1 D.  Sperber,  ‘Intuitive  and  Reflective  Beliefs’,  Mind  &  Language,  12
(1997), pp. 67–83, on p. 71.
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It may be hard to see just what the Lord proposes to teach us in the
Song of Solomon or Old Testament genealogies; it is vastly easier to see
what he proposes to teach us in the Gospel accounts of Christ’s resurrec-
tion from the dead. On the other side, it is clear that among the deliver-
ances of reason is the proposition that the earth is round rather than
flat;  it  is enormously harder to be sure,  however,  that contemporary
quantum mechanics, taken realistically, has things right.1
To put this in more clearly Augustinian terms, Christians need to weigh
up the likelihood that they have understood the literal sense of Scripture
and compare it with the likelihood that a scientific theory is correct. Only
then can they make a judgement about which is to take priority. 
This is a slightly more sophisticated view than that employed by parti-
cipants in the Galileo affair. But it is important to note that it could result
in just the same outcome. Christians could decide that they are reasonably
confident about the literal meaning of the Bible on a topic and much less
confident about the scientific theory that apparently clashes with it. In
this situation, the biblical teaching will prevail. Indeed Plantinga suggests
that this ought to be the case when it comes to Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection.
4.3  Has Anything Changed?
When Pope John Paul II restored Galileo to favour in 1992, he endorsed
what he presented as Galileo’s view of biblical interpretation.
Paradoxically,  Galileo,  a sincere believer,  showed himself  to  be  more
perceptive  in  this  regard  than  the  theologians  who  opposed  him.  ‘If
Scripture cannot err’, he wrote to Benedetto Castelli, ‘certain of its in-
terpreters and commentators can and do so in many ways’.  We also
know of his letter to Christine de Lorraine (1615) which is like a short
treatise on biblical hermeneutics.2
1 A. Plantinga, ‘When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible’
(1991),  in R.  T.  Pennock (ed.),  Intelligent  Design  Creationism and its
Critics:  Philosophical,  Theological,  and Scientific  Perspectives,  A Brad-
ford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 113–45, on p. 121.
2 John Paul II, ‘Faith Can Never Conflict with Reason’, L’Osservatore Ro-
mano, weekly edition in English, 4 November 1992, pp. 1–2.
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It was Galileo’s view, the Pope suggested, that had been accepted by a
general council of the bishops of the Catholic Church, namely the second
Vatican Council, in 1965. This is, however, a case of wishful thinking on
the Pope’s part. 
If we look at what the second Vatican Council actually taught, we find
that it carefully avoided endorsing anything like Galileo’s principle of lim-
itation. The key passage here is from the Council’s Dogmatic Constitution
on Divine Revelation – commonly known (after its opening words) as Dei
Verbum – which deals with the inspiration and the authority of the Bible.
The first part of paragraph eleven deals in relatively traditional terms
with the doctrine of inspiration. But the key text for our topic is to be
found in second part of the paragraph. The wording is as follows.
Since therefore all that the inspired authors or sacred writers assert
ought to be held to be asserted by the Holy Spirit, it follows that the
books  of  Scripture  are  to  be  declared  to  teach firmly,  faithfully  and
without error the truth which God wished to be consigned to the Sacred
Letters for the sake of our salvation.
The history of this much-debated text highlights the care with which it
is worded. As the document went through its various drafts in the autumn
of 1964, the Council Fathers grappled with the difficult question of biblical
inerrancy. The form of the text produced for discussion at this time stated
that the Scriptures ‘are to be acknowledged as teaching firmly and faith-
fully, in its fulness and without error  the truth of salvation’.1 But when
this reached the Council for debate, a number of the Fathers expressed
concerns about the phrase ‘truth of salvation’. This expression seemed to
them to limit the inerrancy of Scripture to matters of faith and morals, a
position which they saw as contrary to Catholic tradition. 
In response to these concerns, the Theological Commission (which ad-
vised the Council Fathers) argued that the key phrase ‘truth of salvation’
should be retained, since it did not necessarily limit the scope of either in-
spiration or inerrancy. But the more conservative Council Fathers were
1 The Latin reads, veritatem salutarem; cited in A. Grillmeier, ‘Chapter III
of  the  Dogmatic  Constitution on  Divine  Revelation’,  in H.  Vorgrimler
(ed.),  Commentary  on  the  Documents  of  Vatican II (London:  Burns  &
Oates, 1969), vol. 3, pp. 199–246, on p. 210 (emphasis mine).
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not satisfied with this and their concerns lead to the intervention of Pope
Paul VI. On 17 October 1965 the Pope sent a letter to Cardinal Ottaviani,
himself  a  deeply  conservative  figure  who  was  head  of  the  Theological
Commission. The letter suggested that the Commission consider afresh
the wisdom of this phrase, since it was at least susceptible of a false inter-
pretation. After an intense debate, the Commission (and later the Council)
accepted the present formulation, which was originally offered by a group
of seventy-three Council Fathers as a way out of the difficulty.1 
The  intention  of  these  changes  was  clear.  The  abandonment  of  the
phrase ‘truth of salvation’ was intended to avoid any suggestion that the
scope of biblical authority is limited to particular kinds of knowledge.2 To
use the language of scholastic philosophy, the new wording suggests not a
material distinction but a formal one.3 It suggests the particular purpose
for which the  whole of Scripture was inspired. It makes it clear that not
only matters of faith and morals, but other matters too – matters of his-
tory or of natural science – could fall under the authority of Scripture, if
1 Grillmeier, ‘Chapter III of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revela-
tion’, pp. 211–15. It is interesting to note that the Commission subtly but
significantly altered the wording of the formulation presented by the sev-
enty-three Fathers.  Their proposed formula had read  veritatem, quam
Deus,  nostrae  salutis  causa,  libris  sacris  consignare  voluit,  where  the
phrase ‘cause of our salvation’ could be read in apposition to ‘God’. The
clause would then have to be translated as ‘the truth which God, the
cause of our salvation, wished to consign to the sacred books’. The Com-
mission not only altered the active infinitive (consignare: ‘to consign’) to a
passive (consignari: ‘to be consigned’), to emphasise once again the fact of
the human authorship of the Bible. It also removed the commas, so that
the word  causa would naturally be read in the ablative rather than in
the nominative case, as an adverbial qualification of consignari. In the fi-
nal text, the phrase nostrae salutis causā clearly indicates not the role of
God as saviour, but the purpose for which these matters were being con-
signed to writing. 
2 Grillmeier, ‘Chapter III of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revela-
tion’, p. 231.
3 Grillmeier, ‘Chapter III of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revela-
tion’, p. 234.
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they can be shown to relate ‘to our salvation’. In other words, the second
Vatican Council’s decree was expressly formulated to exclude what I have
called a  principle of limitation: the idea that the authority of Scripture
could not be invoked in matters relating to science. This was, as we have
seen, the principle for which Galileo argued.
It follows that Pope John Paul II was simply wrong when he asserted
that  the  Council  had  endorsed  Galileo’s  hermeneutical  principles.  The
Church’s attitude to biblical authority today may be slightly more flexible
than that of Cardinal Bellarmine, but even this is not entirely clear. The
Council’s  formulation  suggests  that  not  everything  in  Scripture  was
placed there ‘for the sake of our salvation’. But it does not say that those
matters recorded for another purpose lack the guarantee provided by bib-
lical authority.1 Many of the Council Fathers surely intended this more
liberal view, but it is nowhere set out explicitly, presumably because of the
break with traditional attitudes it  would entail.2 When it  comes to the
Church’s view of biblical authority, little has changed.
1 This  does  seem  to  have  been  the  intention  of  some  Council  Fathers
(Grillmeier, ‘Chapter III of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revela-
tion’, pp. 205–9), but Vatican II nowhere explicitly abandons the de dicto
principle of biblical authority articulated by Cardinal Bellarmine.
2 Something very close to Bellarmine’s view of biblical inerrancy had been
endorsed by at least two modern popes, namely Leo XIII (in 1893) and
Pius XII (in 1943): see J. J. Megivern, Official Catholic Teachings: Bible
Interpretation (Wilmington,  NC:  Consortium,  1978), §§  337–38  and  §
718.
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Lurking in the background of this debate about biblical interpretation was
a question regarding certainty. After all, even Galileo’s opponents admit-
ted that if the Copernican view could be conclusively demonstrated, they
would be forced to reinterpret the relevant biblical passages. But could the
Copernican view be demonstrated in this way? More generally, what de-
gree of certainty was science thought to yield and how did this compare
with the certainty of faith? If the two were put in the balance, on which
side were the scales likely to fall?
5.1  The Claimed Certainty of Faith
In the centuries before Galileo’s conflict with the Church, Christian theolo-
gians had affirmed that the ‘obedience of faith’ (as it was widely known)
yields knowledge of the highest possible degree of certainty.
5.1.1  ‘More Certain than Science’
We find this view clearly expressed in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In his
Summa theologiae, Aquinas addresses the very question with which we
are concerned: that of whether faith yields greater certainty than science.
By ‘science’, of course, Aquinas does not mean the mathematical and ex-
perimental science of which Galileo was a pioneer. He means a body of
knowledge in which conclusions about the world are drawn, by deductive
reasoning, from self-evident principles.1 His answer is that faith does yield
a greater degree of certainty.  He admits that this seems surprising.  It
might  appear that  matters  known by  faith are  less certain than those
known  by  natural  philosophy.  After  all,  in  natural  philosophy  we  can
grasp the reasons why things are as they are, whereas many Christian
doctrines remain mysterious, since they speak of matters that surpass hu-
man understanding. Nonetheless, even if we cannot fully understand such
doctrines, we know them to be true with a certainty that human reason
can never attain, because of their divine origin.2 Their degree of certainty
therefore surpasses that of any other form of knowledge.3
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a, qu. 1, art. 2.
2 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 4, art. 8.
115
 5.1.1  ‘More Certain than Science’
When medieval writers such as Aquinas speak about certainty, what
they are speaking about is firmness of assent. In general, a proposition can
be described as certain when it is one to which we give our assent without
fear of being mistaken. There are, however, degrees of certainty. One can
give one’s assent to two different propositions – say, that ‘fire is hot’ and
that ‘whole is greater than any of its parts’ – without fear of being wrong
in either case. But one can have a greater degree of confidence about the
second proposition than about the first. One can at least conceive of a fire
that is not hot, while one cannot conceive of a whole that is not greater
than any of its parts.1 What is clear, however, is that for Aquinas no de-
gree of certainty can match that provided by God’s word. A demonstration
that takes as its premises an article of faith will always trump any demon-
stration whose premises are drawn from merely human reasoning. In an
early work, Aquinas suggests that reasoning based on faith will  trump
even demonstrations made on the basis of self-evident principles (such as
that regarding parts and wholes).2
It follows that the doctrines revealed by God can be used to judge all
other claims to knowledge. There may seem to be excellent reasons, for in-
stance, to adopt the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world. But
if this really does contradict what Scripture teaches, then it is the Aris-
totelian doctrine that must give way. Why? Because Scripture enjoys noth-
3 Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of St John lect. 5, sect. 2, § 662. For
a similar argument, see C. Rosental, Lessons from Aquinas: A Resolution
of  the  Problem  of  Faith  and  Reason (Macon,  GA:  Mercer  University
Press, 2011), pp. 134–35.
1 See ‘The Aristotelian Ideal of Science’ below.
2 Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences (qu. 1, art. 3 qc. 3 ad 1, cited in
B.  D.  Marshall,  ‘Quod  scit  una  uetula:  Aquinas  on  the  Nature  of
Theology’, in R. van Nieuwenhove and J. Wawrykow (eds), The Theology
of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2005), pp. 1–35, on p. 17.  John Jenkins notes that this comes from an
early work, but it seems consistent with what is found in a passage in
the later  Summa theologiae (1a,  qu.1,  art.  6,  ad 2).  See J  I.  Jenkins,
Knowledge  and  Faith  in  Thomas  Aquinas (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press, 1997), p. 168.
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ing less than divine authority, whereas the sciences enjoy a lesser degree
of authority, that of ‘natural reason’. It follows that any scientific conclu-
sion that is contrary to Scripture ‘must be condemned as false’.1 Or, as
Aquinas puts it more colourfully, it is to be ‘spewed out’.2 Since what we
know by faith enjoys a greater degree of certainty than what we know by
natural reason, ‘natural reason should be subservient to faith’.3 
While this doctrine is most clearly taught by Aquinas, it also underlines
what I have called the principle of the priority of Scripture, which featured
so prominently in the Galileo affair.4 This holds that in the case of an ap-
parent conflict between science and Scripture, if there is any doubt about
the scientific theory in question, the literal sense of Scripture is to prevail.
The only qualification here is that we may not always understand what a
divine revelation is telling us. A demonstrative proof of a theory that ap-
parently contradicts Scripture would be a good indication that we have
not understood Scripture correctly. (This is, of course, the complementary
principle of the priority of demonstration.) But to say this is not to give sci-
entific reasoning a priority over divine revelation. Far from it. If we knew
the  correct  interpretation  of  the  Bible,  then  no evidence  drawn  from
merely human reasoning could be permitted to overturn it. 
Galileo,  of  course,  thought  that  Scripture  was being  misunderstood
when it was invoked against Copernicus. His problem is that he was not
permitted, as an individual, to offer a new interpretation of Scripture. He
could, perhaps, argue for it, but at the end of the day he was obliged to
give the assent of faith to the interpretation laid down by the Church. As
Bellarmine had reminded Foscarini, ‘the Council [of Trent] prohibits inter-
preting Scripture against  the  common consensus of  the  Holy Fathers’.5
Only a decision by the Church authorities to reinterpret Scripture could
free Galileo from this obligation. In the meantime, he was obliged to treat
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a, qu.1, art. 6, ad 2.
2 Aquinas,  Commentary on Colossians 2:9  §  96, cited in Marshall, ‘Quod
scit una uetula’, p. 33 n. 80. The allusion here is to Rev 3:16.
3 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a, qu. 1, art. 8, ad 2.
4 See chap 4, ‘Dealing with Apparent Conflict’.
5 Bellarmine, ‘Letter to Foscarini’, pp. 67–68.
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the established, literal interpretation of Scripture as though it represen-
ted the very Word of God.1
5.1.2  ‘The Secret Testimony of the Spirit’.
The view that faith yields certain knowledge was not unique to Roman
Catholicism. The Protestant Reformers had developed their own version of
this doctrine. They opposed the Roman Catholic idea that it was the au-
thority of the  Church that gave certain knowledge, but emphasized with
equal vigour the certainty of what was known by faith. In fact, the Prot-
estant Reformers went further than Aquinas.  Aquinas had emphasized
the objective certainty of faith: that the doctrines believed rest on an un-
shakeable foundation, namely divine revelation. But the Protestant Re-
formers also insist that faith gives rise to a subjective sense of certainty in
the heart of the believer.
We see this view expressed in the work of John Calvin. Calvin’s particu-
lar target is the Roman Catholic view of faith, which involves the accept-
ance of what the Church proposes for belief. He complains that this sub-
jects the authority of Sacred Scripture to the ‘merely human’ judgement of
the Church. This reliance on human judgement, he insists, is fatal to the
believer’s sense of assurance. Faced with the infinite holiness of God and
our own unworthiness as sinners, how can we be confident of salvation, if
not through the unshakeable authority of God’s own Word?2 The question
then becomes: What gives us this assurance of salvation? 
1 Modern, liberal Roman Catholic theologians are inclined to make distinc-
tions  between different  types  of  Church pronouncement  and to  argue
that Catholics are obliged to give the assent of faith, in the fullest sense
of that term, only to those that enjoy the highest level of authority. But
Galileo’s opponents were making no such distinctions. As I noted earlier
(chap. 3, ‘The Church’s Response’), even if belief in the Copernican theory
had not been formally defined as heretical, it was being treated (on the
basis of the consultants’ report) as though it were (Finocchiaro,  Defend-
ing Copernicus and Galileo, p. 143).
2 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), tr. F. Lewis Battles,
Library of Christian Classics 20–21 (London: SCM, 1961), book 1, chap.
7, § 1.
118
 5.1.2  ‘The Secret Testimony of the Spirit’.
Calvin first suggests that our confidence comes from a kind of immedi-
ate apprehension of the truth of Scripture.
It is as if someone asked: Whence will we learn to distinguish light from
darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter?  Indeed, Scripture exhib-
its  itself  fully as  clear evidence of  its  own truth as  black and white
things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things do of their taste.1
The problem is that this looks like another case of subjecting biblical au-
thority to merely human judgement, in this case the judgement of the in-
dividual believer. So Calvin goes on to insist that the source of this cer-
tainty  is  God  himself:  it  is  nothing  less  than the  Holy  Spirit  working
within the heart of the believer. This ‘secret testimony of the Spirit’ is a
higher authority than human reasons, judgements, or conjectures’. It  is
‘more excellent than all reason’.2 
Calvin does offer what he calls ‘external evidences’ of the authority of
Scripture, based on rational arguments. But these arguments are inten-
ded to support a faith that is already established;3 to an unbeliever they
will seem unconvincing.4 The believer has no need to subject Sacred Scrip-
ture to proof and reasoning, since its certainty arises not from reason but
from ‘the testimony of the Spirit’.5 Both medieval and later writers distin-
guished between differing degrees of certainty,6 but it is clear how Calvin
would respond to this. The authority of Scripture, he would insist, enjoys
the highest possible degree of certainty, greater than that provided by any
merely human reasoning.
1 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 7, § 2.
2 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 7, § 4.
3 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 8, § 13 
4 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 3, chap. 2, § 33.
5 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 7, § 5.
6 H. G. van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630–
90,  International Archives of the History of Ideas 3 (The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 144 et passim; see ‘The Aristotelian Idea of Sci-
ence’, below.
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Calvin’s account of the certainty of faith is connected with the reading of
Sacred Scripture. But there remains what I earlier called the hermeneut-
ical question. How can we be certain we have understood Scripture cor-
rectly?  This was the issue addressed by Alvin Plantinga,  when he argued
that we should be cautious about claiming that Scripture and science are in
conflict,  since  we  cannot  be  certain  we  have  understood  Scripture  cor-
rectly.1 His attitude here resembles that expressed in St Augustine’s ‘prin-
ciple of prudence’.2 But it needs to be balanced against another doctrine to
which Plantinga claims allegiance, that of the ‘perspicuity of Scripture’.3
This is the idea that on matters essential for salvation the meaning of
Scripture is sufficiently clear to any rightly disposed reader. 
One could argue that this doctrine has patristic roots, but it was cer-
tainly emphasized by the Reformers, particularly by Martin Luther. In his
work  On the Bondage of the Will, Luther vigorously rejects a suggestion
made by Erasmus of Rotterdam: the idea that certain teachings are not
clearly  expressed  in  Scripture  and  that  Christians  are  not,  therefore,
bound to them.4 Luther responds that the meaning of the Bible is ‘plain’
and that the believer is therefore capable of grasping it, although he in-
sists that  it  is  by means of  the Holy Spirit  that  this understanding is
achieved.5 
The same doctrine was picked up by later Christian thinkers and is per-
haps most concisely expressed in the Westminster Confession of 1646.
All things in scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear
unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed,
and observed, for salvation,  are so clearly propounded and opened in
1 See chap. 4, ‘Our Knowledge of the Literal Sense’.
2 See chap. 4, ‘Two Forms of Prudence’.
3 Plantinga, ‘When Faith and Reason Clash’, p. 119.
4 M. Luther, ‘On the Bondage of the Will’ (1525), in E. Gordon Rupp and P.
S. Watson (eds),  Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, Library
of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1969), pp.
101–334, on p. 110 (WA 18, 606–609).
5 Luther, ‘On the Bondage of the Will’, p. 112.
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some place of scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the un-
learned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a suffi-
cient understanding of them.1
It is true, of course, that not all modern Protestant Christians would ac-
cept this idea. Indeed it would be difficult to find any doctrine to which all
modern Protestant Christians adhere. But it is a cornerstone of any tradi-
tional form of Protestant theology.
Once again, Dan Sperber’s work can shed light on this question. Re-
member the proposition:
The Bible teaches that Jesus rose from the dead.
Sperber’s idea is that the initial phrase, ‘the Bible teaches’, describes the
‘validating context’  of  the belief  (in this case, that  Jesus rose from the
dead). What Luther and Calvin are saying is that it is not merely the ‘val-
idating context’ of central Christian beliefs that is beyond doubt. It is not
the case that while the authority of the Bible is certain, what it teaches is
uncertain.  Luther  and Calvin  would  freely  admit  that  there  are  times
when we cannot be certain we have understood Sacred Scripture. This is
why even Protestants need theologians. But when it comes to those beliefs
that are necessary for salvation, the Holy Spirit guides the believer to un-
derstand the Bible correctly. Believers can be certain about these key bib-
lical teachings.
The role of the Holy Spirit in Calvinist thought has its parallels in Ro-
man Catholic teaching. Here, too, it is the Holy Spirit that guarantees we
have understood Sacred Scripture correctly, at least when it comes to the
central articles of faith. But the Holy Spirit does not work simply by way
of  an  inner  testimony.  It  also  works  by  way  of  the  external  guidance
provided by the teaching authority of the Church. This idea found its most
vivid expression in 1870, with the definition of the doctrine of papal infal-
libility  at  the  first  Vatican Council.  This  doctrine  does  not  entail  that
everything a Pope teaches is divinely guaranteed. But it does mean that
when a Pope pronounces on a matter that is central to the Catholic faith,
he is preserved from error. 
1 Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. 1, art. 7.
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Such an idea has parallels in other religious traditions. A striking ex-
ample is the mainstream Shi‘ite Muslim belief in the twelve infallible Im-
ams, descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and son-in-
law ‘Ali. Here, too, the underlying idea is that it is not enough to have a
divinely  guaranteed  Sacred  Scripture.  One  must  also  have  a  divinely
guaranteed way of  ensuring that  it  is  understood correctly.  On such a
view, then, whether Muslim or Christian, the certainty of faith extends
not just to the fact of divine revelation; it extends also to certain ways of
understanding that revelation, that is  to say,  particular beliefs derived
from Sacred Scripture.
5.2  Galileo’s Quest for Certainty
What  about  the  sciences?  Do  they  make  comparable  clams  to  certain
knowledge? There was a time when natural philosophers held to an ideal
of certain knowledge, although they rarely claimed to have achieved it.
But with the growth of modern science, even this ideal was abandoned. By
way of contrast,  leading religious thinkers continue to  insist  that faith
gives a level of certainty that human reason can never attain. 
5.2.1  The Aristotelian Ideal of Science
Let me begin with the natural philosophy of Galileo’s day. Within natural
philosophy, there is a tradition dating back to Aristotle that distinguishes
sharply between knowledge and opinion. Aristotle had argued that we en-
joy  knowledge, as opposed to mere  opinion, when we know the causes of
the phenomena. But to know the cause of a phenomenon is to grasp the
necessary connection that exists between the cause and the effect.1 The
most natural way of expressing this is by way of a syllogism, i.e., a deduct-
ive argument that has the fact to be explained as its conclusion. Aristotle’s
best known example of such an argument is:
All objects near the earth do not twinkle.
The planets are near the earth.
Therefore, the planets do not twinkle.2
1 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chap. 2 (Analytica posteriora 71b).
2 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chap. 13 (Analytica posteriora 78a);
M.  Fehér, ‘Galileo and the Demonstrative Ideal of Science’,  Studies in
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The reason why the planets do not twinkle – the cause of this effect – is
given by the second premise (the ‘minor’ premise).
A key question for Aristotelian thinkers is how we know the premises to
be true. After all, the conclusion of such an argument cannot attain any
higher degree of certainty than is found in the premises. Let’s start with
the  second  (‘minor’)  premise.  Aristotle  thinks  that  observation coupled
with a simple process of  reasoning can lead to  the conclusion that  the
planets are close to the earth. The reasoning in question would run as fol-
lows:
The planets do not twinkle.
All objects which do not twinkle are near the earth.
Therefore, the planets are near the earth.1
This is not yet an explanatory syllogism; it merely establishes a fact. But
the fact it establishes is one we can use in our explanation. What about
the first (or ‘major’) premise of the explanatory syllogism: ‘all objects near
the earth do not twinkle’? In Aristotle’s view, this is also derived from ob-
servation. Indeed he firmly rejects the idea that the premises of an ex-
planatory syllogism in the natural sciences are a matter of innate know-
ledge, insisting that they must be drawn from sense perception.2 
The problem is that it is far from clear that sense perception can do
what Aristotle demands. . Even leaving aside sceptical doubts about the
reliability of our senses, Aristotle’s ideal of science demands that our
minds can grasp what is necessarily true of objects, what is essential to
them.3 But can we do this by way of the evidence of the senses? We can ob-
serve, for instance, that the heavenly bodies are apparently unchanging or
that they move in circles. But that doesn’t tell us that they are essentially
unchanging or that it is  of their very nature to move in circles.4 Aristotle
History and Philosophy of Science, 13 (1982), pp. 87–110, on p. 91.
1 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, chap. 13 (Analytica posteriora 78a).
2 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 2, chap. 19 (Analytica posteriora 99b–
100b).
3 Aristotle,  Posterior Analytics, book 1, chap. 4 (Analytica posteriora 73a–
74a).
123
 5.2.1  The Aristotelian Ideal of Science
ends  up  positing  a  kind  of  intellectual  intuition  that  is  capable  of
grasping such truths, but its nature is mysterious. 
Late medieval thinkers were not unaware of such difficulties. Many had
come to accept that while we can be entirely confident of the first prin-
ciples of reason (such as ‘the whole is greater than any of its parts’), we
cannot always be so confident about matters known by experience. Duns
Scotus, for instance, holds that while empirical knowledge (as we would
call it) can sometimes be traced back to self-evident propositions, there are
occasions when it cannot. We can observe, for instance, that a lunar ec-
lipse occurs when the earth is found between the sun and the moon. We
can be certain that this fact explains the eclipse when we combine it with
a  ‘self-evident’  principle,  namely  that  when  an  opaque  body  is  placed
between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light is
impeded.1 But in the case of other matters known by experience, such as
the properties of certain herbs, we lack such a principle. Our conviction
that a particular herb cures an illness may be supported by the fact that
has regularly done so in the past. But this constitutes ‘the very lowest de-
gree of scientific knowledge’.2 If the premises of our scientific reasoning
are of this kind, drawn from nothing more than the constant conjunction
4 S. Gaukroger,  Explanatory Structures: A Study of Concepts of Explana-
tion in Early Physics and Philosophy,  Harvester Studies in Philosophy
(Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), pp. 122–24.
1 To the objection that this so-called ‘self-evident’ principle is itself drawn
from experience, Scotus responds that experience is merely the occasion,
not  the  cause,  of  our  realizing  the  truth  of  the  principle.  See  K.  H.
Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology
and the Foundations of Semantics,  1250–1345,  Studien und Texte zur
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 22 (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill,  1988), p. 80
and  J.  Duns  Scotus,  Philosophical  Writings,  tr.  A.  Wolter  O.F.M.
(Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp. 108, 115.
2 Scotus, Philosophical Writings, pp. 110–11; see also A. W. Hall, Aquinas
and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages, Con-
tinuum Studies in Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 82–85.
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of certain observations, their conclusions will have  nothing more than a
high degree of probability.1 
Those who held to such views did not abandon the Aristotelian concep-
tion of deductive science (as modern scientists have done). But they did re-
cognize that natural philosophy could not always attain the highest pos-
sible  degree  of  certainty.2 A  particularly  interesting  discussion  of  this
question is found in the work of a thinker we have already encountered,
namely  John  Buridan.3 Buridan  distinguishes  between  the  certainty
which arises from logical necessity – the kind of necessity that even God
could not alter – and natural necessity.4 The idea that there is some neces-
sity that even God could not alter might seem odd, since God is supposed
to be omnipotent. But most theologians believed that God could not create
something that would involve a contradiction,5 such as a square with a di-
agonal equal to one of the sides.6 Natural philosophy, Buridan continues,
can attain the level of certainty associated with second kind of necessity,
1 J. Weinberg, Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance,
and Causality (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), p. 64.
2 E. Serene, ‘Demonstrative Science’, in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg
(eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 496–517,
on p. 506; R. Pasnau, ‘Medieval Social Epistemology:  Scientia for Mere
Mortals’, Episteme, 7 (2010), pp. 23–41, on p. 30.
3 It is interesting to note Buridan’s remarks regarding the ‘subjective’ cer-
tainty that accompanies religious belief. He notes that a person can enjoy
the highest degree of subjective certainty even though what he believes
is false. This is clear, he writes, from the example of those heretics who
will die rather than renounce their views. See J. Buridan, Summulae de
Dialectica, treatise 8, chap. 4; ET:  Summulae de Dialectica: An Annot-
ated Translation with a Philosophical Introduction by Gyula Klima, Yale
Library of Medieval Philosophy (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press,
2001),  p. 710; see also Buridan’s Buridan’s  In Metaphysicen Aristotelis
Questiones argutissimae, book 2, chap. 1, cited in Pasnau, ‘Medieval So-
cial Epistemology’, p. 31.
4 Pasnau, ‘Medieval Social Epistemology’, p. 30.
5 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a, qu. 25, art. 4.
6 Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, chap. 15 (p. 279).
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but not that associated with the first. It can never exclude the possibility
that God might alter the way the world operates.
Lurking in the background here may be Archbishop of Paris’s condem-
nations of 1277.1 One of its targets seems to have been the idea that God’s
actions  are  restricted  to  the  way nature  regularly  operates.2 What  the
theologians wanted to defend was God’s absolute power, his ability to act
in any way that is consistently describable (or ‘logically possible’, as philo-
sophers say).3 Buridan does not, of course, deny that God has such power,
that he might step outside the natural order and work miracles. But his
point is that the natural philosopher does not need to worry about this
possibility. 
Since this view sheds light on Galileo’s difficulties, it is worth citing the
key passage in Buridan’s work, which distinguishes the two kinds of cer-
tainty involved. ‘One sort of certainty’, Buridan writes, 
is that which pertains to a proposition so firmly true that it, or one sim-
ilar to it, can by no power be falsified. … But this sort of certainty is not
required for natural science or metaphysics, nor even in the arts or mor-
ality. Another sort of human certainty … is that of a true proposition
that cannot be falsified by any natural power and by any manner of
natural operation, although it can be falsified by a supernatural power
and in a miraculous way. And such certainty suffices for natural sci-
ences. And thus I truly know, by natural science, that the heavens are
moved and that the sun is bright.4
To put this more simply, we can be certain with a natural certainty that
the heavens move, but we cannot exclude the possibility that God could
bring their movement to a halt. But this need not be of concern to natural
philosophers, who do not deal with miracles. Their subject,  writes Bur-
1 See chap. 1, ‘The Debates regarding Aristotle’.
2 See, in particular, proposition 147, cited in Grant, A Source Book in Me-
dieval Science, § 13.
3 Grant, ‘The Condemnation of 1277, God’s Absolute Power, and Physical
Thought in the Late Middle Ages’, p. 214.
4 Buridan,  Summulae de Dialectica,  treatise 8,  chap. 4,  sect.  4  (p. 709);
Pasnau, ‘Medieval Social Epistemology’, p. 30.
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idan, is ‘the common course of nature’: what happens ‘for the most part’
and by way of natural causes.1
This means that there was, as Edward Grant charmingly puts it, ‘a de-
gree  of  uncertainty  … within  Buridan’s  concept  of  certitude’.2 Natural
philosophy might operate by deductive reasoning, in which true premises
cannot  give  rise  to  false  conclusions.  But  the  premises  employed  were
falsifiable. They were falsifiable not merely on the grounds that God could
work a miracle. They were also falsifiable by reference to observation. It is
true that both Duns Scotus and Buridan share Aristotle’s confidence in
the power of the human mind to draw reliable conclusions from empirical
data.3 But since at least some principles of natural science are not self-
evidently true, being drawn from observation, they could be revised in the
light of new evidence.4 On this view, then, natural philosophy cannot claim
absolute certainty for many of its conclusions. 
5.2.2  Galileo’s Impossible Task
While  Galileo’s  ecclesiastical  opponents  claimed  that  what  Scripture
teaches is certain, enjoying a higher degree of certainty than any scientific
conclusion, they were prepared to admit that it might need to be reinter-
preted. We might alter our view of what Scriptures teaches. We would
have to do so, departing from the literal sense of a biblical passage, if a
natural scientific  conclusion that contradicted it  could be proven. So to
compel the Church authorities to reinterpret Scripture, Galileo needed a
demonstrative proof of the Copernican theory. 
1 Serene, ‘Demonstrative Science’, p. 516; E. Grant,  A History of Natural
Philosophy:  From the  Ancient  World to  the  Nineteenth Century (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 257.
2 E. Grant, ‘Science and Theology in the Middle Ages’ (1986), in E. Grant,
The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages,  Studies in
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 52 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 2010). pp. 225–52, on p. 237.
3 J.  Zupko,  John Buridan:  Portrait  of  a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), p. 196.
4 Grant, ‘Science and Theology in the Middle Ages’, p. 237.
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In the same way as late medieval natural philosophers, Galileo holds to
the Aristotelian ideal  of  science.  Early  in the  Dialogue,  his spokesman
Salviati contrasts the kind of knowledge available in the humanities or
law with that yielded by the natural sciences. He insists that scientific
conclusions are ‘true and necessary’.1 But what this means will depend on
how one understands the necessity involved. What kind of demonstration
is required here? If what is required is demonstration in the strict sense,
then Pope Urban VIII’s argument that Galileo had inserted into his Dia-
logue seems unanswerable.2 Galileo was faced with an impossible task.
The Pope’s argument held that even if the Copernican theory were the
best available explanation of the astronomical phenomena, it  is always
possible that God may be bringing about the same phenomena by other
means, unknown to us. To insist that the Copernican view is the only pos-
sible explanation would be to limit the omnipotence of God. We do not
need to believe in God to see the force of this argument. As philosophers of
science have often noted, no scientific theory is ever  conclusively proven,
since there is always more than one possible explanation of  any set  of
data.3
Take for example, Galileo’s key argument for Copernicanism: that it
would explain the movements  of  the  tides.  If  this  is  supposed to  be  a
demonstrative argument, then it looks like an instance of the fallacy of af-
firming the consequent.4 To base one’s support for the Copernican theory
on the argument that if it were true, it would explain the movements of
the tides looks suspiciously like an argument of the form:
1 Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, p. 53.
2 See chap. 3, ‘The Trial of Galileo’.
3 Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art of Reasoning, p. 10.
4 It certainly looked this way to one of Galileo’s contemporaries, Antonio
Rocco, who is 1633 accused him of precisely this fallacy. For Rocco’s com-
ments and Galileo’s response, see A. Favaro (ed.),  Le Opere de Galileo
Galilei:  Edizione Nazionale (Firenze:  G.  Barbèra,  1897),  vol.  7,  p.  699
and A. C. Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradi-
tion: The History of Argument and Explanation Especially in the Math-
ematical and Biomedical Sciences and Arts, 3 volumes (London: Gerald
Duckworth & Co., 1994), p. 611.
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The path outside my window is wet.
If it had been raining, the path would be wet.
Therefore, it has been raining.
The problem here is that something else could have caused the path to be
wet. (My wife could have been watering the garden.) As it happens, this
was precisely the problem with Galileo’s argument. There was another po-
tential explanation that was closer to the true one: the idea that the tides
are caused by the influence of the moon over the seas. Galileo rejected this
because it seemed to him to involve a mysterious, occult force.1 
But while the Pope’s argument might seem a good one, it was putting
Galileo in an impossible position. It was demanding was that he produce
arguments enjoying a level of demonstrative force that was unattainable.
The point  is  not  merely  that  it  seems unattainable  to  us,  who have a
rather different view of scientific proof. It would have seemed unattain-
able to anyone familiar with late medieval discussions of scientific know-
ledge.  What was the Pope demanding? He was insisting that Galileo
rule out the possibility that God brings about the tides in some other
way.  Since God can do anything that can be consistently described, the
Pope was demanding that Galileo rule out the bare  logical possibility of
another explanation. To do this, he would have had to produce an argu-
ment whose conclusion was ‘so firmly true that it … can by no power be
falsified’.2 As Buridan had argued, natural philosophy could not hope for
this, but must settle for a lesser degree of demonstrative force. 
To the best of my knowledge, Galileo never comments on the degree of
certainty attainable in natural philosophy. But we know he was familiar
with late medieval discussions of the Aristotelian ideal of science.3 In one
1 Galilei,  Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, p. 462. Ga-
lileo did attribute to the moon an indirect influence over the tides (Dia-
logue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, pp. 451–54); an explana-
tion of  its  direct influence  had  to  await  Newton’s  theory  of  universal
gravitation.
2 Buridan,  Summulae de Dialectica,  treatise 8,  chap. 4,  sect.  4  (p. 709);
Pasnau, ‘Medieval Social Epistemology’, p. 30.
3 A. C. Crombie,  ‘Sources of Galileo’s Early Natural Philosophy’, in M. L.
Righini Bonelli and W. R. Shea (eds), Reason, Experiment, and Mysticism
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of his earliest surviving writings, he refers to the very distinction upon
which Buridan relies: between a necessity that even God could not alter
and one that reflects the common course of nature.1 He relies on the same
distinction when he remarks that what natural philosophers seek to dis-
cover is not ‘that which God was able to do, but that which He has done’.2
But if he did hold to the same view as did Buridan – that in natural philo-
sophy a less than absolute degree of certainty must suffice – it would ex-
plain why he is so quick to dismiss the accusation that his argument was
logically flawed.3 It may also be the reason why he concedes the force of
the Pope’s argument without allowing it to sway his own judgement in fa-
vour of Copernicus. He would have known that the Pope’s demand was un-
reasonable. 
Did Galileo think that he had, in fact, provided a demonstration of the
Copernican theory? It is difficult to say. Possibly he did,4 on the grounds
that while the Copernican theory was not the only possible explanation of
the movement of the tides, it  was  the  only plausible one. He may have
thought that this constituted the nearest one could come to a demonstrat-
ive proof in such matters. It seems more likely, however, that he thought
he had good reasons to favour the Copernican view, while realizing that
in the Scientific Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 157–75, on
pp. 171–75.
1 Galileo Galilei,  ‘Treatise on Demonstration’,  D2.7,  in  Galileo’s  Logical
Treatises: A Translation, with Notes and Commentary, of His Appropri-
ated Latin Questions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, tr. W. A. Wallace,
Boston  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Science  138  (Dordrecht:  Kluwer,
1992), pp. 125–215, on p. 155; see also W. A. Wallace, Galileo’s Logic of
Discovery and Proof: The Background, Content, and Use of His Appropri-
ated Treatises  on Aristotle’s  Posterior  Analytics,  Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 137 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), p. 145.
2 This is from Galileo’s response to a work by Jean-Baptiste Morin (1583–
1656). See Galileo Galilei, ‘Note per il Morino’ (1631), in Favaro (ed.), Le
Opere de Galileo Galilei,  vol.  7,  pp. 562–68, on p.  565 (translation my
own).
3 Crombie,  Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition, p. 611.
4 Fehér, ‘Galileo and the Demonstrative Ideal of Science’, p. 99.
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these fell short of demonstrative proof.1 Galileo certainly recognised exis-
ted arguments of this kind, which an Aristotelian would have called ‘dia-
lectical’  arguments.2 His spokesman Salviati freely admits that at least
one argument in favour of the Copernican theory does not constitute ‘a ne-
cessary demonstration’, but merely shows its ‘greater probability’.3 
Note, too, that if Galileo thought that his arguments were less than
demonstrative, it would make sense of his modification of the traditional
Augustinian principle of prudence.4 Galileo shares with his contemporaries
the view that  biblical  authority  should  not  be  invoked against  demon-
strated scientific theories. But he also insists that it should not be invoked
against  theories  that  might  one  day be  demonstrated.  This  insistence
would be understandable if he thought the Copernican theory fell into this
category.
It is, however, difficult to tell just what Galileo thought his arguments
had achieved. The reason for this may be that the Church’s edict had put
him in a bind. If he did think he had a demonstrative proof of the Coper-
nican theory, he could not state so openly, for fear of being seen to violate
the Church’s prohibition. If, on the other hand, he thought he had ‘good
enough’ arguments – arguments that supported the theory but that fell
short of demonstrative proof – he could not argue for this, either. Firstly,
claiming that the Copernican view was merely probable could also be seen
as violating the Church’s edict. Indeed this is how his judges did see it,
since they pointed out in their condemnation that no opinion can be con-
sidered probable that contradicts Scripture.5 Secondly, if the Copernican
1 Wallace, Galileo’s Logic of Discovery and Proof, p. 233 n. 40.
2 Galileo Galilei,  ‘Treatise on Foreknowledge’,  F2.4,  in  Galileo’s  Logical
Treatises: A Translation, with Notes and Commentary, of His Appropri-
ated Latin Questions on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, tr. W. A. Wallace,
Boston  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Science  138  (Dordrecht:  Kluwer,
1992), pp. 85–123, on p. 91.
3 Galilei,  Dialogue  Concerning  the  Two  Chief  World  Systems,  pp.  118;
Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art of Reasoning, pp. 113–14, 178.
4 See chap. 4, ‘Two Forms of Prudence’.
5 Cited in Finocchiaro (ed.), The Galileo Affair, p. 289.
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theory were merely probable, then the Church would have no reason to
abandon the literal sense of the biblical passages that contradicted it.
5.3  Religion and Certainty
In Galileo’s case, then, an ecclesiastical authority claiming certain know-
ledge  faced  a  new natural  philosophy  which  aspired  to  certainty,  but
which had difficulty producing the arguments required to attain this goal.
But  is  this  still  the  case? One might  expect  that  religious thinkers no
longer claim certainty for the knowledge that comes from faith. Surely
they have learned some humility in the last four hundred years? On the
other side,  what  about scientific knowledge? What degree of  confidence
does modern science claim for its findings? 
5.3.1  Against Enthusiasm
The  seventeenth  century  saw the  emergence  of  a  changed  attitude  to
knowledge. Richard Popkin refers to this changed attitude as ‘construct-
ive’  or ‘mitigated’  scepticism.1 Proponents freely admitted what the an-
cient sceptical tradition had pointed out: that we can enjoy little or no cer-
tainty in matters of fact. But constructive sceptics insisted that this does
not matter, since we can be content with a high degree of probability, an
assurance  that  falls  short  of  certain  knowledge.2 A  number  of  these
1 This was in part a reaction to the more radical scepticism of thinkers
such as  Michel  de Montaigne (1533–92).  The more radical  position is
sometimes known as  Pyrrhonian scepticism, after Pyrrho of Ellis (360–
270 BC). Oddly enough, it was often used to lend support to religious be-
liefs, on the grounds that if human reason is so unreliable, we must rely
on divine revelation; see R. H. Popkin, ‘Prophecy and Scepticism in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century’,  British Journal for the History of
Philosophy, 4 (1996), pp. 1–20, on pp. 12–13. The more moderate, ‘con-
structive’ or ‘mitigated’ scepticism was also known as  Academic scepti-
cism, since its original proponents were leaders of Plato’s Academy, or
Carneadian scepticism, after Carneades (213–129 BC). On the differences
between these two types of scepticism, see R. H. Popkin, The History of
Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Revised Edition (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2003), pp. xvii–xix.
2 Popkin, The History of Scepticism, p. 112 et passim.
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thinkers were so bold as to extend this moderately sceptical attitude to
the Christian faith. They were content with something less than certainty
in matters of religious belief.1 
We see something of this attitude in the work of the seventeenth-cen-
tury jurist Hugo Grotius. Grotius held that in matters of religion we must
be satisfied with no greater a level of proof than we employ in history and
in everyday life. Indeed, he argues, God chose to make the evidence in
support of religion less certain than that of sense perception and demon-
stration.  He did this in order to ‘try men’s honest dispositions’, since the
evidence  is  sufficient  to  persuade  anyone  ‘who  is  not  obstinately  bent
against it’.2 
A similar view is found in the work of William Chillingworth. Chilling-
worth argues that while religious faith – ‘an assent to Divine revelations
upon the authority of the revealer’ – differs from mere opinion, it shares
some of the characteristics of opinion. Among these is the fact that it is
‘built  on less  evidence than that  of  sense or science’.  Over against  the
Catholics, who demand ‘a certainty of faith above that of sense or science’,
Chillingworth  argues  that  this  is  not  required.  It  is  sufficient  if  the
strength of our faith is ‘equal or proportionable to’ the evidence that can
be produced in its support.3 Chillingworth’s ideas are picked up by John
Locke, in his  Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), and it is
Locke’s view that I would like to examine more closely.
Locke’s particular target is  what he calls religious ‘enthusiasm’.  The
‘enthusiasts’, in the language of his day, were those who claimed religious
1 B.  J.  Schapiro,  Probability  and  Certainty  in  Seventeenth-Century
England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion,
History, Law, and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1983), pp. 74–118.
2 H. Grotius, The Truth of the Christian Religion (1627), tr. J. Clarke; 15th
edition (London: Richard Baynes, 1818), book 2,  sect.  19 (pp. 122–23);
Grotius may also have been influenced by the conceptions of probability
to be found in legal reasoning. For his views on that topic, see Franklin,
The Science of Conjecture, pp. 79–80.
3 W. Chillingworth,  The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation
(1638; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1846), chap. 2, sect. 7–8 (pp. 65–66). 
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knowledge on the basis of what was thought to be a direct communication
from God. Enthusiasm was widely feared among seventeenth and eight-
eenth European intellectuals.1 Indeed their attitude to enthusiasm closely
resembles our attitude to fundamentalism. What lay behind the fear of en-
thusiasm was ‘the fury of the millennial sects,  expressed by those who
have figured in the Peasants War in Germany and the Anabaptist rebel-
lion at Münster’.2 England had seen nothing quite so radical, but memor-
ies of the Civil War (1642–51) and Oliver Cromwell’s Puritans were still
strong. Religious enthusiasm had a frightening ability to turn the world
upside down.
Locke begins his discussion with what looks like a very traditional dis-
tinction between faith and reason. This has to do with the source of what
is believed. ‘Reason’, he writes, 
I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such proposi-
tions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such
ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensa-
tion or reflection.3 
‘Reason’, then, is simply Locke’s term for our ability to reflect on ideas ar-
rived at by using our natural faculties.4 Faith, on the other hand, 
is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of
reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in
some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering
truths to men, we call revelation.5
1 L. Daston, ‘Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern
Europe’, Critical Inquiry, 18 (1991), pp. 93–124, on p. 118
2 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Enthusiasm: The Antiself of Enlightenment’,  Hunting-
ton Library Quarterly, 60 (1997), pp. 7–28, on p. 10.
3 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 18, §
2.
4 D. C. Snyder, ‘Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay’, Journal of the History
of Ideas, 47 (1986), pp. 197–213, on p. 203.
5 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 18, §
2.
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The key insight here is that there are matters we cannot know  on the
basis of our own reasoning, but can learn about on the authority of others. 
On the face of it, this seems quite right. Much of our knowledge is in-
deed based on testimony. I may not be able to offer you the evidence that e
= mc2 (e being energy, m mass, and c the speed of light), because I do not
know enough mathematics and physics to do so. I believe it to be true on
the authority of those scientists who understand Einstein’s work. Reli-
gious faith involves a similar belief on authority, the difference being that
in this case the authority is that of God. On the basis of divine authority
we could  believe things for which we have no direct evidence. Indeed in
this case, we could believe things that human beings could never know by
reason. The fact that they are divinely revealed would be sufficient evid-
ence of their truth.
As Locke points out,  if we knew that something had been revealed by
God, this would be an excellent reason for believing it, at least on the as-
sumption that God is omniscient and morally perfect. Such a being, to use
a  traditional  formulation,  could  neither  deceive  nor  be  deceived. If we
knew with certainty that something was revealed by God, we would also
know with certainty that it was true, even if we could offer no other argu-
ments in its support. 
So far, so good. This is a very traditional view of faith. Where Locke de-
parts from tradition is in his insistence that we need reason to believe that
something is revealed by God. We also need reason to believe that we have
understood that revelation correctly. (That was, you will recall, the key is-
sue in the Galileo affair: whether the Bible was being understood correctly
by those who used it to oppose Copernicus.) What Locke is doing here is
picking up a distinction made by Chillingworth, one that is commonly neg-
lected by theologians. He distinguishes between (a) the certainty a propos-
ition would enjoy on the assumption that it is divinely revealed and (b) the
degree of confidence with which we can believe it to be divinely revealed.
The latter,  he suggests,  will  always be less than the former.  To fail  to
make this distinction, he argues, is to fall into the error of the enthusiasts.
Locke also agrees with Chillingworth that our degree of assent to an al-
leged divine revelation must be proportioned to the evidence available. We
should  not  believe  that  certain  truths  are  revealed  by  God  with  any
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greater degree of confidence than is warranted by the evidence that sup-
ports this belief. More precisely, 
our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a
revelation,  and  that  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  expressions  it  is  de-
livered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true
sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than
an assurance or diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent prob-
ability of the proofs.1
In fact, Locke seems to think that probable proofs are the most we can
achieve in this area.2 
Some care is needed here. Locke is not even moderately sceptical about
belief in God. He thinks this can be proven beyond reasonable doubt.3 He
even holds that human reason can give us some knowledge about God, in
particular that God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, and providential law-
giver, who is to be worshipped and obeyed.4 What he is (moderately) scep-
tical about is the belief that particular religious doctrines have been di-
vinely revealed. While he seems reluctant to make this view fully explicit,
it seems to play a role in his support for religious toleration.5 If we cannot
be certain about any allegedly revealed truths, then we should be tolerant
of competing claims regarding divine revelation.
For Locke, then, faith certainly goes beyond reason: it can tell us (on the
authority of God) of things we could never know otherwise. But it  also
1 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 16, §
14.
2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 11, §
12. On the difficulties to which Locke’s view gives rise, see Snyder, ‘Faith
and Reason in Locke’s Essay’, pp. 207–12.
3 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 10, §
6.
4 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 10, §§
4–5; S. Black, ‘Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke’, Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 28 (1998),  pp. 473–504, on p. 479.
5 Black, ‘Toleration and the Skeptical Inquirer in Locke’, pp. 489–90. The
key argument is found towards the beginning of  Locke’s  Third Letter
Concerning Toleration.
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rests on reason, since we must have reason to believe that God has spoken
and that we have understood what he has said. What is interesting is that
this view undercuts the very distinction with which it began. No longer is
religious faith thought of as a source of knowledge that is  distinct from
reason. There is, of course, still a distinction between believing proposi-
tions for which I have direct evidence and believing those for which I have
only indirect evidence, namely the authority of the person telling me they
are true. But if we should believe someone’s testimony only when we have
reason to believe she is a reliable witness, then we are believing on the
basis of reason, namely our evidence that she is reliable. 
This is not just my conclusion; it is one accepted by Locke himself. He
writes that while he is discussing faith ‘as it is ordinarily placed, in contra-
distinction to reason’, it is in fact nothing other than ‘an assent founded on
the highest reason’.1 What follows from this is the theologically scandalous
idea that ‘reason must be our last judge and guide in everything’.2
The tradition of ‘constructive scepticism’ represented by Locke’s view
did have an influence on conceptions of scientific knowledge.3 But it had
little influence among religious thinkers, who generally rejected an even
moderately  sceptical  attitude  in  matters  of  faith.  Edward  Stillingfleet,
Bishop of Worcester, was one of the first to do so. While he had originally
shared the views of thinkers such as Chillingworth, he later adopted a
more traditional stance. Worried by what the use made of Locke’s ideas by
the freethinker John Toland, Stillingfleet argued that they would lead to
sceptical conclusions, in particular to the idea that faith cannot produce
certain knowledge.4 The dominant religious attitude remained that which
Luther  had  expressed  in  his  correspondence  with  Erasmus:  ‘The  Holy
1 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 16, §
14. 
2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, chap. 19, §
14.
3 Popkin, A History of Scepticism, pp. 217, 257–61.
4 R. Popkin, ‘The Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfleet’, Journal of the History
of Philosophy, 9 (1971), pp. 303–19, on p. 314. See also Popkin, A History
of Scepticism, p. 260 and Snyder, ‘Faith and Reason in Locke’s Essay’, pp.
210–11.
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Spirit is no Skeptic, and it is not doubts or mere opinions that he has writ-
ten on our hearts, but assertions more sure and certain than life itself’.1
5.3.2  Liberal Theology and its Aftermath
There did develop, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a
tradition of  liberal  Christian theology,  hints  of  which we have  already
seen in the work of Andrew Dickson White.2 This was characterized by a
move away from what is sometimes called ‘supernaturalism’: the idea that
there exists a special, miraculous mode of divine action, which breaks into
the regular order of nature. Over against this view, liberal theologians in-
sisted that there was just one mode of divine action: that which accompan-
ied and guided the kind of laws discoverable by science.3 This rejection of
supernaturalism went hand-in-hand with a thoroughly historical view of
religions, including Christianity. Liberal theologians, like secular scholars
of religion, sought natural rather than supernatural explanations of the
origins and history of religious traditions. 
The founder of modern liberal theology, Friedrich Schleiermacher, re-
tained a surprisingly traditional view of the certainty of faith. He held not
only that faith remains a distinctive form of knowledge, but that it  in-
volves a kind of ‘intuitive certainty’, which theology can simply presup-
pose.4 Just as faith in God involves ‘a certainty concerning the feeling of
absolute dependence’, so faith in Christ involves a certainty regarding the
possibility of redemption.5 But later liberal theologians pointed out that
Schleiermacher’s work did not go far enough, suffering as it did from a
kind of residual supernaturalism.6 
1 Luther, ‘On the Bondage of the Will’, p. 109.
2 See my Introduction, on ‘Andrew Dickson White’.
3 E. Troeltsch, ‘Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology’ (1898), tr. E.
Fischoff, in  Religion in History, ed. J. Luther Adams and W. F. Bense
(Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1991), pp. 11–32, on p. 23. 
4 F.  Schleiermacher,  The Christian Faith,  2nd edition (1830),  tr.  H.  R.
Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (1928; London: T. & T. Clark, 1999), § 33.3
(p. 136).
5 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, § 14.1 (p. 68).
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One thinker who took these ideas further was Ernst Troeltsch. We see
this in Troeltsch’s view of the value of the Christian religion. He argues
(on various grounds) that Christianity is ‘the highest and most signific-
antly developed form of religious life that we know’.1 But he admits that
this is a provisional judgement, since we cannot be certain what direction
the future religious development of humanity will take. It is at least con-
ceivable that in the religious development of humankind a ‘higher revela-
tion’ may yet emerge.2 By the traditional standards of Christian theology,
this is a remarkably modest claim.
Liberal theology is not entirely dead. Its aims continue to be pursued by
those whom I shall later call ‘critical’ (rather than ‘confessional’) theolo-
gians.3 These  thinkers  follow in the  tradition established by  Troeltsch:
they make relatively modest claims for the knowledge attained by faith.
Indeed one recent theologian, Gordon Kaufman, argues that Christians
ought to repent of their previous ‘claims to knowledge and certainty’.4 But
twentieth-century  Protestant  theology  also  witnessed  a  decisive  move
away such modesty, its characteristic feature being what William Warren
Bartley called a ‘retreat to commitment’.5 The most influential represent-
ative of this trend was Karl Barth, whom no less a figure than Pope Pius
XII described as ‘the greatest theologian since Thomas Aquinas’.6  
6 W. E. Wyman, Jr., ‘Revelation and the Doctrine of Faith: Historical Rev-
elation within the Limits of Historical Consciousness’, The Journal of Re-
ligion, 78 (1998), pp. 38–63, pp. 49–51.
1 E. Troeltsch,  The Absoluteness of  Christianity and the History of  Reli-
gions, 3rd edition (1929), tr. D. Reid, Library of Philosophy and Theology
(London: SCM, 1972), p.117.
2 Troeltsch,  The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions,
pp. 114–15.
3 See chap. 6, ‘Critical Theology’.
4 G. D. Kaufman, In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 57.
5 W. W. Bartley III, The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd edition (La Salle, IL:
Open Court, 1984), pp. 35–70.
6 J. B. Torrance, ‘Barth, Karl’ (1987), in L. Jones (ed.), Encyclopedia of Re-
ligion, 2nd edition (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2005), pp. 789–
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In conscious opposition to the liberal theologians of the nineteenth cen-
tury,1 Barth reaffirms the idea that faith offers a form of knowledge that
must be regarded as certain. What the believer may not doubt, he holds, is
the authority of the biblical witness to the Word of God. In spelling out
this idea, Barth refers to what he calls ‘the Protestant scripture principle’,2
which regards the authority of Scripture as simply a given, a principle
from which theology begins but which it cannot be permitted to question.
Following Calvin, Barth claims that the authority of Sacred Scripture is,
in a certain sense, self-authenticating. It is, to use John Calvin’s Greek
term, autopistos: to be believed of itself.3 If you ask why we should believe
the biblical witness, all one can say in response is that the Bible itself says
we should. It follows that if we do not already accept the authority of the
Bible, we will see no reason to do so.4 The doctrine of the Word of God is ‘a
logical circle … of self-asserting, self-attesting truth’. You are either inside
the circle or you are not. The authority of the biblical witness is ‘either
already known and acknowledged or it is not accepted’.5 
What this means, incidentally, is that no arguments in support of bib-
lical authority are needed. Nor are they permitted. We are forbidden to
submit that authority to any argument or proof.6 Barth acknowledges that
the Protestant Reformers did produce arguments of this kind.7 They did
92, on p. 789.
1 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I, part 2 (1938), tr. G. T. Thomson and
H. Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), vol. 1, part 2, § 17.1. For
Barth’s relationship to Schleiermacher, see his ‘Concluding Unscientific
Postscript  on  Schleiermacher’  (1968),  tr.  G.  Hunsinger,  Sciences  Reli-
gieuses/Studies in Religion 7 (1978), pp. 117–35.
2 K. Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion,
vol. 1 (1924), tr. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids:  William B.  Eerdmans,
1991), § 8.3.
3 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 7, § 5.
4 Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics, § 8.3.
5 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, part 2, § 19.2.
6 Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics, § 8.3.
7 See,  for  example,  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian Religion,  book  1,
chap. 8.
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not regard such arguments as decisive, since they believed the Bible ulti-
mately does not require them. Yet even  offering such arguments was a
dangerous and regrettable move. It was regrettable since it 
brings us into a sphere in which the pros and cons are secretly or openly
set out alongside one another, in which we cannot do more than ad-
vance probabilities, and in which it is not impossible that one day the
opposite might be stated and proved. 
Read that sentence again. The greatest theologian since Aquinas is saying
that it is dangerous to put forward arguments in support of the authority
of Sacred Scripture, since any arguments you produce may be defeated.1 It
is hard to imagine anything more directly opposed to the scientific ideal,
as  outlined  by  the  philosopher Karl  Popper.  This  holds  that  scientists
should put forward theories which have a high degree of empirical con-
tent, since if such theories are mistaken, there is a good chance that they
will be falsified and discarded.2
In any case, Barth’s claim that the authority of the Bible is ‘self-authen-
ticating’ is difficult to take seriously. Self-authentication is just too easy.
Here is a proposition I would like you to believe.
Everything written in this book is true.
How do you know this proposition is true? Because it is written in this
book and everything written in this book is true. You might feel justified
in withholding your belief if this is the only argument I can produce in its
support. 
How do both Calvin and Barth find themselves holding so ridiculous a
view? They do so because they cannot avoid the question of how we know
the Bible to be a divine revelation. For Calvin, this question has become
pressing since he must defend his exclusive reliance on biblical authority
against his Roman Catholic opponents.3 For Barth, the question has be-
come pressing because he lives in an age in which religious authority in
1 As Barth says elsewhere,  ‘revelation is denied when it is regarded as
open to discussion (Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, part 2, § 17.1).
2 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935), Routledge Classics
(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 96.
3 Popkin, The History of Scepticism, p. 14.
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general has been called into question. The problem is that once the ques-
tion has been raised and acknowledged, the believer has only two possible
responses. She can either produce reasons in support of her belief, which
means subordinating the authority of Scripture to that of human reason.
But if she does this, she can no longer claim that faith is distinct from
reason. Or she can claim that Scripture is in some sense self-authenticat-
ing, however unsatisfactory that answer may be.
5.3.3  ‘A Certitude No Longer Open To Doubt’
The continued commitment to the idea that faith yields certain knowledge
is not unique to Protestant Christianity. It has plenty of parallels within
Roman Catholic thought. Take, for example, the prominent twentieth-cen-
tury theologian, Avery Dulles. Like Robert Bellarmine, Dulles was a Je-
suit eventually elevated to the rank of Cardinal. In his discussion of Chris-
tian faith, Dulles deals with the topic of ‘certitude and doubt’. He notes
that Christian tradition has always insisted on ‘firmness of conviction’: re-
ligious faith, he insists, is incompatible with regarding what is revealed as
‘merely probable’.1 Dulles’s point is not merely that the believer must re-
gard what is revealed is objectively certain, because of its divine source. It
is that the believer’s subjective attitude ought to be one of certitude: faith
ought to involve a firm and unwavering assent. 
Dulles is in good company here, for only a few years ago the same idea
was reaffirmed by Pope John Paul II. The Pope contrasts the certainty of
faith with the level of knowledge attainable by (mere) human reason. All
human beings, the Pope writes,
seek a final explanation, a supreme value, which refers to nothing bey-
ond itself and which puts an end to all questioning. Hypotheses may
fascinate, but they do not satisfy. Whether we admit it or not,  there
comes  for  everyone  the  moment  when  personal  existence  must  be
anchored to a truth recognized as final, a truth which conveys a certi-
tude no longer open to doubt.2
1 A. Dulles S.J.,  The Assurance of Things Hoped For: A Theology of Chris-
tian Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 229–34.
2 John Paul  II,  Fides et  Ratio:  Encyclical  Letter of  the Supreme Pontiff
John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Relationship
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It is this certainty which, in the Pope’s view, Christian faith provides.
There is some evidence that this attitude to religious knowledge is not
unique to Christianity. Insofar as any religion regards certain texts, indi-
viduals,  or institutions as sacred, what those sources tell  us will be re-
garded as unquestionable. This point has been made recently by the an-
thropologist Roy Rappaport, who draws on the work of a Polish logician
and Dominican priest, Józef Bocheński. Rappaport notes that religious be-
liefs fall into several categories. These include (a)  ultimate sacred postu-
lates,  which are  the core beliefs  of  a  tradition,  (b)  sanctified sentences,
which are derived from these core beliefs, and (c)  heuristic rules, which
spell out where the core beliefs are to be found and how they are to be in-
terpreted. Within Christianity, the ultimate sacred postulates correspond
to those doctrines whose truth is guaranteed by what Protestants call ‘the
perspicuity of Scripture’ or (for Catholics) the authority of the Church.1
They  are considered unquestionable. As Rappaport notes, they are most
emphatically not held in the way in which scientific hypothesis are held:
as explanatory claims that could be revised.2 
It is true that not all the claims proposed for belief within a religious
tradition have this status. Those that have the status of  sanctified sen-
tences will be thought to enjoy a lesser degree of certainty. While these de-
rive their sacred status from their relation to the ultimate sacred postu-
lates, they are considered revisable, at least in principle. Particular ethical
commands are often understood in this way. Within Islam, for instance,
the commands explicitly stated in the Qur’an or the reports of the sunna
(practice)  of  the  Prophet  are  considered  unquestionable.  But  there  are
other commands that are derived from the Qur’an and  sunna, by analo-
gical  reasoning.  Often these deal with new situations that have arisen
since the time of the Prophet. Muslims are expected to adhere to the con-
between  Faith  and  Reason (Strathfield,  NSW;  St  Paul’s  Publications,
1998), § 27.
1 See ‘The Locus of Certainty’, above.
2 R. A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, Cam-
bridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Cambridge:  Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), p. 294.
143
 5.3.3  ‘A Certitude No Longer Open To Doubt’
sensus view of the scholars on such issues, if indeed there is a consensus.
But that consensus may change over time. 
A similar situation can be found within Roman Catholicism. Here, too,
there are certain papal teachings that are considered unquestionable: they
cannot be changed, since on the occasions when they are put forward the
Pope is  considered  infallible.  But  there  are  other  papal  teachings that
Catholics are expected to adhere to, but which most theologians do  not
consider to  be unquestionable.  An example would be the current papal
teaching regarding contraception. 
It is, however, the ultimate sacred postulates that I am concerned with
here. As we have already seen from the work of Aquinas, these are con-
sidered to enjoy the greatest conceivable degree of certainty. Describing
these ultimate postulates as ‘ρ-sentences’, Bocheński notes that they
have to be considered as possessing the probability 1. In most theologies
it is even asserted that the certainty of the ρ-sentences is by far greater,
indeed belongs to a quite different order, than the certainty of any other
sentence. This, however, is a psychological matter; logically there is no
probability higher than 1.1
Logically, of course, this is true: no proposition can have a degree of cer-
tainty great than 1. But believers can and do consider their central beliefs
to have a higher degree of certainty than any other form of knowledge.
The implication is clear. If the ultimate postulates of religion are thought
to enjoy a greater degree of certainty than the theories of science, then it
is not hard to see which will be given priority when they come into (at
least apparent) conflict.
5.4  Science and Certainty
Within the world of Christian thought, then, leading thinkers and key au-
thorities continue to maintain that the act of faith yields certain know-
ledge, a firmness of assent that excludes any possible doubt. This attitude
seems characteristic of religions in general, insofar as they regard certain
sources of knowledge as sacred and therefore unquestionable. But this fact
1 J. M. Bochenksi, The Logic of Religion (New York: New York University
Press, 1965), p. 61.
144
 5.4  Science and Certainty
stands in stark contrast to the kinds of claims made by modern scientists
and philosophers of science. 
One of the developments that occurred in the seventeenth century was
the abandonment of the old ideal of demonstrative knowledge. We have
seen that for many centuries, natural philosophers identified scientia with
demonstrated knowledge. Of course, many realized that this was an ideal,
which could rarely be attained. But at a certain point in the development
of modern science, even that ideal was abandoned. As one recent scholar
writes,
in contrast to Aristotelian epistemology with its emphasis on universal,
true,  first principles, our modern science proceeds on the assumption
that everything is up for grabs. Nothing is certain, all claims for univer-
sality are equally fallible.1 
The abandonment of this demonstrative ideal of science seems related to
the tradition of ‘constructive’ or ‘mitigated’ scepticism that we find in the
work of  John Locke.2 But whatever its  origins,  there is no doubt it  oc-
curred. 
If I had to put a date on the event, I would choose 1690, when Christi-
aan Huygens published his  Treatise on Light.  Optics had long been re-
garded as one of the mathematical sciences, where a high degree of preci-
sion was possible. But in the preface to that work, Huygens contrasts the
degree of confidence that optics can achieve with the certainty of pure geo-
metry. While optics employs geometry, it does not achieve the certainty of
geometry. The best it can achieve is a high degree of probability.3 It does
so by means of what we now call ‘hypothetico-deductive’ reasoning. We de-
duce from our theory a wide range of observations and check to see if those
predicted observations are verified. If we can do this, then we can be very
confident about the theory. But, it seems, a high degree of confidence is
now the most we can hope for.
1 J. C. Pitt, ‘Galileo, Rationality and Explanation’,  Philosophy of Science,
55 (1988), pp. 87–103, on p. 92.
2 See ‘Against Enthusiasm’, above.
3 A. E. Shapiro, ‘Huygens’ “Traité de la Lumière” and Newton’s “Opticks”’:
Pursuing and Eschewing Hypotheses’,  Notes and Records of the Royal
Society of London, 43 (1989), pp. 223–47, on p. 225.
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This is certainly the attitude taken by modern scientists. Scientists ac-
cept that no theory can ever be said to be conclusively proven. It may have
a high degree of evidential support, but it is never certain. At a popular
level this fact is not sufficiently well known. Many people appear to be-
lieve that science offers certain knowledge or that if it does not offer cer-
tain knowledge, then its conclusions are ‘merely’ a matter of opinion. My
own students are  inclined to  think there  are only  two options when it
comes to knowledge: certainty, based on the kind of proof that no rational
agent could doubt, and a scepticism that denies we know anything at all.
But  modern science  was born from the attempt  to  find  a middle  path
between these two extremes. In the course of finding that middle path, it
abandoned claims to certainty regarding its theories.
Philosophers of science have found various say of articulating this in-
sight.  Some formalize  the approach pioneered by Huygens in speaking
about the ‘probability’  of scientific theories. This approach often makes
use of a theorem developed by Thomas Bayes (1701–61), which calculates
the degree to which a particular piece of new evidence should increase the
confidence with a belief is held. The details of Bayesian theory need not
detain us here. All I want to note is that Bayesian theorists assume that
in science we are dealing with degrees of probability, not certainty. In the
words of two leading proponents of this approach,
suppose  h is some scientific hypothesis. Experimental data can never
conclusively prove that h is true, even if it is true. So you are never ab-
solutely certain of  h’s truth, only more or less. The inductive inference
consists in assessing the degree of certainty warranted by the evidence.1
On this view,  then,  the degree of  probability  of  a  scientific  theory will
never be 1 (i.e. certainty). 
In assigning degrees of probability to a theory, Bayesians are relatively
conservative. Karl Popper, for instance, rejects the idea that we can speak
of probability when it comes to scientific theories.2 He holds that the most
we can claim for a scientific theory is (a) that it would, if true, account for
the facts we are trying to explain and (b) that it has not yet been falsified.
1 C. Howson and P. Urbach, ‘Bayesian Reasoning in Science’, Nature, 350
(4 April 1991), pp. 371–74, on p. 371.
2 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, §§ 80–81.
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We can, perhaps, be confident that with the progress of science our theor-
ies are coming  closer to the truth. But even if we had a true theory, we
could not know that it was true.1 At one point Popper offers a vivid meta-
phorical expression of this idea. ‘The empirical basis of objective science’,
he writes, ‘has nothing ‘absolute’ about it’.
Science does not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theor-
ies rises, as it were,  above a swamp. It  is like a building erected on
piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not
down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and when we cease our attempts to
drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached
firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.2
It is difficult to imagine a clearer expression of the idea that science does
not offer certain knowledge.
Such a view is not found merely among Bayesians and Popperians. It is
also found among the intellectual descendants of Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804).3 On the modern Kantian view, defended by Michael Friedman, the
goal of science is an ideal state towards which we may regard our sci-
entific theories as gradually converging. We cannot ever assume that this
ideal state has been achieved, nor can we assume it will ever actually be
achieved. Indeed, if scientists ever believed they had reached this goal, it
‘would halt scientific progress dead in its tracks’4 
It is interesting to contrast this attitude with that expressed by Pope
John Paul II. The Pope, you will recall, argues that what we are seeking is
a truth that ‘puts an end to all questioning’.5 But this is certainly not what
scientists seek, for the end to all questioning would be the end of science.
1 K. R. Popper, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, vol. 2
of Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery (1956), ed. W. W. Bartley
III (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 46.
2 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, § 30.
3 See also chap. 6, ‘Science and Criticism’.
4 M. Friedman, Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford
University (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001), p. 64.
5 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, § 27.
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The modern sciences have come a long way from the ancient medieval
quest for demonstrative knowledge. We may, as the Pope believes, long for
certain knowledge, and we may flee to religious faith in an effort to attain
it, but the quest for certainty is a quest the scientific community has long
renounced.
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6. CRITICAL THOUGHT IN RELIGION AND
SCIENCE
The differences I have identified between the two sides in the Galileo af-
fair are not unique to early modern Europe. They are characteristic of any
form of scripturally based religion and any form of science. To better un-
derstand those differences, I want to go beyond the immediate lessons of
the Galileo affair, with its concerns regarding authority and certainty. My
aim  is  to  offer  some  tentative  suggestions  about  the  place  of  critical
thought within the world of religion, in order to compare it with the place
of  critical  thought  within  the  sciences.  They  are  tentative  suggestions,
since they are inevitably a little speculative. But they are consistent with
the historical evidence examined so far.
In speaking of ‘critical thought’ I do not mean merely what is taught in
introductory classes on critical  thinking:  the examination of  arguments
with a view to identifying sound or fallacious reasoning. This is clearly im-
portant, but I mean something broader. What I am interested in is some-
thing closer to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant urged in his 1784 es-
say, ‘What is Enlightenment?’
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutel-
age is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direc-
tion from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not
in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without
direction from another.  Sapere  aude! ‘Have courage to use your own
reason’ – that is the motto of enlightenment.1
If we combine this Kantian idea with a recognition of the importance of social
relations,  we can arrive at a broader understanding of critical reason. On
this view, critical thinking involves a willingness to question ‘established
forms of thought and established forms of collective life’.2 That questioning
is especially directed at those forms of thought and ways of life whose au-
thority is generally taken for granted.
1 I. Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment’ (1784), in Foundations of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals and What is Enlightenment?, tr. L. White Beck, Library of
Liberal Arts (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 85–92, on p. 85. 
2 L. Wacquant,  ‘Critical Thought as Solvent of  Doxa’,  Constellations,  11
(2004), pp. 97–101, on p. 97.
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One might think that critical thinking in this sense is a distinctively
modern ideal. As Kant’s essay reminds us, it is often associated with the
period tendentiously referred to as ‘the Enlightenment’: the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries in Europe. But it has deeper historical roots, go-
ing back to the philosophical traditions of ancient Greece. Nor is it  en-
tirely absent from religious communities. Here, too, there are people who
are prepared to question established beliefs and collective forms of life.1
What I  shall  argue, however, is  that  religious thought is bound to the
foundational myths of its community to an extent that scientific or philo-
sophical thought is not. There are more or less clearly defined limits to cri-
ticism in religion: religious communities do not allow it to be carried too
far.  In  the  sciences,  however,  there  are  no such limits.  Within  science
there are no ideas that are out of bounds, no beliefs that may not be sub-
ject to critical scrutiny.2
6.1  Foundational Myths
Scripturally  based religions  can be  characterised  by  their  foundational
narratives, which I shall refer to as ‘myths’. I am not using the word in its
popular sense, in which a myth is simply a false belief.3 My use of the term
corresponds to that common among anthropologists. On this view, myths
are  sacred  narratives  which  tell  stories  of  origins  or  transformations,
shape the rituals of the communities that hold them sacred, and function
as patterns that are used to interpret later events. They tell of events that
can be known only by way of the sacred texts in which these narratives
1 Barnes, Stages of Thought, pp. 206–10.
2 In chap. 8, I shall qualify this conclusion, noting that there may be as-
sumptions underlying the practice of science – ‘hinge beliefs’,  to use a
Wittgensteinian phrase – that are unable to be questioned within sci-
ence, since they are essential to its practice. But if there are such beliefs,
they are assumptions that no human being could abandon without ceas-
ing to be a rational agent.
3 In order to avoid this idea, I shall follow Merlin Donald in using the ad-
jectival  form ‘mythic’  instead  of  the  more  disparaging  ‘mythical’.  For
Donald’s work, see my Introduction, ‘Locating the Conflict’.
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are found.1 What  makes a story a ‘myth’ in this sense is not its truth or
falsity, but the way it is regarded and its function within the community
that transmits it. 
Many of the stories in the Sacred Scriptures of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam can be seen as myths in this sense.2 The most obvious example
is the creation story found in the biblical book of Genesis, which not only
tells of the beginning of the world, but has profoundly shaped the Chris-
tian understanding of sexuality and sin. It is also tells of God’s rest on the
seventh day, which forms the pattern for the Jewish practice of sabbath
observance. Within Judaism, the Exodus of the Hebrew slaves from Egypt
is recalled every year in the Passover Haggadah, the victory of the Macca-
beans during the celebrations of Hanukkah, and the tragedies that have
befallen the Jewish people on the fast day of Tisha B’Av. Within Chris-
tianity, the birth of Jesus is commemorated at Christmas, his resurrection
at Easter, and the events of his death and resurrection at the Eucharist
(the  Lord’s  Supper  or  ‘Mass’).  Within  Islam,  the  story  of  Abraham
(Ibrahim) is recalled and re-enacted yearly in the rituals of the  hajj, the
pilgrimage to Mecca. As these examples suggest, the myths of these three
scripturally based religions are not identical, but they do overlap. Judaism
and Christianity  share  a  set  of  Sacred Scriptures,  namely the Hebrew
Bible (the Christian Old Testament), and many of the biblical stories are
found in the Qur’an, although narrated in subtly different ways.
Not only are these stories continually retold; they also function to shape
and give meaning to the lives of believers.3 On 3 April 1968, only hours be-
fore he was killed, Martin Luther King gave a speech in which he said:
1 P. S. Cohen, ‘Theories of Myth’,  Man, N.S. 4 (1969), pp. 337–53, on p.
337. Cohen’s definition embraces two different types of narrative, which
Collingwood  refers  to  as  ‘theocratic  history’  and  ‘myth’;  see  R.  G.
Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946),
part I, § 1. But since the Bible contains both, I have not made this dis-
tinction here. For a further discussion of the various uses of ‘myth’, see
G. B. Caird, The Language and Imagery of the Bible, Duckworth Studies
in Theology (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1980), pp. 220–24.
2 I. G. Barbour,  Myths, Models and Paradigms: The Nature of Scientific
and Religious Language (London: SCM, 1974), pp. 22–23. 
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Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place.
But I’m not concerned about that now. I just want to do God’s will. And
He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I’ve looked over. And
I’ve seen the Promised Land.1
In uttering these words, he was taking the biblical story of the Exodus and
using it to interpret the contemporary struggle of African-Americans. In
doing so, he was following in a long tradition, one that dates back to the
biblical  writings  themselves,  and  which  has  been  repeated  throughout
Jewish and Christian history. It is found also in the Qur’an, where the
story of the life Ibrahim is retold in such a way that it calls to mind the
life of Muhammad, showing the Prophet to be following in the footsteps of
the first person to embrace monotheism.2
6.2  The Authority of Myths
Central to the Galileo affair, as we have seen, was the authority of the
Bible, which was thought to embody a divine revelation yielding certain
knowledge. The belief in a divine origin is a common feature of myths.
Since these stories are divinely guaranteed they enjoy an unparalleled de-
gree of authority within the communities that regard them as sacred. In-
deed, this seems to be one of the defining characteristics of a sacred nar-
rative: the fact that its authority is regarded as unquestionable.3 While it
can be reinterpreted, it cannot be abandoned.
The authority of religious myths is particularly evident in the attitude
of believers to what we might think of as metaphor. As modern readers,
we might describe mythic narratives as useful fictions, conveying some
spiritual truth, or perhaps as metaphors or allegories. But the mythic nar-
ratives of religious communities have not traditionally been regarded in
this way. Even if sophisticated thinkers (such as St Augustine) felt com-
3 G.  W.  Dawes,  ‘Paradigmatic  Explanation:  Strauss’s  Dangerous  Idea’,
Louvain Studies, 32 (2008), pp. 64–77, on pp. 68–74.
1 K. D. Miller, Martin Luther King’s Biblical Epic: His Final, Great Speech
(Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2012), p. 182.
2 See, for example, Qur’an 21:58, 68 –71 and 29:28.
3 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, p. 291. See
chap. 5, ‘A Certitude No Longer Open To Doubt’.
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pelled to interpret some sacred texts figuratively, their preference was to
retain both the literal and the figurative meaning. 
It is important to appreciate this when assessing claims about religion
and science. Opponents of  the conflict  thesis often avoid a  clash of  sci-
entific and religious doctrines by suggesting that the biblical narratives
were written as allegories or extended metaphors. Karl Giberson, for in-
stance, is anxious to harmonize Genesis with the modern theory of evolu-
tion. He does so by suggesting that ‘multiple elements in the Genesis story
of creation suggest a figurative or symbolic, rather than a literal reading’.1
Another  defender  of  evolution,  Kenneth  Miller,  also  favours  a  broadly
symbolic interpretation of Genesis. ‘To reveal Himself to a desert tribe six
thousand years ago’, he writes, God spoke ‘in the direct and lyrical lan-
guage of Genesis’.2 Well, perhaps he did. But that does not mean that the
authors of Genesis 1–3 regarded what they were writing as poetry.
There are two questions here. The first has to do with what the authors
of Genesis intended. The second has to do with how these narratives were
used at a later date. With regard to the first, it is difficult to know what
was intended by unknown authors writing more than two and a half thou-
sand years ago. But it is worth noting that mythic narratives in tribal so-
cieties are rarely, if ever, regarded as ‘merely’ metaphorical.3 This point
was made by the philosopher Ernst Cassirer in his study of myth. We
think of  a  metaphor  as  an imaginative  representation of  the  object  to
which it is applied. This entails making a distinction between the object
1 K. W. Giberson,  Saving Darwin: How to Be a Christian and Believe in
Evolution (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 52.
2 K. R. Miller,  Finding Darwin’s God:  A Scientist’s  Search for Common
Ground Between God and Evolution (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p.
257.
3 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Some Features of Nuer Religion’, The Journal of
the  Royal  Anthropological  Institute  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  81
(1951), pp. 1–13, on p. 2; G. Lienhardt, ‘Modes of Thought in Primitive
Society’,  New Blackfriars,  34 (1953), pp. 269–77,  on pp. 272–72;  S. K.
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason,
Rite,  and Art,  3rd edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1957), 149.
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represented and a particular way of representing it. But such a distinc-
tion, Cassirer argues, is foreign to mythic thought in tribal societies.
Where we see mere ‘representation’, myth, insofar as it has not yet devi-
ated from its fundamental and original form, sees real identity. The ‘im-
age’ does not represent the ‘thing’;  it is the thing; it does not merely
stand for the object, but has the same actuality, so that it replaces the
thing’s immediate presence.1 
In this context the idea that myths are ‘merely metaphorical’ is likely to
be strongly resisted. 
Let me illustrate this with an example drawn from the history of my
own country. The Māori people of the South Island of New Zealand identi-
fied a  local  range of  mountains with the Tākitimu canoe that  brought
their ancestors to this land. We are inclined to say that this is a ‘legend’,
based on some kind of metaphorical identification of the mountain range
with an upturned canoe. But this description trivializes the role  of  the
myth within that culture. The early twentieth-century ethnographer who
interviewed local elders wrote:
The canoe is said to have been wrecked in Foveaux Strait and the Taki-
timu Mountains were named to keep the canoe in memory, but this pro-
saic explanation has no vogue amongst the southern natives. They as-
sert that this great range of Takitimu is the veritable canoe turned into
stone, and I did not risk my life by contradicting them.2
To call it a ‘legend’ or a ‘metaphor’ does not do justice to how seriously
such stories are taken in traditional societies.
Whatever  the  authors  of  Genesis  may  have  intended,  medieval  and
early modern interpreters did have a more sophisticated view. A clear dis-
tinction between myth and history was first made by Greek historians of
the fifth century BC,3 and late medieval authors had developed their own
1 E. Cassirer,  The Philosophy of  Symbolic Forms,  tr.  R.  Manheim (New
Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1955), vol. 2, p. 38.
2 J.  H.  Beattie,  ‘Traditions  and Legends  Collected  from the  Natives  of
Murihiku (Southland, New Zealand)’, The Journal of the Polynesian Soci-
ety, 24 (1915), pp. 98–112, on p. 109.
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understanding of the role of myth.1 But they remained resistant to regard-
ing the words of Sacred Scripture as merely metaphorical. We see this in
the Augustinian principle of the priority of Scripture, that is to say, the
literal sense of Scripture. A figurative reinterpretation is legitimate only
under strictly defined circumstances.2 Medieval authors would certainly
have resisted the idea that the biblical history is nothing more than an al-
legory.3 Thomas Aquinas, for instance, accepts that a scriptural text may
have multiple meanings, but insists that any figurative meaning must be
built on the literal meaning. There are cases of straightforward metaphor,
such as the statement that ‘God is a rock’. But in the case of the biblical
narratives, the literal meaning refers to actual events. It is those events,
not  merely  the words of  the  text,  that  point  to  realities  beyond them-
selves.4 
6.3  The Criticism of Myths
If myths have such authority within the communities in which they arise,
how do they ever come to be questioned? There are, it seems, individual
sceptics in every age, those who are inclined to take a distanced attitude
toward the  sacred  beliefs  and  practices  of  their  society.  In  his  famous
study of the Azande of the southern Sudan, Evans-Pritchard noted the ex-
istence of sceptical opinions regarding witchcraft and oracles among his
informants.5 But the existence of individual sceptics does not yet make for
3 Collingwood,  The  Idea  of  History,  part  I,  §  2;  S.  Saïd,  ‘Myth  and
Historiography’, in J. Marincola (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman
Historiography,  Blackwell  Companions  to  the  Ancient  World (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 76–88, on p. 78.
1 B. Stock,  Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard
Sylvester (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 31–62.
2 See  chap.  4,  ‘Dealing  with  Apparent  Conflict’,  and  McMullin,  ‘How
Should Cosmology Relate to Theology?’, p. 19.
3 M.-D. Chenu O.P., ‘The Symbolist Mentality’ (1957), in Nature, Man, and
Society in the Twelfth Century, pp. 99–145, on p. 116.
4 Aquinas,  Summa theologiae,  1a, qu.  1,  art.  10; Chenu, ‘The Symbolist
Mentality’, pp. 116–17.
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a tradition of critical thinking. It is a tradition of critical thinking that is
required for the emergence of science.
6.3.1  The Origins of Critical Thinking
One society that produced such a tradition was that of ancient Greece. It
may not be the only society to do so. If we accept the idea of an ‘axial age’
revolution  in  human thought,1 then  a  similar  transition  occurred  in  a
number of cultures at about the same time: between 800 and 200 BC. But I
shall focus on ancient Greece, because the revolution that occurred there
contributed directly to the rise of modern science. Even Galileo appeals to
the natural philosophers of the classical and Hellenistic world. His math-
ematically-oriented physics was inspired by Archimedes, whose work Ga-
lileo refers to more than one hundred times.2 
A  key  development  in  ancient  Greece  occurred  among  the  Milesian
philosophers: those early thinkers associated with the city of Miletus, in
Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey). We should not read the work of such
thinkers anachronistically, seeing them as materialists or empiricists, in
some modern sense. They were neither, as we shall see. But they do seem
to have pioneered a critical attitude to traditional myths, including the re-
ligious myths of Greek society. Rather than merely accepting and repeat-
ing those myths, these philosophers began to discuss them and to invent
new stories of their own, which they regarded as more adequate accounts
5 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), pp. 183, 193, 255. Note, however, that
such scepticism was limited to particular instances of witchcraft; it was
not directed towards the very possibility of magic.
1 The idea was first proposed by Karl Jaspers (1883–1969); see K. Jaspers,
The Origin and Goal of History (1949), tr. M. Bullock (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1953), especially chap. 1. For a recent discussion of this
idea,  see  Bellah,  Religion  in  Human  Evolution,  pp.  210,  265–82,  et
passim.
2 M. Clagett,  ‘The  Impact  of  Archimedes  on  Medieval  Science’,  Isis,  50
(1959), pp. 419–29, on p. 419.
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of the nature of the world.1 It is this tradition of critical thought that laid
the foundation for later science.2  
It was not the only such foundation. The development of science also re-
quired a new conception of the natural world. G. E. R. Lloyd refers to this
as a ‘discovery of nature’.3 It involved the idea that there exists a natural
order which functions in predictable ways and whose workings can be ex-
plained without reference to the gods. Thales of Miletus, for example, of-
fers a natural explanation of earthquakes, which previously had been at-
tributed to the will of Poseidon.4 It is this view of the natural world that
was revived, in a slightly modified form, in the twelfth century.5 A third
step in the development of science was taken only a little later, with the
emergence of an experimental attitude among the Greek medical writers
associated with the school of Hippocrates.6 
1 K. R. Popper, ‘Back to the Pre-Socratics’,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, NS 59 (1958–59), pp. 1–24, on p. 19; K. R. Popper,  Conjectures
and Refutations (1963),  Routledge Classics (London:  Routledge,  2002),
chap. 4.
2 While  I  have  traced the  emergence  of  a  critical  attitude  to  the  early
Greek philosophers, there may be other ways of telling this story. Ye-
huda Elkana, for example, has argued that a critical attitude – he calls it
‘second-order thinking’ – first emerged in the realm of political theory
rather than that of cosmology. But even on this account, the outcome of
the process is the same. We witness the emergence of a critical spirit, a
way of thinking in which ‘nothing was any longer taken for granted’. See
Y.  Elkana,  ‘The  Emergence  of  Second-Order  Thinking  in  Classical
Greece’, in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age
Civilizations, SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 40–64, on pp. 48–49, 57.
3 G. E. R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle, Ancient Culture
and Society (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 8.
4 Lloyd,  Early Greek Science, p. 9; see also  R. D. McKirahan,  Philosophy
Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary (Indiana-
polis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), pp. 28–29.
5 See chap. 1, ‘Between Athens and Jerusalem’.
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6.3.2  The Criticism of Religious Ideas
But even if a critical attitude is only a  precondition for the emergence of
science, it is a necessary precondition, and one that remains central to sci-
entific endeavour. More importantly, it was quickly extended to religion, a
move that almost immediately provoked a backlash.  Xenophanes, for ex-
ample, does not merely satirize his contemporary, Pythagoras.1 He also
criticizes Homer and Hesiod for their depictions of the gods. 
The  works  of  Homer  and  Hesiod  were  not  Sacred  Scripture,  in  the
Christian sense. But they did have a foundational role in the creation of
Greek religion. As the ancient historian Herodotus writes, it was Homer
and Hesiod who ‘first fixed for the Greeks the genealogy of the gods, gave
the gods their titles, divided among them their honours and functions, and
defined their images’.2 More importantly, there existed a widely held tra-
dition that saw a great poet as analogous to a prophet, both being inter-
mediaries between the gods and humanity.3 Hesiod, for instance, begins
his work by invoking the divine Muses.4 Although such invocations be-
6 F. M. Cornford, ‘Was the Ionian Philosophy Scientific?’,  The Journal of
Hellenic  Studies,  62  (1942),  pp.  1–7,  on p.  2;  G.  E.  R.  Lloyd,  ‘Popper
versus Kirk: A Controversy in the Interpretation of Greek Science’,  The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18 (1967), pp. 21–38, on p.
34.
1 Lloyd, Early Greek Science, p. 11.
2 Herodotus,  Histories,  book 2,  § 53,  in M. Findlay,  ‘Foreword’,  in P.  E.
Easteling and J. V. Muir (eds),  Greek Religion and Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. xiii–xx, on p. xv.
3 S. Commager,  The Odes of Horace: A Critical Study (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 13–14.
4 Hesiod,  Theogony  (Theogonia), lines 22–25; Dodds (The Greeks and the
Irrational, pp. 80, 117) suggests this claim was intended quite literally.
In  Hesiod’s  other  complete  work,  he  speaks  of  dedicating  a  tripod-
cauldron to the Muses at the place ‘where they first made me start on the
way of beautiful singing’; see  Works and Days (Erga kai Hēmerai), line
659; ET:  The Poems of Hesiod, tr. R. M Frazer (Norman, OK: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1983), p. 131
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came increasingly formulaic,1 they were originally taken quite seriously.2
The status of Homer is also highlighted by the fact that his verses are
found in magical texts,3 presumably because they were thought to have di-
vine power. 
Xenophanes, however, is not discouraged by the status of these writers.
He rejects their depiction of the gods on moral grounds, declaring that 
Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods
all deeds which among men are a reproach and a disgrace:
thieving, adultery, and deceiving one another.4
Xenophanes is no atheist. Indeed, he wants to offer a new theology to re-
place the old. His conception of God resembles that which would later be
put forward by Aristotle: a divinity who is ‘eternal, self-sufficient, inde-
pendent and master of everything, and unmoving’.5 What is worth noting
here, however, is that his criticism of religious myths is not an attempt to
purify the mythic tradition from within, by using its own resources. Xeno-
phanes’s  theology  is  rational theology,  based  on  human  reason  rather
than a purported divine revelation.
To appreciate this, it will be useful to look more closely at Xenophanes’s
view of knowledge. He is, perhaps, the first philosopher to espouse what
we now call ‘fallibilism’: the idea that what we believe we know is never
certain, but is always hypothetical and subject to correction. As he writes,
no man has seen nor will anyone know
the truth about the gods and all the things I speak of.
For even if a person should in fact say what is absolutely the case,
nevertheless he himself does not know, but belief is fashioned
1 Commager, The Odes of Horace, pp. 2–16.
2 P. Murray, ‘Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece’,  The Journal of Hellenic
Studies, 101 (1981), pp. 87–100, on p. 90.
3 D.  Collins,  ‘The  Magic  of  Homeric  Verses’,  Classical  Philology,  103
(2008), pp. 211–36.
4 Xenophanes, DK 21B11 (cited in McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates,
p. 60).
5 McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates, p. 62.
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over all things [or, in the case of all persons].6
While the last line is obscure, the general sense of the saying is clear.  Xeno-
phanes does not deny that our existing beliefs  may be true. But even if
they are true, we cannot know they are true.2 This fallibilist view of know-
ledge is  coupled  with  a  rejection of  the  idea  that  we can have certain
knowledge through divine revelation. 
By no means did the gods reveal all things to mortals from the begin-
ning, but in time, by searching, they discover better.3
We can come to  know the  truth,  including  the  truth about  God,4 only
through the exercise of human reason.
Xenophanes’s criticism of religious myth is picked up by later Greek
writers, including Plato,5 who is equally critical of the stories related by
Homer and Hesiod and urges their censorship.6 Like Xenophanes, Plato
wants to purify, rather than destroy, the traditional conceptions of divin-
ity. But some writers in this critical tradition go further. Protagoras, for
example, is reported to have expressed a view that corresponds to what we
would call ‘agnosticism’.
Concerning the gods I am unable to know either that they are or that
they are not or what their appearance is like. For many are the things
that hinder knowledge: the obscurity of the matter and the shortness of
human life.7
6 Xenophanes DK 21B34 (cited in McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates,
pp. 66–67).
2 Note that Xenophanes is prepared to apply this principle even to his own
work; Xenophanes DK 21B35 (cited in McKirahar, Philosophy Before So-
crates, p. 67).
3 Xenophanes DK 21B18 (cited in McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates,
p. 67).
4 Despite the plural (‘gods’) here, Xenophanes is apparently a monotheist:
see DK 21B23 (McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates, p. 62).
5 R. Waterfield,  Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths  (London: Faber
and Faber, 2009), p. 221.
6 Plato, Republic, books 2–3 (377c–392c).
7 DK 80B4 (McKirahar, Philosophy Before Socrates, p. 387).
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Thrasymachus is said to  have argued,  on the basis of  the evils we see
around us, that 
the gods pay no attention to human affairs; if they did, they would not
have ignored justice, which is the greatest good for men.1 
Such ideas went too far for Plato, who condemned those who hold that
there are no gods or that the gods are indifferent to human affairs.2
It  was not just Plato who imposed limits to critical thought when it
came to  religion.  The ancient  Greeks had no set  of  religious beliefs  to
which individuals were expected to subscribe and no formal religious au-
thority charged with ensuring orthodoxy. Even so, some of those who en-
gaged in critical thinking about the gods came to grief. The Greeks may
have had no sacred beliefs, but they certainly had sacred practices, the
maintenance of which was seen as essential to the well-being of society. As
Athens suffered from a series of crises, not least of which was the inter-
minable war with Sparta, its citizens became increasingly anxious about
the effects of ‘impiety’. We see this in the ‘moral panic’ occasioned in 415
BC by the vandalism of the herms (figures of the god Hermes) and a ru-
mour that the Eleusinian mysteries had been mockingly performed in a
private home.3 
A number of the new critical thinkers of the age were caught up in this
reaction. The most famous of these was, of course, Socrates, who was tried
and executed in 399 BC on charges of ‘not recognizing the gods of the city’
and  ‘corrupting  the  young’.4 Socrates  is  perhaps  best  regarded  as  a
scapegoat,5 a  victim not  just  of  religious reaction but  also of  malicious
rumours about his teachings. We see such rumours reflected in the work of
1 DK 85B8;  ET:  R.  Waterfield,  The First  Philosophers:  The Presocratics
and Sophists, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 274.
2 R. F. Stalley,  An Introduction to Plato’s Laws  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1983), p. 167; Plato, The Laws, 885B.
3 Thucydides,  History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.27, 6.53, 6.60; Water-
field, Why Socrates Died, pp. 90–97.
4 Plato, The Defence of Socrates (Apologia Sōkratous), 24b.
5 Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, p. 202.
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the playwright Aristophanes.6 But the trial of Socrates was not an isolated
event. About 432 BC, a professional interpreter of oracles, Diopeithes, had
sponsored a decree which stated that ‘anyone who did not pay due respect
to  divine  phenomena  or  who  offered  to  teach  others  about  celestial
phenomena should be impeached’.7 It is difficult to know what effect this
had. There is some evidence of a series of prosecutions, which included
that of Protagoras.8 While this evidence may not be entirely reliable,9 it
seems there did occur a religious reaction to the views of the philosophers.
Even if it was occasioned by social and political factors, it was focused very
clearly on what was seen as ‘impiety’.
6.4  Religion and Criticism
The religion of ancient Greece was a very different kind of religion from
Christianity, which harks back to an alleged divine revelation. Even so,
there were limits to the critical  thinking Greek society would allow, in
matters religious. If this is true of Greek religion, it is even more evident
in the history of scripturally based religions. There is a long and distin-
guished history of critical thought within Judaism, Christianity, and Is-
lam. What is striking, however, is that it can operate only within limits. It
can reinterpret, but it cannot seriously question, the foundational narrat-
ives of its community. 
There are two ways in which critical thought can be exercised within re-
ligious  traditions.  The  first  is  by  way  of  internal reform.  Religious  re-
formers critique the existing beliefs and practices of their community by
reference to that community’s foundational myths. They ask if these be-
liefs and practices in accordance with the revelation originally given by
6 An influential work here may have been Aristophanes’s The Clouds; see
Plato, The Defence of Socrates (Apologia Sōkratous), 19d.
7 Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 32.1, cited in Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, p.
165.
8 Dodds,  The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 189; J. V. Muir, ‘Religion and
the New Education’, in P. E. Easterling and J. V. Muir (eds), Greek Reli-
gion  and Society (Cambridge:  Cambridge University  Press,  1985),  pp.
191–218, on p. 216.
9 Waterfield, Why Socrates Died, pp. 165–66.
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God and embodied in Sacred Scripture. The second way in which critical
thought can be exercised is by reference to standards drawn from outside
the religious tradition. The particular form of external criticism in which I
shall be interested is that of critical theology. The critical theologian as-
sesses the community’s beliefs and practices by reference not only to its
foundational myths, but also to more general standards of evidence and
argument. Those more general standards are generally, although not al-
ways, drawn from philosophy.
The difference between internal and external forms of criticism is nicely
illustrated by Joachim Doron. In an important study of what he calls ‘Jew-
ish self-criticism’,  Doron examines the disparaging attitude of the early
Zionist leaders towards the way of life characteristic of the shtetl (the tra-
ditional Jewish village of Central and Eastern Europe). He begins with
the  attitudes  of  the  liberal  (or  ‘reform’)  Jews  of  nineteenth-century
Europe. It  was these thinkers, he writes, who ‘first indulged in Jewish
self-criticism’.1 This may seem a surprising claim, for the Bible itself wit-
nesses to reform movements within Jewish religious life. The prophets, for
instance, frequently admonished their fellow Jews for their failings. But
as Doron notes, this criticism was derived from what was seen as the Di-
vine Law. It was an internal self-criticism. The self-criticism that arose in
the liberal Judaism of the nineteenth century was different from this: it
criticised the Jewish communities of its day for failing to live by the ra-
tional standards of modernity.
While these two forms of critical thought can overlap, in the sense that
one person can engage in both, they often stand opposed. Some religious
reformers are so intent on faithfulness to their community’s foundational
myths that they oppose the employment of general standards of rational-
ity. The Protestant Reformer, Martin Luther, for instance, had no interest
in a philosophically-oriented theology. Philosophy might have some lim-
ited value in dealing with worldly affairs,2 but when it attempts to speak
1 J. Doron, ‘Classic Zionism and Modern Anti Semitism: Parallels and In‐ -
fluences (1883–1914)’,  Studies  in Zionism:  Politics,  Society,  Culture,  4
(1983), pp. 169–204, on p. 173.
2 B. A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 34.
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about God it is nothing more than ‘the devil’s greatest whore’.1 Similarly, the
most  influential  thinker  behind  modern  Islamic  revivalist  movements,
Sayyid Qutb, was openly hostile to philosophy. The moment when Muslim
thinkers  began  using  Greek  philosophy  was,  in  his  view,  the  moment
when they fell away from the true faith.2 
6.3.1  Reform and Renewal
Let’s begin with the tradition of internal religious reform. As Doron’s art-
icle on Jewish self-criticism makes clear, it is not unique to Christianity.
While the term ‘reform’  is  a  Jewish and Christian one,  a  similar word
(islāh) is also found within Islam. Muslims also speak of ‘renewal’ (tajdīd)
in religious contexts and cite a tradition that in every century God will
raise up a ‘renewer’ (mujaddid)  who will restore the true religion.3 But
whatever it is called, internal reform typically takes the form of efforts to
purify the religious tradition from later accretions. It seeks to return to
the tradition’s foundational myths. Reformers typically complain that the
authority of these foundational narratives has been forgotten or neglected
and demand that it be implemented anew. 
It follows that while they may speak of ‘renewing’ their tradition, reli-
gious reformers are not attempting to introduce novelties. Within Islam,
in  particular,  the  idea  of  ‘innovation’  (bid‘a)  is  deeply  suspect.  As  one
scholar  writes,  ‘innovation is  the  introduction of  something  new,  unat-
tested  by  the  Prophet  Muhammad.  It  is  abhorrent  to  pious  orthodox
Muslims unless it tallies with, or at least does not contradict, the orthodox
views and customs’.4 Orthodox views and customs are those found in the
practice (sunna) of the Prophet and his companions. Like reform within
1 M. Luther, Last Sermon in Wittenberg, Second Sunday in Epiphany, 17
January 1546 (WA 51,126); Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 26. 
2 S. Qutb,  Milestones  (1964), ed. A. B. al-Mehri (Birmingham: Maktabah
Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), chap. 1 (pp. 31, 34).
3 This is based on a report (a  hadīth) from the Prophet Muhammad, in
which he says ‘Allah will raise for this community at the end of every
hundred years the one who will renovate its religion for it’.
4 E.  Landau-Tasseron,  ‘The ‘Cyclical  Reform’:  A Study of  the  mujaddid
Tradition’, Studia Islamica, 70 (1989), pp. 79–117, on p. 107.
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Judaism and Christianity, renewal within Islam is a ‘making new’ by re-
turning to what once was.
Within the three monotheistic traditions examples of this kind of re-
form are not hard to find.  The biblical  books of  Kings tell  of  a  reform
movement initiated in the sixth century BC under King Josiah. That move-
ment begins, as the story is told, with the discovery of a book of the law in
the Temple (2 Kings 22: 8–13). One can question whether this book of the
law actually  existed  (rather  than  being  a  convenient  fiction),  but  this
question need not  delay us.  The point  is  that  the reform movement is
presented as the recovery and re-implementation of an original divine rev-
elation.  The  same  is  true  of  the  reform movement  led  by  the  biblical
prophets following the catastrophe of the Babylonian Exile in 586 BC. This,
too,  is  presented  as  a  return  to  the  observation  of  the  original  Law
(Torah), from which Israel had fallen away. The Protestant Reformation of
the sixteenth century took the form of a return to what was thought to be
the original and pure form of Christianity found in the New Testament. In
a similar way, the revivalist (salafī) movements within Islam today call
for a return to the original, pure Islam expressed in the teachings of ‘the
pious forefathers’ (al-salaf al-sālih), found among the first three genera-
tions of Muhammad’s followers.
Internal religious reform does represent a kind of critical thought in the
realm of religion, since it involves criticism of the community’s existing prac-
tices and ways of thinking. Yet because this critique takes the form of a re-
turn to the community’s foundational myths, it does not question their au-
thority. Reformers do, at times, recognize that these foundational narrat-
ives cannot be taken at face value; they need to be reinterpreted. But re-
formers assume that these foundational narratives are telling the truth,
even if that truth lies beneath the surface meaning of the text. 
6.3.2  Critical Theology
The second way of exercising critical thought seeks to apply general norms
of  rationality  to  religious beliefs.  This is  most  clearly  expressed in the
practice of what I shall call  critical (rather than confessional) theology. I
am using this phrase in a broad sense, to refer to any kind of theology that
is responsive to more general standards of evidence and argument. The
contrast here is with a theology whose standards are entirely internal to
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the tradition within which it is operating. Here is a useful rule of thumb
for distinguishing the two. If a theologian provides a reasoned defence –
whether good or bad – of her appeal to what she is regarding as a divine
revelation,  then her work is an example  of  critical  theology.  If,  on the
other hand, she acts as if this alleged divine revelation is a non-negotiable
starting point, which needs no argument, her theology is confessional. 
Readers familiar  with contemporary theology might  be  interested in
some  examples.  In  my  view,  the  work of  Gordon  Kaufman and  David
Tracy would be clear instances of  critical  theology.1 Kaufman’s  work is
particularly interesting, for in a later edition of his Systematic Theology he
records his own attempt to break with what he calls the ‘authoritarian’
character of theology.2 The theology of Karl Barth, on the other hand, is
unashamedly confessional,3 as is that of more traditional modern theolo-
gians, such as Louis Berkhof. Other thinkers can be more difficult to clas-
sify. More recent theologians, for instance, have begun to employ general
forms of argumentation, but only as a preliminary move, in order to justify
their subsequent adherence to norms that are internal to their own tradi-
tion. The so-called ‘postliberal’ theology of George Lindbeck is a good ex-
ample.4 Making use of the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lindbeck
defends what is, in effect, a confessional theology.5 
A detailed discussion of the tradition of critical theology would take us
too far afield. But it is not required, since the point I want to make here is
1 My classification has something in common with that of Hans Frei, who
also offers these two examples. See H. Frei, Types of Christian Theology,
ed. G. Hunsinger and W. C. Placher (New Haven, CN: Yale University
Press, 1992), pp. 28–34.
2 G.  D.  Kaufman,  Systematic  Theology:  A  Historicist  Perspective (1968;
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978),  p. xv.
3 See chap. 5, ‘Liberal Theology and its Aftermath’.
4 G. A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-
liberal Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1984), pp. 113–24.
5 As David Tracy remarked of  Lindbeck’s work,  ‘the hands may be the
hands of Wittgenstein and [Clifford] Geertz, but the voice is the voice of
Karl Barth’. See D. Tracy, ‘Lindbeck’s New Program for Theology: A Re-
flection’, The Thomist, 49 (1985), pp. 460–72, on p. 465.
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a simple one. While critical theology can be remarkably bold, there are
limits beyond which it will not be permitted to go. When it carries its crit -
ical analysis too far, it meets with opposition, either from religious author-
ities or by way of a popular backlash.1 But it is not merely external pres-
sure that binds theology to the foundational myths of its own community;
any form of theological reflection is committed to those myths by its own
internal logic.
Let me begin with the external pressures. It would be easy to cite ex-
amples of theologians who have come into conflict with Church authorities
because they carried their critical thinking too far. But the example I shall
take is that of the twelfth-century theologian, Peter Abelard. Abelard is
best known today for his tempestuous affair with Heloise, the niece of a
canon of Notre-Dame, whom he had been tutoring. But his significance in
this context stems from the distinctive character of his theology. Abelard
shared with a number of his twelfth-century colleagues a critical attitude
to authority in general.2 Abelard’s critical attitude to religious authorities
is evident in his best known work, entitled Sic et Non (Yes and No). This
sets  out  statements  by  various  Church  Fathers  alongside  each  other,
showing how on key issues regarding the faith they appear to contradict
one another. Abelard was not the first to use this method,  but he differs
from his  predecessors  in  leaving  the  apparent  contradictions  as  they  are,
making no attempt to reconcile them.3 
1 Sometimes religious authorities were happy to allow the popular back-
lash to achieve what they themselves were reluctant to initiate. There
were occasions when Church authorities were happy to allow suspected
heretics to be lynched by the mob; see M. T. Clanchy, Abelard: A Medi-
eval Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 289–91, 303.
2 See chap. 1, ‘Between Athens and Jerusalem’.
3 G. Makdisi,  ‘The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry
into Its Origins in Law and Theology’, Speculum, 49 (1974), pp. 640–61,
on p. 646. There is a clear contrast here with the work of Aquinas, who
uses something of the same technique. Aquinas’s reliance on Scriptural
or patristic authority,  to trump the objections, and his own discussion
leaves little room for questioning.  See A.  E.  Malloch,  ‘The Techniques
and  Function  of  the  Renaissance  Paradox’,  Studies  in  Philology,  53
167
 6.3.2  Critical Theology
Abelard’s aim in doing this was not to encourage scepticism.1 It was to
show that we must apply our own judgement in matters of faith, rather
than merely accepting what others have said. As he writes in the prologue
to that work,
we have  undertaken  to  collect  diverse  sayings  of  the  Holy  Fathers,
which stand out in our memory to some extent due to their apparent
disagreement on some question. This may provoke weak readers to the
greater exercise of seeking the truth and render them more acute as a
result of the investigation.
The ‘first key of wisdom’, he writes, is ‘assiduous or frequent questioning.
… By doubting we come to questioning and by questioning we perceive the
truth’.2
What is particularly interesting about Abelard’s theology is that it sub-
jects the Christian faith to scrutiny in the light of more general norms of
rationality. Abelard began his academic life as a teacher of dialectic (what
we would call ‘logic’). Even when he turns to theology, he remains a philo-
sopher, ‘Christ’s philosopher’, as Peter the Venerable called him,3 but a
philosopher nonetheless. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more evident than in
his Collationes,4 also known as the Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew
and a Christian. This is not so much a dialogue between three people –
the Jew and the Christian never speak with each other – as a questioning
of both Jew and Christian by the philosopher. 
(1956), pp. 191–203, on p. 198.
1 A. Victor Murray, Abelard and St Bernard: A Study in Twelfth Century
‘Modernism’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), pp. 144–
45.
2 P. Abelard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition, ed. B. B. Boyer and R. McKeon
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977),Prologue, p. 103 (transla-
tion my own).
3 Clancy, Abelard, p. 2.
4 The term collatio can mean both ‘a dialogue’ and ‘a comparison’, and per-
haps both meanings are intended here; see J. Marenbon and G. Orlandi,
‘Introduction’, in P. Abelard, Collationes, tr. J. Marenbon and G. Orlandi
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. xvii–cxix, on pp. xxiv–xxv.
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It is the philosopher who takes the lead because, he says, ‘it is the task
of philosophers to investigate the truth by reasoning and in all things to
follow the lead of reason, not people’s opinion’.1 Accordingly, his first chal-
lenge to both Jew and Christian is to ask them if they have reasons for
their beliefs. 
Is there some reason which led you to your particular faiths, or are you
here  following  common  opinion  alone  and  love  of  your  own  people?
Should  the  first  alternative  be  the  case,  it  deserves  full  approval,
whereas the other alternative is entirely unacceptable.2
To hold to a religious position because you have reasons for it  is good;
simply to follow in the footsteps of your ancestors is not.3 
 What is striking about this work is that both the philosopher and the
Christian adopt a position that seems at odds with a traditional view of
faith. This view is expressed in the work of both St Augustine and St An-
selm (Anselm of Canterbury, 1033–1109). St Augustine undoubtedly val-
ues reason in matters of faith; indeed he defines faith as ‘thinking with as-
sent’.4 But he often suggests that the assent should take priority over the
thinking. As he remarks, ‘unless you believe, you will  not understand’.5
The Christian, on this view, should not seek to understand so as to be-
lieve, but should believe so as to understand.6 St Augustine’s principle is
1 Abelard, Collationes, p. 3.
2 Abelard, Collationes, p. 9.
3 The ‘philosopher’ here is, admittedly, a character in a dialogue, but other
passages in Abelard’s writings reflect a similar attitude. See  Marenbon
and Orlandi, ‘Introduction’, p. lvii.
4 J. Rist, ‘Faith and Reason’, in E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (eds),  The
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), pp. 26–39, on p. 26.
5 Augustine, De libero arbitrio, book 1, chap. 2, para. 4; ET: St Augustine:
The Problem of Free Choice, tr. M. Pontifex, Ancient Christian Writers 22
(Westminster, MD; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), p. 38. The
saying is a Latin version of the Greek text of Isa 7:9.
6 Augustine,  In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus, tractate 29,  §  6 (on John
7:14–18); ET: ‘Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St John,’
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repeated by St Anselm, who famously defined theology as ‘faith seeking
understanding’.1 
In Abelard’s work, however, the Christian agrees with the philosopher
that nothing should be believed unless it is first understood. It is not ‘reas-
onable’, the Christian says, ‘to accept what is doubtful, unless the reason
why it should be accepted is first proposed’.2 It is hard to know what falls
under the scope of the phrase ‘what is doubtful’. It could be that the basic
tenets of the faith are not subject to such a demand, although this would
hardly be consistent with the dialogue as a whole. In any case, the same
idea is found in Abelard’s autobiographical sketch, the Historia Calamit-
atum (‘History of my Misfortunes’). Abelard notes that he wrote his first
book on theology because his students 
were always seeking for rational and philosophical explanations, asking
for reasons they could understand rather than mere words, saying that
it was futile to utter words which the intellect could not possibly follow,
that nothing could be believed unless it could first be understood, and
that it was absurd for anyone to preach to others a thing which neither
he himself nor those whom he sought to teach could comprehend.3
‘Nothing can be believed unless it is first understood.’ While this is a re-
port of his students’ views, Abelard does not distance himself from it and
it may be an implied criticism of St Anselm’s position.4
I  have described Abelard  as perhaps the first  example  of  a  ‘critical’
theologian.  But  ‘criticism’  here  does  not  mean  ‘finding  fault  with’.  Al-
tr. J. Gibb and J. Innes, in P. Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of the Nicene
and  Post-Nicene  Fathers,  vol  7  (1888;  Grand Rapids,  MI:  William B.
Eerdmans, 1974), pp. 1–452, on p. 184.
1 Anselm,  Proslogion,  prologue and chap. 1; ET: ‘Proslogion’,  in  Anselm:
Basic  Writings,  tr.  T.  Williams (Indianapolis,  IN:  Hackett  Publishing,
2007), pp. 75–98, on pp. 75, 81.
2 Abelard, Collationes, p. 91.
3 P. Abelard, Historia Calamitatum, chap. 9; ET: The Story of My Misfor-
tunes:  An  Autobiography  by  Peter  Abélard,  tr.  H.  Adams  Bellows  (St
Paul, MN: Thomas A. Boyd, 1922), p. 36.
4 M. T. Clanchy, ‘Abelard’s Mockery of St Anselm’, The Journal of Ecclesi-
astical History, 41 (1990), pp 1–23, on p. 17.
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though Abelard may find fault with certain theological views, such as a
particular understanding of the atonement,1 he does so only out of loyalty
to the Christian tradition as a whole. He, too, is no modern rationalist.
Ironically, however, the use of reason in support of the faith can be just as
challenging to religious authority as the use of reason to undermine it.
Abelard  believed,  for  instance,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  trinitarian
nature of God was accessible to those outside the Christian tradition.2 To
affirm that God is triune, he argues, is to affirm that he has the three at-
tributes of being powerful, wise, and benign. Since these are the qualities
that any intelligent person will attribute to the divinity, this apparently
distinctive Christian doctrine is knowable by reason.3 The problem with
this view is that it renders a special act of divine revelation all but re-
dundant. Faith now becomes a simple acceptance of a truth that is evident
to any reflective observer.
Abelard  is  careful  to  affirm that  knowledge  of  the  divine  can come
about only through revelation.4 But he understands ‘revelation’ in a way
that makes it all but indistinguishable from reason. After all, he not only
claims that pagan philosophers grasped these truths about God. He also
argues that they would have been saved by living in accordance with what
they had understood.5 So Abelard’s conception of revelation may be like
his conception of divine grace: it  is something that God provides to all,
1 T. Williams, ‘Sin, Grace, and Redemption’, in J. E. Brower and K. Guilfoy
(eds),  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Abelard (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 258–78, on p. 263.
2 P. Abelard, Theologia Christiana, book 1, in J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologia
Latina, vol. 178, columns 1141, 1144, 1150, 1161, 1165; ET:  Abelard’s
Christian Theology,  tr.  J.  Ramsay McCallum (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell,
1948), pp. 50–57.
3 J. Marenbon,  The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 55–56, 58.
4 Abelard,  Theologia  Christiana,  book  2,  in  Patrologia  Latina 178,  col.
1220; Abelard’s Christian Theology, p. 68.
5 Abelard,  Theologia  Christiana,  book  2,  in  Patrologia  Latina 178,  col.
1173; Abelard’s Christian Theology, p. 60.
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simply by creating them as they are.1 Such a view is not easily reconcilable
with the traditional conception of faith, which involves the acceptance of
truths on the authority of God, truths that in some cases we could never
attain on our own.2 When it comes to trinitarian belief, for example, Aqui-
nas would expressly reject that idea that the triune nature of God can be
known by ‘natural reason’.3 
Abelard was accused of particular doctrinal errors. But it seems to have
been his critical approach to matters of faith that provoked the wrath of St
Bernard of Clairvaux. St Bernard may be regarded as representative of an
older style of theology, associated with the monasteries rather than the
cathedral schools.4 The theology of the cathedral schools and (later) the
universities differed from that of the monasteries insofar as it drew on the
authority of philosophers as well as that of the Bible. Its primary tool was
the method of disputation, in which differing opinions were set out and
discussed.  The  monks  frequently  regarded  this  style  of  theology  with
alarm. Their preferred style of theological reflection was a continuation of
that found among the Church Fathers,5 closely tied to the authority and
1 Williams, ‘Sin, Grace, and Redemption’, pp. 273–74.
2 See chap. 7, ‘Faith and Belief’.
3 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a, qu. 32, art. 1.
4 D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard’s
Thought in the Early Scholastic Period, Cambridge Studies in Medieval
Life and Thought, Second Series, 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), p. 111. This is, admittedly, something of an oversimplifica-
tion, since (as Constant Mews writes) ‘there were many monks who were
keenly interested in the theological writings emerging from the schools’,
to which monks sometimes went to study ; see C. J. Mews, ‘Bernard of
Clairvaux and Peter Abelard’, in B. P. McGuire (ed.),  A Companion to
Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  Brill’s  Companions  to  the  Christian  Tradition
(Leiden;  Boston:  Brill,  2011),  pp.  133–68,  on  p.  168.  But  the  clash
between Bernard and Abelard can still be considered representative of
two styles of theology: that of the monasteries, on the one hand, and the
cathedral schools on the other.
5 J. Leclerq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Mon-
astic Culture (1957),  tr.  C.  Misrahi,  2nd edition (New York:  Fordham
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language of the Bible. They shared the Fathers’ suspicion of knowledge for
its own sake, the seeking of which they regarded as a vice, that of vain
‘curiosity’.1 
This is certainly true of St Bernard, who held that theology should pro-
ceed ‘through prayer rather than through disputation’.2 He shared with
his fellow monastics the fear that a theology based on the independent use
of reason would overstep its proper bounds. William of St James of Liège
expressed the monks’ concerns very precisely when he spoke against the
‘innovators who apply to faith the yardstick of reason’ and who ‘make faith
derive from understanding rather than understanding from faith’.3
St Bernard does list a number of what he considered heretical proposi-
tions drawn from Abelard’s work.4 But he seems particularly concerned
with the freedom with which Abelard applied reason to matters of faith.
Here’s the beginning of St Bernard’s letter to Pope Innocent II, denoun-
cing Abelard.
We have in France an old teacher turned into a new theologian, who in
his early days amused himself with dialectics, and now gives utterance
to  wild  imaginations  upon  the  Holy  Scriptures.  He  is  endeavouring
again to quicken false opinions, long ago condemned and put to rest, not
only his own, but those of others; and is adding fresh ones as well. I
know not what there is in heaven above and in the earth beneath which
he deigns to confess ignorance of:  he raises his eyes to  Heaven,  and
searches the deep things of God, and then returning to us, he brings
University Press, 1974), p. 233.
1 Leclerq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, p. 252.
2 Bernard, De consideratione, 5.32, cited in Leclerq, The Love of Learning
and the Desire for God, p. 262.
3 Cited in Leclerq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, p. 258. Le-
clerg’s translator uses ‘intelligence’ for William’s  intellectus. I have sub-
stituted ‘understanding’. For further discussion of this reaction against
the ‘innovators’, see H. de Lubac,  Medieval Exegesis: vol. 1 – The Four
Senses of Scripture (1959), tr. M. Sebanc, Ressourcement (Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans & Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998), pp. 60–66.
4 For  a  summary  and  evaluation,  see  Luscombe,  The  School  of  Peter
Abelard, pp. 114–42.
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back unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter, while
he is presumptuously prepared to give a reason for everything, even of
those things which are above reason.1
In  St  Bernard’s  view,  Abelard’s  theology  is  nothing  less  than  human
reason overstepping its proper bounds.2 St Bernard goes on to cite a re-
mark by St Gregory the Great (AD 540–604),  that ‘the kind of faith for
which human reason provides proof has no merit’.3 Ironically, this is one of
the  first  propositions  set  out  for  discussion  in  Abelard’s  Sic  et  Non.
Abelard at times seems to endorse this (entirely traditional) view,4 and it
would later be defended by Aquinas.5 But in the Dialogue of a Philosopher
with a Jew and a Christian, Abelard puts a scathing response into the
mouth of the philosopher. He suggests that those who cite St Gregory’s
saying do so because they lack the ability to engage in the necessary reas-
oning.6 
Abelard survived not one but two condemnations of his work – one in
1121 and another in 1140 – and died, safely out of the public eye, under
the protection of Peter the Venerable, the powerful Abbot of Cluny. But if
practitioners of a critical theology are lucky enough escape censure by reli-
gious authorities,  they may still  encounter  a  popular  backlash to  their
ideas.  The most  striking example  of  such a  backlash is  the  movement
known as ‘fundamentalism’. 
1 Bernard of Clairvaux,  Epistle LX; ET:  Some Letters of Saint Bernard,
Abbot of Clairvaux, ed. F. Aidan Gasquet (London: John Hodges, 1904),
p. 260.
2 On St Bernard’s idea of reason keeping to its proper limits, see Peters,
‘Transgressing the Limits Set by the Fathers’, pp. 339–40, 352 and Le-
clerq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, p. 258.
3 Gregory the Great,  LX Homiliae in Evangelia,  book 2,  homily 26  (on
John 20: 19 – 31).
4 See the editors’ note in the Collationes (p. 90, n. 24), which points out two
occasion on which Abelard uses this quotation in a way that suggests he
approves of it, and one other in which he uses it disparagingly.
5 See chap. 7, ‘Aquinas on Faith’.
6 Abelard, Collationes, p. 91.
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Fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon. It is a reaffirmation of the au-
thority of its community’s foundational myths at a time when these have
been called into question. So it emerges, or at least becomes visible, at
particular periods of religious history. But it is a reaffirmation of an atti-
tude that always exists, one that is characteristic of scripturally based re-
ligions. Such religions, as we have seen, regard their fundamental beliefs
as divinely revealed: these beliefs are, to use Rappaport’s phrase,  sacred
postulates.1 What fundamentalists do is to act upon this conviction, taking
it more seriously than many of their fellow believers. 
It follows that fundamentalism is not a perversion of the ‘true’ religious
spirit, as some of its critics like to think. Rather, it embodies an attitude
towards knowledge that is normative within religious communities. That
attitude holds, among other things, that religious beliefs should take pri-
ority over any ‘merely human’ claims to knowledge. This is particularly
dangerous when religious thinkers have an ‘expansionist’  view of scrip-
tural authority: one that refuses to limit its scope. But as my earlier dis-
cussion has shown, this view also has roots in Christian tradition and is
echoed in modern statements of Roman Catholic teaching.2
What the work of Abelard signified was the emergence of a critical atti-
tude  to  religious  authority,  rooted  in  the  new epistemic  norms  of  the
cathedral schools and (in the following century) the arts faculties of the
universities. Abelard did not, of course, question the divine origin of Sac-
red Scripture, although he did warn against scribal errors and noted that
even prophets and apostles have sometimes fallen into error.3 There were
sceptics even in medieval Europe,4 but openly to deny biblical authority
would have been suicidal. In any case, there is no indication that Abelard
wanted to do so. What he was questioning were traditional interpretations
of the Bible. But even this provoked a backlash. A more radical question-
1 See chap. 5, ‘A Certititude No Longer Open To Doubt’.
2 See  chap.  4,  ‘The  Scope  of  Biblical  Authority’  and  ‘Has  Anything
Changed?’
3 See the prologue to Abelard’s Sic et Non.
4 G. G. Coulton, Ten Mediaeval Studies, 3rd edition, 1930 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1959), pp. 194–97.
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ing of biblical authority would occur only at a later date, in the  seven-
teenth century. 
A  key  figure  here  was  the  Jewish philosopher  Baruch (or  Benedict)
Spinoza,1 who suffered the fate of so many critical religious thinkers, being
excommunicated  from  the  synagogue.  Spinoza  outlined  a  program  for
what came to be known as the ‘historical criticism’ of the Bible, treating
the Scriptures in the same way as any other set of ancient documents.2
This program reached its high point in the nineteenth century, when an
increasing number of scholars set out to interpret the Bible ‘like any other
book, by the same rules of evidence and the same canons of criticism’.3 It is
this movement that shaped the liberal theology of thinkers such as Ernst
Troeltsch, who embraced what he called a  ‘historical’  rather than ‘dog-
matic’  approach  to  theology.4 The  same  movement  also  influenced  the
work of Andrew Dickson White. White sees the Bible as one of a number of
sacred books that reflect the development of human ethical and religious
thought, although in ways that are cloaked in myth and legend.5 He de-
votes almost a third of his second volume to the development of this new
understanding  of  Sacred  Scripture,  reserving  particular  praise  for
Spinoza.6 But while White and the liberal theologians embraced this new
understanding of the Bible, fundamentalists decisively reject it.7 
1 E.  Cassirer,  The Philosophy of  the  Enlightenment (1932),  tr.  F.  C.  A.
Koelln and J. P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1951), p. 185.
2 Dawes, The Historical Jesus Question, pp. 39–56.
3 B. Jowett,  ‘On the Interpretation of Scripture’,  in  Essays and Reviews
(London: John W. Parker and Son, 1860), pp. 330–433, on p. 375; see
also pp. 338 and 377.
4 See chap. 5, ‘Liberal Theology and its Aftermath’.
5 White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,
vol. 2, pp. 288, 394.
6 White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,
vol. 2, p. 318.
7 G.  M.  Marsden,  ‘Fundamentalism  as  an  American  Phenomenon.  A
Comparison with English Evangelicalism’, Church History 46 (1977), pp.
215–32, on p. 215.
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What  gave the modern fundamentalist  movement its  name was the
publication, between 1910 and 1915, of a series of pamphlets known as
The Fundamentals. These were widely distributed, free of charge, with the
aid of money from Lyman and Milton Stewart, the founders of the Union
Oil Company of Los Angeles.1 Amongst the doctrines that they set out to
defend was the divine inspiration of the Bible, which they claimed histor-
ical criticism had called into question. As one of their authors wrote,
the formative forces of the Higher Critical movement were rationalistic
forces, and the men who were its chief authors and expositors … were
men who had discarded belief in God and Jesus Christ Whom He had
sent.  The Bible,  in their view, was a mere human product. It  was a
stage in the literary evolution of a religious people. …  it certainly was
not given by the inspiration of God, and is not the Word of the God.2
The same author condemns the liberal theologians of his day: those who
claim to be believers in biblical authority, but who employ the methods
and assumptions of the historical (or ‘higher’) critics when studying the
Bible.  In  this  author’s  view,  there  should  be  no  compromise  between
Christian faith and the critical spirit of modern thought. 
The ongoing influence of  fundamentalism, particularly in the United
States,  scarcely  needs  to  be  documented.  The  young-earth  creationist
movement, which opposes the theory of evolution by natural selection, is
its most visible sign. Roughly 47% of the American population will agree
that ‘God created man pretty much in his present form at one time within
the last 10,000 years’.3 Nor is the influence of such movements limited to
the United States or to Christianity: creationism has become a global phe-
nomenon and has spread to other faiths. Even in apparently secular and
sceptical European countries, such as Switzerland and Germany,  young-
1 E.  R.  Sandeen,  ‘Toward  A  Historical  Interpretation  of  the  Origins  of
Fundamentalism’, Church History, 36 (1967), pp. 66–83, on pp. 77–78.
2 D. Hague, ‘The History of the Higher Criticism’, in The Fundamentals: A
Testimony to the Truth, vol. 1 (Chicago: Testimony Publishing Co., 1910),
pp. 87–122, on p. 98.
3 R. L. Numbers,  The Creationists: From Scientific Creationism to Intelli-
gent  Design,  Expanded  Edition  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University
Press, 2006), p. 1.
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earth creationists represent about 20% of the population.1 Among Asian
countries, Korea now has a flourishing and influential creationist move-
ment.2 While modern creationism has Christian origins, by the late twen-
tieth century it  had also  spread  to  Islam (particularly  in Turkey)  and
among orthodox Jews worldwide.3
In practice, then, the project of critical theology – that of assessing the
articles of faith by reference to more general norms of rationality – can
succeed only within limits. These limits are not, however, simply imposed
from without, by fundamentalist reactions to critical thought. They arise
from the very nature of theological thinking. If the theologian intends to
speak about the  Christian God (or the God of Judaism or Islam, as the
case may be), then her theology must begin with the acceptance of the
community’s foundational narratives. One does not need to be a theolo-
gian to appreciate this; the anthropologist Clifford Geertz makes the same
point. ‘The basic axiom’, he writes, ‘underlying what we may perhaps call
“the religious perspective” is everywhere the same: he who would know
must first believe’.4 Geertz is, of course, echoing a traditional Christian
view, reflected in St Augustine’s ‘unless you believe, you will not under-
stand’.5 It follows that even when theologians take on the task of reinter-
preting their community’s myths, they continue to be bound, at least to
some degree, by their authority. 
What is true of theology is true of religious beliefs in general: cut off
from their mythic origins, such beliefs would be nothing more than series
of disconnected philosophical and ethical propositions. Mythic narratives
are what hold a religious tradition together and give it its distinctive iden-
tity. Liberal theologians, it must be said, feel less bound to traditional for-
mulations than their more conservative colleagues. They keep to a min-
imum those propositions they regard as unquestionable. But even liberal
1 Numbers, The Creationists, p. 409.
2 Numbers, The Creationists, p. 418.
3 Numbers, The Creationists, pp. 421–30.
4 C. Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’ (1966), in C. Geertz, The Inter-
pretation of Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 1975), pp. 87–125, on p. 110.
5 Augustine, De libero arbitrio, book 1, chap. 2, para. 4; see chap. 6, ‘Crit-
ical Theology’.
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thinkers cannot entirely evade the constraints imposed by an authoritat-
ive tradition. Gordon Kaufman, for instance, is one of the most influential
of liberal theologians. Yet even he admits that the starting point of theolo-
gical reflection must be ‘the categories and concepts and images provided
by tradition and history’,1 the tradition in question being that of Chris-
tianity. These Christian  ‘categories and concepts and images’ are of in-
terest because they are presumed to convey some truth, a presumption
that is at least analogous to the traditional act of faith.2 We can access
that  truth,  Kaufman writes,  ‘only  by studying these traditions and at-
tempting (at least imaginatively) to appropriate them, making their com-
mitments ours’.3
6.5  Science and Criticism
Modern science has inherited and extended the critical spirit of the an-
cient Greeks, including (of course) a critical attitude towards religion. In
contrast with religion, it is not bound to any particular set of doctrines.
The critical spirit of modern science goes hand in hand, as it did for Xeno-
phanes, with a fallibilist view of knowledge, which recognizes that even
our best-supported scientific theories may one day be overturned. 
A useful statement of this attitude is found in a famous essay, pub-
lished by the sociologist of science Robert K. Merton in 1942. Merton’s fo-
cus was on what he called ‘the normative structure of science’: the set of
cultural norms and values governing how science is practised. He identi-
fied four such norms, which, he argued, constitute the ‘ethos of science’.4
The first of these is universalism: the fact that the ‘race, nationality, reli-
gion, class, and personal qualities’ of a scientist are treated as irrelevant
1 G. D. Kaufman,  An Essay on Theological  Method, 3rd edition, AAR Re-
flection  and  Theory  in  the  Study  of  Religion  (Atlanta,  GA:  Scholars
Press, 1995), p. 10; see also pp. 40, 61, 79.
2 Kaufman, In Face of Mystery, pp. 450–51.
3 Kaufman, In Face of Mystery, p. 28.
4 R. K. Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’ (1942), in The Soci-
ology  of  Science:  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Investigations,  ed.  N.  W.
Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 267–78, on p.
268.
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factors in the assessment of her scientific work. As Louis Pasteur  wrote,
‘The scientist has a nationality; science does not’.1 The second is what Mer-
ton calls communism: the idea that the results of science are considered to
belong to all. They ‘constitute a common heritage in which the equity of
the individual producer is severely limited’.2 This is, Merton notes, why
priority disputes are often so fierce: the claim to be the first to make a dis-
covery is really the only claim a scientist can make with regard to her res-
ults. The third norm is disinterestedness. Individual scientists may be pas-
sionately  committed  to  their  own theories,  but  the  norms  of  the  com-
munity ensure that their partiality will not distort the science. Fraud, for
instance, is relatively rare, not because scientists are more virtuous than
other people, but because ‘the activities of scientists are subject to rigorous
policing, to an extent perhaps unparalleled in any other field of activity’.3 
It is, however, the last of Merton’s norms that is of particular interest
here. It is what he calls  organized scepticism: it involves ‘the temporary
suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of
empirical and logical criteria’.4 The ‘organized scepticism’ of science means
that no ideas are exempt from critical examination.  This, of course, as-
sumes what I  have already argued: that no scientific theory represents
certain knowledge. Once cannot set out to be sceptical about claims that
are  established  beyond doubt.  Individual  scientists  may  act as  though
their theories were the last  word in the field,  but the community as a
whole will not accept this idea. It will regard no scientific theory as beyond
revision.
The  reader  will  not  be  surprised  to  learn  that  Merton’s  ideas  have
themselves been subject to criticism.5 Critics have claimed, among other
1 Le savant a une patrie, la science n’en a pas, cited in Merton, ‘The Norm-
ative Structure of Science’, p. 272 (translation my own). The saying dis-
tinguishes nicely between Merton’s two levels of analysis: that of collect-
ive and individual norms. (See chap. 9, ‘Orthodoxy and Dissent’.)
2 Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’, p. 273.
3 Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’, p. 276.
4 Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’, p. 277.
5 For  an  extensive  list  of  such  criticisms,  see  N.  Toren,  ‘The  Scientific
Ethos Debate: A Meta-theoretical View,  Social Science & Medicine,  17
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things, that his so-called ‘norms’ are too vague to effectively constrain be-
haviour,1 that this alleged ‘ethos’ is nothing more than an ideology, under-
girding power relations among scientists and in society at large,2 and that
violations of such norms can and sometimes do produce first-rate science.
(James Watson’s less than flattering account of the discoverers of DNA is
often taken as  a  case  in  point.3)  But  the  least  contestable  of  Merton’s
claims is that regarding organized scepticism. If the scientific community
does anything, it provides a context within which particular claims can be
treated sceptically and critically tested, if not by their authors then cer-
tainly by others. 
I shall come back to this point.4 In the meantime, let me add just one
qualification. The sceptical spirit that characterises the procedures of sci-
entific communities will not entail a scepticism carte blanche, for it will be
impossible to subject all our beliefs to critical scrutiny at any one time. We
need to take some beliefs for granted, at least for the moment, so that we
can have a basis on which we can criticise others. This idea was given
vivid expression by the philosopher of science Otto Neurath. 
We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but
are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken
away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the
ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and drift-
wood, the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual recon-
struction.5 
(1983), pp. 1665–72, on p. 1666.
1 S. Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, 2nd edi-
tion (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), pp. 34–35.
2 M. J. Mulkay, ‘Norms and Ideology in Science’,  Social Science Informa-
tion, 15 (1976), pp. 637–56.
3 J. D. Watson,  The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of
the Structure of  DNA (1968),  A New Critical  Edition,  ed.  G.  S.  Stent
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).
4 See chap. 9, ‘Orthodoxy and Dissent’.
5 O. Neurath, ‘Anti-Spengler’ (1921), in M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen (eds),
Empiricism and Sociology,  Vienna Circle Collection (Dordrecht: D.  Re-
idel, 1973), pp. 158–213, on p. 199.
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Science can subject its evidential base to critical examination only in a
piecemeal fashion. But no part of that evidential base is sacrosanct. The
beliefs that we have taken for granted at one moment can be subjected to
criticism at a later date. The result may eventually be the rejection of an
entire  system of beliefs, as in the case of the replacement of Newtonian
physics by that of Einstein in the early twentieth century.1
It is true, too, that not all our scientific beliefs are equally likely to be
subject to criticism. Some features of the structure of scientific knowledge
are more foundational than others and are therefore less likely to be aban-
doned. In the experimental testing of Newtonian physics, for example, Eu-
clidean geometry was not under any immediate challenge. It was taken
for granted, since it was assumed to be the only kind of geometry there
was. It took four hundred years for this assumption to be overturned, but
overturned it was. The physics of Einstein employs a (deeply unintuitive)
non-Euclidean  geometry,  drawn  from  the  work  of  nineteenth-century
mathematicians such as Georg Friedrich Riemann.
Are there  any  scientific  principles  that  are  truly  unquestionable,
perhaps assumptions that one must make in order to do science at all?
One might argue that there are, but I shall return to this question later.2
For the moment I need note only that science ‘makes scepticism a virtue’
in a way that religion does not.3 This is not true merely of modern science.
We  have  seen  hints  of  this  attitude  in  the  natural  philosophy  of  the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which revived both the ancient sense of a
natural order – what I have called ‘the rediscovery of nature’ – and a scep-
tical  attitude to authority. Then, too, this attitude met with opposition
from religious  thinkers,  especially  when it  was extended to  theological
matters. The root cause of this conflict is the idea that faith is a source of
knowledge, one that is distinct from and more reliable than ‘mere’ human
reason. It is to this idea that I must now turn.
1 M.  Polanyi,  Personal  Knowledge:  Towards  a  Post-Critical  Philosophy
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 294.
2 See chap. 8, ‘Scientific Acts of Faith’.
3 R. K. Merton, ‘Science and the Social Order’ (1938), in The Sociology of
Science:  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Investigations,  pp.  254–66,  on pp.
264–65.
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7. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
What I have been arguing is that there exists a clear contrast between re-
ligion and science. It can be found in the differing attitudes to knowledge
characteristic of religious and scientific communities. Religious communit-
ies have traditionally insisted on the certainty of their claims to know-
ledge, which are resistant to radical criticism in ways that have no paral-
lel within science. What I have not yet done to examine the root cause of
this difference. 
What gives rise to these contrasting attitudes is the idea that religious
faith offers a source of knowledge that is distinct from human reason. Reli-
gious and scientific claims sometimes overlap: they would (if true) have a
common referent, even when that referent is described very differently.1
But religious believers consider themselves to have a source of knowledge
that science lacks. Their claims to knowledge are based not merely on hu-
man insight and reflection, but also on faith. We can think of this idea –
that knowledge arises from both faith and reason – as a kind of ‘epistemo-
logical dualism’.2 It is time to examine the conception of faith that under-
lies this view.
7.1  Religious Faith
Let me begin with an observation. There exists a misunderstanding of re-
ligious faith, which is common among philosophers. It assumes that reli-
gious faith falls into one of our familiar categories of belief. Philosophers,
it should be noted, use the term ‘belief’ very broadly. To believe something,
in the philosophical sense, is simply to hold it  to be true. We can hold
things to be true with varying degrees of conviction. I may be entirely con-
fident, for instance, that there is a coffee cup on the desk in front of me. In
these circumstances, I would probably not  say that I believed it; I would
1 See my Introduction, ‘Goals and Means’.
2 The phrase is that of W. A. Wallace, mentioned in the discussion follow-
ing the paper by B. Nelson, ‘The Quest for Certitude and the Books of
Scripture, Nature, and Conscience’, in O. Gingerich (ed.),  The Nature of
Scientific  Discovery:  A  Symposium  Commemorating  the  500th  An-
niversary of the Birth of Nicolaus Copernicus (Washington, DC: Smithso-
nian Institution, 1975), pp. 355–91, on p. 386.
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simply assert what I see as a fact. (‘There is a coffee cup on my desk’.) But
as far as philosophers are concerned, it would still constitute a belief. 
There are some things we cannot help but believe: we cannot avoid tak-
ing them to be true. The existence of other people, with minds of their
own, seems to  be  one of  these.  To seriously  consider  that  other  people
might be merely a figment of my imagination – not just taking this as a
possible state of affairs, but actually suspending belief in their existence –
is to risk insanity. (I shall come back to this point later.1) But outside of
such special  cases, many philosophers argue that  we should proportion
our belief to the evidence available. This position is often referred to ‘evid-
entialism’ and is found in the works of both John Locke and David Hume.2
Indeed it seems to many philosophers almost self-evidently correct. A com-
mon criticism of religious belief is that it is not proportioned to the avail-
able evidence. It is held in the absence of adequate evidence and is not
given up, or even weakened, in response to counter-evidence. Why is this?
This phenomenon becomes less puzzling when we realize that religious
faith is not simply another instance of belief. My point is not merely that
religious  faith  adds something  to  belief.  The  religious  person does  not
merely hold certain propositions to be true. Her belief has an affective di-
mension and is accompanied by a commitment to live a certain way of life.
This  is  surely  true,  but  the  differences  go  deeper.  They  relate  to  the
grounds on which one believes. Religious belief  (as traditionally under-
stood) is not the kind of belief that all human beings form spontaneously,
and which we  cannot  avoid  forming,  when placed  in  the  right  circum-
stances. (It is not what philosophers call a ‘basic’ or ‘non-inferential’ be-
lief.3) But nor is it the kind of reflective belief that is formed in response to
evidence  and  arguments.  It  forms  a  third  category  of  belief,  which  is
formed in the absence of adequate evidence by a deliberate choice, an act
of the will. 
1 See chap. 8, ‘The Idea of a Hinge Belief’ and chap. 9, ‘Scientific Acts of
Faith’.
2 See chap.  5,  ‘Against  Enthusiasm’;  D.  Hume,  An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), Section 10, Part 1, § 4 (p. 170).
3 See ‘An Assessment’, in the present chapter.
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I shall provide support for these claims shortly. For the moment, let me
note that they help to explain a feeling common among atheist philosoph-
ers: that the arguments put forward by believers are merely post hoc ra-
tionalizations. They are not actually the grounds on which such thinkers
hold their beliefs, but are being produced merely to defend them. Atheists
are likely to regard this as inappropriate. But it corresponds to a widely
held Christian view of how faith and reason should interact. On this view,
the act of faith is independent of rational considerations; the only appro-
priate role for reason is to lend it support.
This  view of  faith is  perhaps  most  clearly  expressed  in  the  work of
Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas is certainly a dominant figure within Roman
Catholic thought. Not only does he shape later Catholic tradition, but his
work reflects ideas found in earlier Catholic writers. St Augustine, for ex-
ample, resembles Aquinas in holding that faith is the product of a rightly
guided will (voluntas), rather than of any evidence that might be produced
in its support.1 The Protestant Reformers of the sixteenth century depar-
ted from Catholic tradition on many matters. But despite these disagree-
ments (regarding, for example, human freedom), their views on faith also
resemble  those  found  in  Aquinas.2 What  about  more  recent  Christian
thinkers? I cannot claim that all modern theologians would accept Aqui-
nas’s view of faith, but something closely resembling it has been defended
by the twentieth-century Calvinist theologian Louis Berkhof and by the
philosopher William Lane Craig.3 So we can regard Aquinas as broadly
representative of a major stream in Christian tradition.4 
1 Rist, ‘Faith and Reason’, p. 37
2 On the substantial identity between Aquinas’s view of faith and that of
Martin  Luther,  see  B.  D.  Marshall,  ‘Faith  and  Reason  Reconsidered:
Aquinas and Luther on Deciding What is True’, The Thomist, 63 (1999),
pp. 1–48, on p. 2. On the substantial identify of Aquinas’s view with that
of John Calvin, see A. Vos,  Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protest-
ant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas
Aquinas (Washington, DC: Christian University Press, 1985), pp. 1–20.
3 Berkhof,  Systematic  Theology,  pp.  503–507;  W.  L.  Craig,  Reasonable
Faith:  Christian Truth and Apologetics,  Revised Edition (Wheaton IL:
Crossway Books, 1994), pp. 43–51.
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7.1.1  The Faith of Demons
A helpful place to begin is with Aquinas’s discussion of what he calls ‘the
faith of demons’.1 The idea that demons have faith may seem odd. They
are, after all, fallen angels who have rebelled against God. But the New
Testament states that the demons do believe, while also noting that this
faith will not save them (James 2:19). This poses a theological problem. In
what sense can demons be said to have faith? If they do have faith, why is
this faith of no religious value? Why does it not bring them salvation?
It is of the essence of faith, Aquinas holds, to assent to some truth in
the absence of insight into the facts that make it true. Aquinas believes
that demons have angelic intellects which are greatly superior to ours.2
Even so, there are truths about God which they cannot grasp unaided. If
they are to know these truths, they can do so only by means of divine rev-
elation. But the demons are clever enough to recognize the signs that what
the Church teaches is divinely revealed. So they are forced, despite them-
selves, to recognize that there exist truths that are revealed by God and
must, therefore, be true. 
This is a type of faith, but Aquinas holds it to be quite different from re-
ligious faith, properly so-called.3 The faith of demons lacks merit: it does
them no good in the eyes of God. Why does it lack merit? It does so be-
cause it is motivated by evidential considerations: the demons’ belief is
brought  about  by  signs  that  these  propositions  been  revealed  by  God.
Aquinas holds that any act of faith that is the result of evidence and argu-
ments lacks merit. The believer does not lose any merit,  in the eyes of
4 What follows is an adapted and abbreviated version of material found in
G. W. Dawes, ‘The Act of Faith: Aquinas and the Moderns’, Oxford Stud-
ies in Philosophy of Religion 6, ed. J. L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015), pp. 58–86.
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 5, art. 2; De veritate qu. 14, art.
9 ad 4.
2 Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1a, qu. 64, art. 1; B. J. Shanley, The Thom-
ist  Tradition,  Handbook  of  Contemporary  Philosophy  of  Religion  2
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), p. 27.
3 As Aquinas says (De veritate, qu. 14, art. 9, ad 4), the terms ‘belief’ is
‘predicated equivocally’ of men and demons.
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God, if she seeks out reasons that support her belief after making the act
of faith. But her faith would not be properly religious if the reasons in
question preceded and brought about her act of faith.1 
This, too, was not a new idea. The reader may recognize it as the view
expressed  by  St  Gregory  several  hundred  years  earlier,  and  which  is
echoed in St Bernard’s arguments against Abelard: ‘The kind of faith for
which human reason provides proof has no merit’.2 It had been reaffirmed
in the instructions of Pope Gregory IX to the theologians of Paris in 1228.3
But while this is an entirely traditional view, it has some striking implica-
tions,  which are  rarely  made explicit.  It  means,  for  instance,  that  if  a
Christian philosopher succeeded in arguing a non-believer into accepting
Christian doctrines, the latter’s acceptance of those doctrines would not
constitute an act of faith, properly understood. 
Aquinas believes there are truths about God that you could be argued
into accepting. He thinks, for instance, that there are good arguments in
support of the existence of God. But even these truths ought to be the ob-
ject of a properly religious act of faith. The believer, as believer, is not to
accept them on the basis of the arguments that can be marshalled in their
support.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  one  person  from assenting  these
truths on the basis of reason and another doing so by faith.4 It may also be
possible for the same person to assent on the basis of reason on one occa-
sion and by faith on another.5 One might, for instance, be predisposed to
believe by rational arguments and then later make an act of faith.6 But
faith  and reason remain distinct  ways of  attaining knowledge.7 Indeed
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 10.
2 See chap. 6, ‘Critical Theology’.
3 Jaroszyński, Science in Culture, p. 81.
4 Aquinas, De veritate, qu. 14, art. 9.
5 Aquinas at least suggests this: Summa theologiae, qu. 2, art. 10, ad 2.
6 This seems to be what Aquinas is saying in De veritate qu. 14, art. 9 ad
9; for comment, see Jenkins,  Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas,
p. 198 and Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 25.
7 I am assuming that Aquinas regards faith as yielding knowledge, since
he holds that Christian theology is a kind of scientia (Summa theologiae,
1a, qu. 1, art. 2) and scientia involves knowledge.
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they are, in a certain sense,  mutually exclusive ways of attaining know-
ledge.1 If you grasp a revealed truth by reason, you cannot simultaneously
have faith in it; if you have faith in it, you cannot simultaneously grasp it
on the basis of reason.2
7.1.2  A Non-Evidentialist View
There are those who will reject this sharp distinction between faith and
reason. They will argue that Aquinas holds something much closer to an
evidentialist  view:  that  while  the  religious act  of  faith  may  go  beyond
reason, it is based on reasons.3 The reasons in question are those that sup-
port the claim that what we believe is divinely revealed. While such a con-
ception of faith may well be defensible – it resembles that held by John
Locke4 – it cannot plausibly be attributed to Aquinas. As we shall see in a
moment, Aquinas insists that faith requires an act of the will. But he else-
where makes it  clear that  the intellect  cannot  help  but  accept  evident
truths.5 So if the reasons in support of the faith were decisive arguments,
no act of the will would be required. Faith would be a simple matter of in-
tellectual insight. If, on the other hand, the act of faith were the result of
merely  persuasive arguments  (which  fall  short  of  demonstration),  this
would  make  nonsense  of  the  idea  that  faith  yields  certain  knowledge.
Aquinas  does  have  a  doctrine  of  the  ‘preambles  of  faith’  (praeambula
fidei), but these are not arguments that lead to faith.6 They are simply be-
liefs that the act of faith presupposes and which can, at least in principle,
1 This does not, of course, mean that what is believed cannot later be sup-
ported by reasons. As we have seen, for Aquinas it can (Summa theolo-
giae, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 10). But this is a different issue.
2 Aquinas, De veritate, qu. 14, art. 9.
3 T. Penelhum, ‘The Analysis of Faith in St Thomas Aquinas’,  Religious
Studies, 3 (1977), pp. 133–54, on p. 144.
4 See chap. 5, ‘Against Enthusiasm’.
5 Aquinas,  Summa theologiae,  1a 2ae, qu. 17, art.  6;  De veritate qu. 14,
art. 1.
6 This  was  the  central  point  of  the  ground-breaking  article  by  G.  de
Broglie,  which tried to correct what had been a widespread misunder-
standing of  Aquinas;  see G.  de Broglie,  ‘La vraie notion thomiste des
“praeambula fidei”’, Gregorianum, 34 (1953), pp. 341–89.
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be proven rationally. Knowledge of such arguments is neither necessary
nor sufficient for faith.1
For Aquinas, the act of faith is not a simple response to evidence, be-
cause it is not simply an intellectual affair. It is a decision, an act in which
the will commands the intellect to believe. Philosophically minded readers
might hesitate at this point, for it is not clear that we can choose to believe
something. (Try it. Choose to believe – not merely to imagine or to enter-
tain the idea – that I was sitting in a café as I wrote this.) If we cannot do
so, then some reinterpretation of Aquinas’s view may be needed. Rather
than saying that the will commands belief, it might be better to say that
the will commands us to  accept that certain truths are revealed by God.
We  commit  ourselves  to  regarding  them  as  true,  to  taking  them  as
premises in any relevant process of reasoning.2 But since Aquinas does not
make this distinction, I shall continue to talk about ‘belief’. 
However we think about the act of faith, we must still try to under-
stand its grounds. If it is not a simple response to arguments and evid-
ence, to what is it a response? Aquinas’s discussions of this topic seem to
distinguish two kinds of motivations.3 The first consists of those factors
that predispose a person to believe. The second is the motivation that is in-
volved in the act of faith itself.  
Let’s start with that which predisposes a person to believe. We may be
predisposed to believe by rational arguments in support of the faith. But
Aquinas holds that these arguments will fall short of proof; they will not
1 Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 21.
2 C. Michon, ‘Aquinas and the Will to Believe’, in  D.  Łukasiewicz and R.
Pouivet (eds), The Right to Believe: Perspectives in Religious Epistemo-
logy (Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2012), pp. 73–84, on pp. 81–83. For
the relevant sense of ‘acceptance’, see L. Jonathan Cohen, ‘Belief and Ac-
ceptance’, Mind, N.S. 98 (1989), pp. 367–89, on p. 368.
3 This is, perhaps, clearest in his Commentary on the Gospel of St John lec-
ture 5, sect. 2,  § 662, where Aquinas distinguishes between those argu-
ments that lead one to faith and that which motivates the act of faith it-
self. If I depart from some other recent commentators on Aquinas, it is in
making this distinction clear, although it is also found in Rosental’s ac-
count (Lessons from Aquinas, pp. 109, 121).
189
 7.1.2  A Non-Evidentialist View
be decisive. We know this because not everyone is persuaded by such ar-
guments. 
As regards … man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may ob-
serve a twofold cause, either of one of external inducement, such as see-
ing a  miracle,  or  being persuaded by  someone to  embrace  the  faith.
Neither of these is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same
miracle,  or  hear  the  same  sermon,  some  believe,  and  some  do  not.
Hence we must assert  another internal  cause,  which moves man in-
wardly to assent to matters of faith.1
In other words, it is not only the evidential considerations that predispose
us to believe. There is another motivation, which appeals to the will rather
than the intellect. 
Aquinas sometimes suggests that what motivates the will is a realiza-
tion that belief is appropriate, that it is, in some sense, what we ought to
do. When this happens, 
our understanding is determined by the will, which chooses to assent to
one side definitely and precisely because of something which is enough
to move the will, though not enough to move the understanding... This
may  happen  when  someone  believes  what  another  says  because  it
seems fitting or useful to do so. Thus, too, we are moved to believe what
God says because we are promised eternal life as a reward if we believe.
And this reward moves the will to assent to what is said, although the
intellect is not moved by anything which it understands.2 
On this view, one of the reasons belief is appropriate is that it is a neces-
sary step to obtaining what God has promised. It follows that we are pre-
disposed to the act of faith by our desire for these goods, a desire that is it-
self the work of God.3 As Aquinas writes,
when goods are proposed to someone, first he wants them; second, he
wants to cleave to them;  third, he wants to hope for them; and fourth
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.
2 Aquinas, De veritate, qu. 14, art. 1, in the translation by R. W. Mulligan.
3 Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 33; Rosental, Lessons from Aquinas,
p. 107.
190
 7.1.2  A Non-Evidentialist View
he wants to believe them; so that by believing he may thus hope, love,
and possess.1 
This desire is, however, merely a first step, leading to the act of faith. It is
not an appropriate motivation for the act of faith itself.
To appreciate Aquinas’s view of the act of faith itself, we must switch
from the language of philosophy and psychology to that of theology. For
Aquinas, the desire for what God promises is already a divine gift, but
faith itself is a  theological virtue, something brought about within us by
God. It is not something we can achieve on our own. What does the grace
of God do, in this context? It makes it possible for us to accept that those
things proposed for belief are revealed by God. This cannot mean that we
have an intuitive grasp of the truth of the proposition, ‘These things are
revealed by God’.2 If the truth of this proposition were intuitively clear,
the act of faith would no longer be voluntary, since we cannot help but ac-
cept an evident truth.3 Rather, what the grace of God does is to enable us
to accept what God has revealed for no other reason than that he has re-
vealed it.
At this point, the reasons that might originally have attracted us to the
faith become irrelevant, or (at best) secondary. We have a new motivation
for believing: we believe what God has revealed because of our love for
God as the first truth. As Aquinas writes, 
when … a person has been led to believe, she can say that she believes
not on account of any of these things: not on account of natural reason
nor the testimony of the law, nor the preaching of others. Rather, she
believes only on account of the truth itself.4
1 Aquinas,  Commentary on the Sentences,  book 3,  dist.  23,  qu. 2,  art.  5,
cited in Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 33.
2 Jenkins (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, p. 192) comes close to
suggesting this, but it seems incompatible with the idea that the act of
faith remains voluntary.
3 Aquinas,  Summa theologiae,  1a 2ae, qu. 17, art. 6;  De veritate, qu. 14,
art. 1. Calvinists might insist that we are free only to refuse God’s grace,
but even on this view the act of faith has a voluntary component.
4 Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of St John lect. 5, sect. 2,  § 662, in
Marshall, ‘Quod scit una uetula?’, p. 31 n. 66.
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To put it simply, the religious believer believes what God has revealed on
the authority of God. As later followers of Aquinas would put it,  ‘the au-
thority of God is simultaneously  that which and  that by virtue of which
one believes’.1 It is by one and the same act that one believes in the pro-
position revealed and the fact of revelation.2
What about the certainty of faith? The certainty to which the act  of
faith gives rise does not come from any new arguments or evidence.3 Ob-
jectively speaking, the arguments and evidence remain no more or less
convincing than before. If they were the basis for belief, they would not
give certainty. But this fact is simply irrelevant to the believer. She may
initially have been attracted by arguments and evidence, but they are not
the basis of her act of faith. The certainty of faith comes from what it is we
commit ourselves to, in making the act of faith. We commit ourselves to
taking the propositions in which we believe as  objectively certain, for we
are taking them as divinely revealed. 
It is true that we may not feel certain about the truths to which we as-
sent, in the way in which we would if we had a decisive proof.4 But this
lack of insight into the truth of what is believed does not, and may not,
amount to doubt. On the contrary, Aquinas insists that the assent of the
will  must  be  ‘unwavering’.5 Peter  Abelard  might  have  believed  that
‘through doubt we come to inquiry, and through inquiry we perceive the
1 J.  M. Hervé,  Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae  (Paris:  Berche et  Pagis,
1935), vol. 3, § 321 (translation my own).
2 Hervé,  Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, vol. 3, § 318; R. Garrigou-Lag-
range O.P., The Theological Virtues: Vol. 1 – On Faith, tr. T. Reilly O.P. (St
Louis, MI: B. Herder, 1965) p. 74. This may seem to beg the question
(see ‘An Assessment’ below), but it is, nonetheless, what Aquinas and his
followers suggest.
3 Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 34.
4 I take this to be close to what Aquinas meant when he wrote that it the
case of faith the movement of discursive thought ‘is not yet brought to
rest’, as it is when we have a decisive proof, and that for this reason ‘a
movement directly opposite to what the believer holds most firmly can
arise in him’ (De veritate qu 14, art. 1).
5 The believer assents firmissime: Aquinas, De veritate qu. 14, art. 1.
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truth’,1 but this is one reason he found himself in trouble. It is certainly
not what Aquinas believes about faith. When it comes to religious belief,
doubt is simply incompatible with faith.
7.1.3  The Sinfulness of Unbelief
The act of faith, then, involves a commitment to regard certain proposi-
tions as non-negotiable and irrevocable. But it also has a moral dimension.
A failure to make this commitment, or a turning back from it, once made,
is not some kind of simple cognitive failing. It is not like a failure to grasp
a mathematical proof. Rather, it has moral implications. A failure to be-
lieve, when presented with the truth, is a vice: it is morally blameworthy.
It is for this reason that faith has traditionally been regarded as incom-
patible with doubt. Some modern religious thinkers appear to disagree.
Ian Barbour, for instance, has written that religious faith does not exclude
doubt. ‘If faith were the acceptance of revealed propositions’, he writes, ‘it
would be incompatible with doubt. But if faith means trust and commit-
ment, it is compatible with considerable doubt about our theological inter-
pretations’.2 The problem with this view, however, is not only that it  is
deeply untraditional; it is also confused and misleading. 
Barbour’s claim is confused because it involves a false dichotomy. We
cannot set ‘trust and commitment’ in opposition to ‘the acceptance of pro-
positions’. This was recognized even by the great liberal theologian, Ernst
Troeltsch. ‘For some people’, writes Troeltsch, 
faith means submission to the accepted truths of revelation, whereas for
others it means an attitude of confidence. But it cannot be an either/or.
… Faith is both: confidence in something, and believing something to be
true. Confidence makes no sense unless I know what I have confidence
in; and insofar as I  know it, it is a matter of  knowledge,  of believing
something to be true.3
1 Abelard, Sic et Non, Prologus (p.103).
2 I. G. Barbour,  Issues in Science and Religion, Harper Torchbooks (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 227.
3 E. Troeltsch, The Christian Faith (1925), tr. G. E. Paul, Fortress Texts in
Modern Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 49.
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Indeed the view of faith found in Aquinas entails the acceptance of certain
propositions on the basis of what we might call ‘trust and commitment’. 
Barbour’s expression of this view is also misleading, insofar as he speak
of doubt regarding ‘theological interpretations’. This, of course, has always
been permissible,  for such interpretations lie in the realm of what Roy
Rappaport calls ‘sanctified sentences’ rather than ‘ultimate sacred postu-
lates’.1 But this is very different from doubt regarding the basic articles of
faith. If what Barbour means is that a believer is permitted doubt the ba-
sic articles of faith, his view would be rejected by all traditional theolo-
gians. 
The traditional attitude is clearly expressed by John Henry (later Car-
dinal) Newman. ‘The Church’, he writes, ‘does not allow her children to en-
tertain any doubt of her teachings; and that, first of all, simply for this
reason, because they are Catholics only while they have faith, and faith is
incompatible with doubt’.2 A Catholic, writes Newman, is permitted to in-
vestigate the grounds of  his faith, and even to consider the arguments
that have been brought against it, when he has a good reason for doing
so.3 But he is not permitted, under pain of divine punishment, seriously to
question whether what he has believed is true. 
One might argue that such a view shows signs of its age and would not
be held by Catholic thinkers today. But this is not the case. The work of
Avery Dulles offers a clear example of the same attitude. While insisting
on a firm and unwavering assent of faith, Dulles admits that for many be-
lievers this may seem difficult. The reflective believer may be aware of the
many objections that can be raised to religious belief. But Dulles cites in
this context Newman’s remark that ‘ten thousand difficulties do not make
one doubt’.4 Once the commitment of faith is made, the believer is obliged
to avoid doubt. She may not seriously consider the possibility that what is
being proposed for belief might be false. There is, of course, room for dis-
1 See chap. 5, ‘Religion and Certainty’.
2 J. H. Newman, ‘Discourse XI: Faith and Doubt’, in Discourses Addressed
to Mixed Congregations,  New Edition (London:  Longmans,  Green,  and
Co., 1892), p. 215.
3 Newman, ‘Discourse XI’, pp. 226–27.
4 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, p. 232.
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agreement about whether certain propositions  are revealed by God. But
once it is determined that they are (perhaps by the relevant Church au-
thorities) to continue to doubt constitutes a vice rather than a virtue.
If mere doubt is sinful, then apostasy – the act of falling away from the
faith  after  having  believed –  is  an even more serious offence.  Aquinas
makes  this  abundantly  clear.  Those  who  have  accepted  the  faith,  and
fallen away from it, can be compelled to make a new act of submission and
appropriately punished if they do not.1 This, of course, was the fate facing
Galileo.  (The  Catholic  Church did  not  accept  the  principle  of  religious
liberty until 1965; from the time of St Augustine, Church authorities had
vigorously opposed it, on the grounds that ‘error has no rights’.2) 
What about a mere failure to believe? Aquinas recognizes that there
can be a kind of unbelief that is purely negative: it is the lack of belief that
is found in those who have never heard the Christian message. This is not,
in itself, sinful. Although those who lack faith on these grounds will still
be damned, their being damned is on account of other sins, rather than
the sin of unbelief.3 Such sins can be forgiven only through an act of faith.
But both Aquinas and Newman insist that for those who have heard the
Christian message a failure to believe is itself sinful.4 Nor is this merely a
Roman Catholic view, for it is shared by John Calvin. Indeed Calvin’s view
seems to be even more uncompromising. Inspired by St Paul’s letter to the
Romans (1:19–23), Calvin held that  all human beings possess an innate
‘sense of the divine’ (sensus divinitatis). This is not, by itself, sufficient to
bring them to salvation. But it is sufficient to make them culpable if they
fail to believe.5 This is why God can justly punish them. 
Aquinas is aware of  the difficulties such a view creates. It  seems to
mean, for example, that someone who was ‘brought up in the forest or
1 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 8.
2 J.  T.  Pawlikowski,  ‘Human  Rights  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Tradition:
Some Theological Reflections’, Selected Papers from the Annual Meeting,
American Society of Christian Ethics, 1979, pp. 145–66, on p. 147.
3 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 1.
4 Aquinas,  Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 1; Newman, ‘Discourse
XI’, pp. 224–25..
5 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chap. 5, § 14.
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among wolves’ (and who therefore had no opportunity to believe) would
inevitably be damned.1 His response is that if such a person sought good
and avoided evil, God would give him the opportunity to make an act of
faith, however minimal its content. A somewhat more expansive version of
this  idea is  found in the teachings of  the  second Vatican Council.  The
Council repeats the traditional view, affirming that any person who know-
ingly declines God’s invitation to believe will be damned. But it also states
that God will  not deny salvation ‘to  those who,  without blame on their
part, have not yet arrived at an explicit knowledge of God’, provided they
live a good life.2 This seems to entail that one could, at least in principle,
be a blameless atheist. Avery Dulles takes a similar attitude to apostasy.
He cites the first Vatican Council’s statement that 
those who have adhered to Catholic truth through the heavenly gift of
faith … [and] have received the faith under the teaching authority of
the Church, can never have any just cause for changing their faith or
calling it into doubt.3
Does this mean, he writes, that those who have abandoned the faith are
condemned to eternal punishment? It would do, he says, if it were the case
that their faith had been entirely extinguished. But there may be some
‘embers’ of faith in their hearts that will result in their salvation.4 
Other Christian writers, however, are content to adopt a more uncom-
promising position, even in our own day. William Lane Craig, for example,
writes that ‘when a person refuses to come to Christ’, 
it is never just because of lack of evidence or because of intellectual diffi-
culties: at root, he refuses to come because he willingly ignores and re-
jects the drawing of God’s Spirit on his heart. No one in the final ana-
1 Aquinas, De veritate, qu. 14, art. 11, ad 1.
2 Vatican  II,  ‘Dogmatic  Constitution  on  the  Church’  (Lumen  Gentium),
chap. 3 (emphasis mine).
3 Vatican I, ‘Dei Filius’, chap. 3, in Denzinger and Schönmetzer, Enchiridi-
on symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum
Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et
morum, § 3014.
4 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, pp. 252–53.
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lysis really fails to become a Christian because of lack of arguments; he
fails to become a Christian because he loves darkness rather than light
and wants nothing to do with God.1
So not only is the certitude of faith not open to doubt, but if you fail to em-
brace the faith, it is because you are sinful. I need hardly note that there
is nothing comparable to this attitude in the world of the sciences. A fail-
ure to accept a scientific theory when confronted with the evidence may be
a sign that you are dim-witted, but it is not understood as a sign that you
are wicked.
7.1.4  An Assessment
The problem with Aquinas’s view of faith will be evident to any philosoph-
ically minded reader. Faith may be a gift of God through which he moves
our will to assent to doctrines he has revealed for no other reason than
that he has revealed them. But this merely raises the question of how we
can know that God exists and has revealed these doctrines. Aquinas holds
that there  are good arguments in support of Christian faith, but he also
holds that such arguments are neither necessary nor sufficient for the act
of faith.2 To say that we are predisposed to believe because of a desire for
God only seems a good reason if this desire was implanted by God. Other-
wise, faith would be nothing more than wishful thinking: we would be be-
lieving something simply because we want it to be true.3 But the assump-
tion that this desire is implanted by God merely begs the question: it as-
sumes the very conclusion it is supposed to support.4 To say that faith is a
divine gift may be true, but it offers no help at all to someone who wonders
if all this talk of divine gifts has any basis in fact.
1 Craig, Reasonable Faith, pp. 35–36.
2 Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, p. 21. For a more cautious anticipation
of this view, see Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, 202.
3 Marshall, ‘Quod scit una uetula’, pp. 13–14.
4 Jenkins (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 120–21, 186) ad-
opts an ‘externalist’ approach to the issue of faith, focusing on the mech-
anisms giving rise to the belief rather than evidence for the truth of the
belief. But while this certainly reflects Aquinas’s own approach, it merely
avoids the question at hand by changing the topic.
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Perhaps this objection is not fatal, although I know of no good response
to it. In any case, Aquinas’s view of faith continues to have its defenders.
One of the most clever of these is Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga defends what
he calls the ‘Aquinas-Calvin’ view of faith by assimilating Christian faith
to one of our more familiar categories of belief: that of ‘properly basic’ or
‘non-inferential beliefs’.1 But this immediately leads him astray. The clas-
sic example of a ‘properly basic’  belief is one that arises from everyday
sense perception. I believe there is a coffee cup on my office desk, not be-
cause  of  any  (conscious)  inference  I  have  made,  but  simply  because  it
seems to me that there is. But this belief could be defeated. (As philosoph-
ers say, it is ‘defeasible’.) I could discover that what appears to be a coffee
cup in front of me is no coffee cup at all, but is a clever holographic image
created by a colleague from the Physics Department. So if Christian faith
involves a  belief  of  this kind,  it  would also be defeasible,  as Plantinga
freely admits.2 (Plantinga, of course, denies that it has been defeated, but
that is another question.) 
Aquinas’s view is quite different, for he is clear that the Christian faith
is not up for grabs in this way. It is not open to philosophical assessment.
Philosophy, on his view, is sometimes a useful tool for the theologian, and
one of its roles is that of countering arguments against the faith. But since
what Christians believe is not derived from reason, it cannot be defeated
by rational arguments.3 In the words of William Lane Craig, who is him-
self citing Martin Luther, reason has only a ministerial, not a magisterial
role: it serves the faith rather than standing in judgement on it.4 Faced
with an apparently successful argument against the faith, the believer’s
1 A. Plantinga, ‘Is Belief in God Properly Basic?’, Noûs, 15 (1981), pp. 41–
51, on p.p. 43–48.
2 A. Plantinga,  Warranted Christian Belief  (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 462. What would be required, Plantinga argues, is some-
thing like a logical argument from evil, which holds that the propositions
‘God exists’ and ‘evil exists’ cannot both be true.
3 E. F. Byrne,  Probability and Opinion: A Study in the Medieval Presup-
positions of Post-Medieval Theories of Probability (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1968), p. 160.
4 Craig, Reasonable Faith, pp. 47–51.
198
 7.1.4  An Assessment
duty is not to abandon her faith, but to find some way of countering the
arguments.
7.2  Religion without Faith
Is a faith of this kind essential to religion? Even if it is true that scriptur-
ally based religions demand it, could there be a form of religion that does
not? Could there be a religion without revelation, a ‘religion within the
bounds of reason’? 
7.1.1  A Kantian Proposal
The phrase I have just used echoes the title of one of Kant’s works, Reli-
gion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In Kant’s view, such a religion
would be an ethical religion: it would consist in little more than ‘the recog-
nition of all our duties as divine commands’.1 Its doctrinal content is quite
minimal, being only what is required to support this ethical idea. ‘The uni-
versal true religious faith’, Kant writes,
is faith in God (1) as the almighty creator of heaven and earth, i.e., mor-
ally as holy lawgiver; (2) as the preserver of the human race, as its be-
nevolent ruler and moral guardian; (3) as the administrator of this own
holy laws, i.e., as just judge.2
While this is a variety of religious faith,3 its basis is practical reason. This
is why it can be universal, not restricted to any particular group of people.
It has nothing to do with the acceptance of a divine revelation. 
Kant, interestingly enough, does not believe that this pure rational reli-
gion is sufficient for human beings,  at  least not in their present state.
Given the ethical weaknesses from which we suffer, we need a moral com-
1 I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and  Other Writ-
ings, tr. A. Wood and G. D. Giovanni, Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.  153 (Ak.
6, 154).
2 Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, pp. 141–42 (Ak. 6,
139).
3 For Kant’s view of faith, see W. Lad Sessions, ‘Kant and Religious Belief’,
Kant-Studien, 71 (1980), pp. 455–68.
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munity. Such a community will be governed by a ‘church-faith’ or ‘ecclesi-
astical  faith’,  which will  be  founded  upon writings  regarded as  Sacred
Scripture. But for Kant the status of such Scripture is contingent and pro-
visional. We should accept it only insofar as it promotes the aims of a pure
rational religion, and it is always to be interpreted in ways that are con-
sistent with that religion.1 Kant rejects the idea that we must have faith
in  such  a  scripturally  based  revelation  in  order  to  be  saved.  This,  he
writes, is nothing more than a dangerous ‘delusion’.2
This  is  a  fascinating  account  of  religion  without  faith,  or  at  least
without the kind of faith described by Aquinas and Calvin. But what I am
interested  in here is  something rather different.  It  is  a  religion whose
theology employs the same mode of thought as the sciences.3 Such a theo-
logy would put forward propositions about the existence and action of God
not as revealed truths, to be accepted by faith, but as explanatory hypo-
theses. Kant, as it happens, would have rejected this idea, for he holds
that propositions about God cannot function as explanatory hypotheses. In
order to put forward an explanation of some fact about the world, we need
to  know that  what  is  being  proposed  is  at  least  possible.  ‘Otherwise’,
writes Kant, ‘there would be no end to empty fictions of the brain’.4 But
1 Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, pp. 105–22 (Ak. 6,
93–114).
2 Kant,  Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, pp. 164, 167 (Ak.
6, 168, 171).
3 To use Michael Barnes’s terms, a theology of this kind would employ the
late formal operational thought characteristic of philosophy and the mod-
ern sciences (Barnes,  Stages of Thought, pp. 205–10; see my Introduc-
tion, ‘Locating the Conflict’).
4 I.  Kant,  Critique of Judgement (1790),  Part 2: Critique of Teleological
Judgement, tr. J. Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952),  § 29
(90),  p. 139. This may reflect Isaac Newton’s proposal that a hypothesis
should be a  vera causa (‘true cause’), although Kant’s version demands
that we know not that such causes exist, but only that they are possible.
For Newton’s principle, see his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Math-
ematica, book 3 (regulae philosophandi); for an earlier statement of this
principle, see Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems,
p. 421. 
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nothing drawn from sense experience, Kant believes, can demonstrate the
possibility  of  God’s  existence,  and  the only  other  kind of  possibility  to
which we could appeal is a bare ‘logical possibility’. But Kant vigorously
rejects the idea that we can demonstrate actual possibility – that an object
could, in fact, exist – from the mere fact that it can be described without
contradiction (which is what logical possibility means).1 
7.2.2  A Scientific Theology
Now it may be that Kant is right. If he is, then the idea of God that fea -
tures in proposed theistic explanations is no more than ‘an empty fiction
of the brain’. But for the sake of the argument let me assume that Kant is
wrong and that one can put forward propositions about God as explanat-
ory hypothesis. After all, most modern arguments for God’s existence take
precisely this form. If one could produce a ‘natural theology’ of this kind,
then its conclusions would not need to be taken ‘on faith’. Furthermore, it
would enjoy no greater degree of certainty than any other scientific hypo-
thesis. 
It is true that a ‘scientific theology’ of this kind would differ in some sig-
nificant respects from the natural sciences. Firstly, its explanations would
be  personal  explanations, invoking an agent having beliefs and desires,
rather than impersonal entities and forces that can be described mathem-
atically. But this may not be a fatal objection. After all, we employ per-
sonal explanations in everyday life, when we explain people’s actions by
reference to the reasons they have for acting as they so. We also employ
such explanations in fields such as history and some branches of econom-
ics  and  psychology.  So  it  seems  that  they  are  not,  in  themselves,  un-
scientific.2 
Secondly, it is not clear whether a scientific theology would allow for ex-
perimental testing of its claims. It may be that it would. There have been,
1 Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 29 (90), p. 139; I. Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 506–7 (A602 /
B630).
2 For a defence of this claim, see the appendix on ‘Intentional Explana-
tions’ in G. W. Dawes, Theism and Explanation, Routledge Studies in the
Philosophy of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 147–66.
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for instance, experimental trials to test the efficacy of intercessory prayer.1
But one could argue that these were doomed to fail, since one could not ex-
pect to predict how God would act in individual cases.2 (If we had a popu-
lation of gods, we might be able to make statistical predictions about their
behaviour. But the religions with which I am concerned are strictly mono-
theistic.) If this is correct, then a scientific theology may be limited to ex-
planations ‘after the fact’, of the kind commonly made within history. Yet
these would still be legitimate explanations.
However, even if we set aside these concerns, the idea of a scientific
theology faces some weighty objections. First of all, the claim that we need
to posit the existence of God to explain some fact about the world is (to say
the least) hotly contested. It seems to many that, in the famous words at-
tributed to Pierre Simon Laplace (1749–1827), ‘we have no need of this hy-
pothesis’.  Few proposed  theistic  explanations  seem convincing  to  those
who are not already believers. When it comes to science, a theistic explan-
ation would also be an exception to a long-established practice of positing
only natural forces and entities. The origins of science, as we have seen,3
can be traced to that moment in ancient Greece when thinkers such as
Thales stopped invoking the gods to explain natural events. 
Secondly, even if there did exist successful theistic explanations, it is
not clear  what kind of religious claims they could be used to support. It
may be that belief in God could be supported in this way, as John Locke
believed.  But  what  about  other  traditional  religious  doctrines?  Alvin
Plantinga parodies this way of arguing in a striking passage.
What is the best explanation for all that organized complexity in the
natural world and the characteristic features of human life and all the
rest of what we see about us? Well, let’s see, perhaps there is an omni-
scient, omnipotent, wholly good being, who created the world. Yes,
1 J. A. Astin, E. Harkness, E. Ernst, ‘The Efficacy of “Distant Healing’’: A
Systematic Review of Randomized Trials’,  Annals of Internal Medicine,
132 (2000), pp. 903–10, on pp. 908–10.
2 For a similar objection, see C. B. Cohen, S. E. Wheeler, D. A. Scott, et al.,
‘Prayer as Therapy’, The Hastings Center Report, 30 (May – June 2000),
pp. 40–43, on p. 42–43.
3 See chap. 6, ‘The Origins of Critical Thinking’.
202
 7.2.2  A Scientific Theology
that’s it; and perhaps this being is one of three persons, the other two
being his divine son, and a third person proceeding from the first two (or
maybe just the first), yet there are not three gods but one; the second
person became incarnate, suffered, was crucified, and died, thus atoning
for our sins and making it possible for us to have life and have it more
abundantly. Right; that’s got to be it; that’s a dandy explanation of the
facts.1
It is hard to see how many distinctively Christian beliefs could be defen-
ded as the best available explanation of some fact about the world. 
Finally, there is the question of whether such a theology would be ad-
equate to its object:  a God who is generally thought of as utterly tran-
scendent.2 ‘The divine substance’,  as  Aquinas  wrote,  ‘by  its  immensity,
transcends every form that our intellect can realize’.3 It follows that if we
can speak of God at all, we can do so only by way of metaphor and ana-
logy.4 This does not, of course, prevent us from speaking about God, but it
creates problems for anyone wishing to engage in a ‘scientific’ theology.
Philosophically,  one  could  express  this  by  arguing  that  no  finite  cause
could require us to posit an infinite effect, for the effect would be out of
proportion to the cause. As David Hume writes,
when we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion
the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause
any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A
body of ten ounces raised on any scale may serve as a proof, that the
counterbalancing  weight  exceeds  ten  ounces;  but  can  never  afford a
reason that it exceeds one hundred.5
1 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 386–87.
2 E. M. Hogan, ‘John Polkinghorne and Bernard Lonergan on the Scientific
Status of Theology’, Zygon 44 (2009), pp. 558–82, on p. 560.
3 Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, book 1, chap. 14.
4 This applies, of course, only to God’s intrinsic predicates: those that tell
us something about the divine nature. There may be other predicates,
such  as  ‘incorporeal’,  which  can  be  attributed  to  God  in  their  literal
sense. For a discussion, see Dawes, Theism and Explanation, pp. 47–48.
5 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 11,  § 12
(p. 191).
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Theologically, one could argue that a theology that dares to speak of such
a God could do so only on the basis of a divine revelation. If the nature of
God so exceeds the power of the human mind, then perhaps only God can
tell us about God.
It may be, of course, that God has told us about God, by means of a di-
vine revelation. One could put forward arguments in support of belief in
such a revelation and its embodiment in Sacred Scripture. Since these ar-
guments could invoke premises that any reasonable person would accept,
they need not require a religious act of faith. Both Thomas Aquinas and
John Calvin thought there existed arguments of this kind, ‘external evid-
ences’ (as Calvin put it) of the divine origins and authority of Scripture, al-
though they did not regard them as either necessary or sufficient for the
act of faith. In our own time, Richard Swinburne has offered a very similar
style of argument in support of the Christian claim that the Bible embod-
ies a divine revelation.1
The arguments in question may or may not be persuasive. But this does
look like the most promising way of engaging in a scientific style of theo-
logy. Let me return, however, to what I argued earlier: that the way in
which theistic philosophers make such proposals is misleading. Theistic
philosophers are, above all, philosophers. They recognize, at least while
doing philosophy, only one source of authority, namely the force of the ar-
guments for and against the position being discussed. They may argue, as
Plantinga does, that religious knowledge involves a form of basic belief,
akin to my belief that there is a coffee cup in front of me. But philosophers
do not just assert this; they produce arguments in support of this view. So
they should; this is what philosophers are paid to do. But it means that
from a philosopher’s point of view revelation has authority only insofar as
it is supported by reason.  
7.2.3  From Athens to Jerusalem 
It should be clear by now that such a procedure subtly misrepresents the
traditions that are being defended. As soon as you present reasons for ac-
cepting  the  authority  of  Scripture,  you have  taken the  side  of  Athens
1 R. Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), chaps. 5–10.
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rather than that of Jerusalem.1 The belief you are encouraging is nothing
more than what Aquinas would call ‘the faith of demons’. Once again, it is a
matter of differing epistemic norms: those that govern the practice of philo-
sophy classroom are quite different from those at work within religious com-
munities. It follows that even if there could be a religion within the bounds
of reason, it would look very different from the scripturally based religions
that actually exist. Those religions have traditionally rejected the idea of
relying on reason. They have claimed that our knowledge has two sources
– human reason and divine revelation – and that these are distinct. As the
first Vatican Council decreed in 1870, in words repeated by Pope John
Paul II in 1998,
there exists a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only as regards
their source, but also as regards their object. With regard to the source,
because we know in one by natural reason, in the other by divine faith.
With regard to the object, because besides those things which natural
reason can attain, there are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in
God which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known.2
On this view, religious faith is different in nature from merely philosoph-
ical  reasoning.3 Any  proposal  that  reduces  religious  faith  to  a  form of
philosophical reasoning runs directly counter to this idea.
Nor is this true only of Roman Catholic Christianity. As we have seen,
the twentieth-century Protestant theologian Karl Barth denied that one
should even attempt to offer arguments for the authority of Sacred Scrip-
ture.4 Philosophical reasoning, on this view, should play no role in the de-
fence of Christianity. While most of my examples come from the history of
Christian thought, similar views may be found in other traditions. Abu
Hamid al-Ghazali, for example, recognizes the existence of arguments in
1 L. Strauss, ‘Jerusalem and Athens: Some Introductory Reflections’, Com-
mentary (June 1967), pp. 45–57, on p. 46.
2 Vatican I, ‘Dei Filius’, chap. 3, in Denzinger and Schönmetzer, Enchiridi-
on symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, §
3008; John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, § 9.
3 As John Paul II writes (Fides et Ratio,  § 9), ‘faith is of an order other
than philosophical knowledge’.
4 See chap. 5, ‘Religion and Certainty’. 
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support of the authority of the Qur’an, particularly those from miracles.
But  he  seems  unconvinced  that  these  are  decisive,  regarding  religious
knowledge as derived from a kind of direct apprehension that is distinct
from the reasons that philosophers offer. Like the Christian’s act of faith
(as traditionally conceived), this is thought to yield certain knowledge.5 
5 R. M. Frank, Al-Ghāzāli and the Ash‘arite School, Duke Monographs in
Medieval and Renaissance Studies 15 (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1994), pp. 67–68.
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At this point defenders of religion will have a host of objections to raise.
Even sympathetic readers may be hesitating. I appear to be claiming, they
will say, that while religion is based on faith, science is based on reason.
But it is not that simple. Religious believers, they will argue, are not alone
in making acts of faith, for many of our everyday beliefs are also faith-
based. They are beliefs that we hold, and regard as certain, without (it
seems) adequate evidence. Even scientists appear to make acts of faith,
when taking for granted the fundamental principles underlying their re-
search. If it is acceptable for even scientists to make such acts of faith,
then why should we find fault with religious believers for doing the same?
The present chapter will deal with this objection: the idea that we all
make acts of faith, scientists included. I shall discuss, first of all, what I
shall call our everyday acts of faith. There are, it seems, many beliefs we
all hold to be certain, in a way that seems independent of any arguments
that could be offered in their support. These are sometimes called ‘hinge
beliefs’, because they are the unquestioned assumptions upon which our
lives turn. We all believe, for example, that other people have minds like
ours. We feel no need to produce evidence for this belief and no sceptical ar-
guments can shake it.  If we are entitled to maintain convictions such as
these, are we not equally entitled to our religious beliefs?
This idea can be extended to science, for (it could be argued) scientists also
make acts of faith, comparable to those made by religious believers. After all,
scientists accept many theories, not on the basis of any evidence they have
examined, but on the authority of the scientific community. How does this
differ from, for example, a Catholic’s acceptance of doctrines on the au-
thority of the Church? Moreover, science as a whole relies on certain as-
sumptions about the nature of the world. Without these assumptions the
practice of science would be impossible. But these also appear to be acts of
faith. This observation, it could be argued, undercuts my sharp distinction
between religion and science.
8.1 Religious and Everyday Beliefs
It is true that there are everyday beliefs that we hold with at least the
same degree of confidence as religious beliefs. Like religious beliefs, these
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are not open to revision in the light of new evidence. Faced with sceptical
questions, we do not abandon these convictions, but try to find ways of
countering the objections. The philosopher G. E. Moore drew our attention
to a class of such beliefs in his ‘defence of common sense’. They include the
belief that
there exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This
body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continu-
ously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; it was, for in-
stance, much smaller when it was born ... Ever since it was born, it has
been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and,
at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other
things [like my body], having shape and size in three dimensions.1
The belief that I have two hands is another example. We do not doubt
matters like this, and if anyone tries to make us doubt them, we refuse to
take him seriously. If Moore is correct, then why should religious beliefs be
singled out for criticism? Surely they are no more problematic than these
everyday beliefs, which are (it seems) also ‘matters of faith’.
8.1.1  A Wittgensteinian Defence
Duncan Pritchard has recently put forward a defence of belief in God that
has precisely this form.2 He begins with a description of two of the features
of faith that I have been discussing. The first is that it is resistant to revi-
sion in the light of new evidence. He describes this vividly by comparing
religious faith with other kinds of everyday belief.
Compare, for example, the theist’s belief in God with an agent’s belief
that her car is parked around the corner. In the latter case, if presented
with putative counterevidence to this belief – e.g., someone authoritat-
ive coming along and informing our agent that her car has been stolen –
then the right thing for the agent to do is clearly to (at the very least)
suspend judgement until she can better determine whether this proposi-
1 G. E. Moore, ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ (1925), in G. E. Moore, Philo-
sophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 32–59, on p. 33.
2 His argument had been anticipated by J. H. Gill, ‘Tacit Knowing and Re-
ligious Belief’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6 (1975),
pp. 73–88.
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tion is true or false.  But if  someone authoritative presented a  theist
with evidence that God doesn’t exist – e.g., by introducing her to the
problem of evil, a problem she is aware she doesn’t know the solution to
at that time – it would be downright odd for her to respond by simply
suspending her belief in this proposition.1
Religious people typically maintain their faith even after being presented
with arguments against it, arguments that for the moment they may not
be able to answer. Pritchard’s second (and closely related) point is that be-
lief in God forms a ‘fixed point’, as it were, against which other proposi-
tions can be judged. These include, as we have seen, scientific theories.
Pritchard refers to this as the ‘fulcrum’ role played by religious belief.
So far, so good. This is consistent with the traditional view of faith I
have already discussed. The problem facing the theist is: Can this attitude
be justified? If I ought to revise my belief that the car is parked around
the corner in the light of new evidence, why should I be entitled to hold on
to my belief in God, come what may? In developing his defence, Pritchard
makes use of one of the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, entitled On
Certainty. Wittgenstein’s pithy aphorisms are notoriously ambiguous and
any interpretation of his sayings will be controversial. But his ideas are
worth examining, to see how far the line of argument takes us. As we shall
see, it does not take us very far.
8.1.2  The Idea of a Hinge Belief
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty was intended as a response to G. E. Moore’s
reflections on common sense. Wittgenstein accepts Moore’s point that we
regard beliefs of this kind as certain. I am entirely confident, for example,
that  other  people  exist  and have minds.  But  Wittgenstein argues that
such beliefs should not be thought of in the same way as what we might
call ‘empirical’ beliefs. They are not held on the basis of evidence, nor are
they revised as a result of further evidence. In this sense, they are simply
not comparable to my belief that the car is parked around the corner. Not
only do we feel no need to offer evidence in their support, but any attempt
to do so would be problematic. 
1 D. Pritchard, ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, in J. L. Kvanvig (ed.), Ox-
ford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), pp. 145–59, on p. 145.
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It would be problematic, first of all, because we would feel less confident
about any evidence offered than about the beliefs we were trying to sup-
port. As Wittgenstein writes,
If a blind man were to ask me ‘Have you got two hands?’ I should not
make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t
know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by
looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by
what?1
More seriously, the force of any evidence we might offer would assume the
very beliefs we would be trying to prove. Take, for example, the belief that
there exists an ‘external world’, a world outside my states of conscious-
ness. I could try to prove this, as Moore did, 
by holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture
with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’ and adding, as I make a certain
gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’.2
Since these are examples of objects external to my own mental life, they
show that there is an external world. But would this proof be successful?
No, it would not. The alleged proof relies on the very assumption that is to
be proven: that such a world exists.3 One’s hand is evidence for such a
world only if it is itself an ‘external’ object. 
We  may  generalize  this  observation.  Our  evidential  practices  –  the
ways in which we find and present evidence for any proposition – take cer-
tain things for granted. In doing science, for example, we assume that the
world exists independently of our thought and that it operates in more or
less  predictable  ways.  This  forms  a  background  picture  against  which
other, more particular facts that functions as evidence. But no evidence is
offered, within science, for that assumption. In doing history, we assume
1 L.  Wittgenstein,  On Certainty,  ed.  G.  E.  M. Anscombe and G. H. von
Wright;  tr.  D.  Paul and G.  E.  M. Anscombe (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell,
1969), § 125.
2 G. E. Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’ (1939), in Moore, Philosophical
Papers, pp. 126–48,  on p. 144.
3 C. Wright, ‘Wittgensteinian Certainties’, in D. McManus (ed.),  Wittgen-
stein and Scepticism (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 22–55, on p. 26.
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that ‘the earth has existed for many years past’.1 But this is not itself an
item of historical knowledge: it cannot be proven with the methods of his-
tory. Those methods presuppose it. As Wittgenstein writes, ‘it belongs to
the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed [in
der Tat] not doubted’.2 They form ‘the inherited background against which
I distinguish between true and false’.3 
Wittgenstein employs a  series of  metaphors for  beliefs  of  this  kind.4
Some  metaphors  are  foundational:  such beliefs  are  ‘the  ground’  of  our
other beliefs, the ‘bedrock’, the point at which we have reached ‘rock bot-
tom’.  They are  that  which ‘stands fast’,  while  other  things change.  On
other occasions, such beliefs are thought of as a ‘background’ to our every-
day activities, a ‘world-picture’ (Weltbild) that we unhesitatingly accept.
But perhaps the most revealing metaphor is that of ‘hinge’ beliefs: they
are ‘hinges’ in the sense that our practices turn on them, including our
practice of looking for evidence. As Wittgenstein writes,
the questions that we raise and out doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt,  are as it  were hinges on which
those turn. … We just can’t investigate everything. … If I want the door
to turn, the hinges must stay put.5
Without such hinge beliefs, our practices of inquiry simply could not get
underway.
It  is easy to see the direction in which this line of thought could be
taken, when it comes to religion, and Pritchard does not disappoint us. We
can, he writes, 
think of religious belief as also involving a hinge commitment to the ex-
istence of God which is immune to rational evaluation. … If Wittgen-
stein is right then religious belief is on a par with everyday belief on
1 G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 172; cf.
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 138.
2 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 342–43.
3 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 94.
4 D.  Moyal-Sharrock,  Understanding  Wittgenstein’s  On  Certainty (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 53–54.
5 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 341–43.
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this score, in that it is in the nature of all belief, religious or otherwise,
that it incorporate these hinge commitments which are immune to ra-
tional evaluation.1
Most of us think that it is perfectly reasonable to rely on our everyday
hinge beliefs. But if this is true, then surely a religious person is entitled
to rely on her belief in God?
8.1.3  Hinge Beliefs as Tacit Beliefs
Is this correct? Pritchard focuses on belief in God, rather than religious be-
lief in general, for he argues that given belief in God our other religious
beliefs may have rational grounding. (He calls his view a  quasi-fideism.)
But what I shall argue is that belief in God differs from hinge beliefs, as
Wittgenstein describes them. While belief in God may be regarded as un-
questionable and can play a ‘fulcrum’ role in believers’ lives, its genesis is
quite different from that of a hinge commitment. Hinge beliefs consist of
assumptions that are embodied in our practices. We act on these beliefs –
acting as if they were true – but we rarely, if ever, make them explicit and
reflect on their status. Hinge beliefs, in other words, originate as (and nor-
mally remain) intuitive or ‘tacit’ beliefs. By way of contrast, belief in God
originates as a  reflective belief. It is acquired by way of explicit teaching
and is accompanied with an awareness of those facts that are thought to
guarantee its truth.
Let me start with the idea that hinge beliefs are (at least in the first in-
stance) tacit beliefs,2 embodied in our practices. (They are certainly not
the only variety of tacit belief, but they are tacit beliefs nonetheless.) This
means that  a  hinge belief  is  best  regarded as a  kind of  know-how, al-
though it can also be regarding as a kind of unreflective knowing that. We
know how to undertake certain activities and when we undertake such
1 Pritchard, ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, pp. 150–51.
2 Danièle  Moyal-Sharrock (Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, p.
67) would deny that what she call simply ‘hinges’ are tacit beliefs Indeed
given her strongly ‘non-cognitivist’ view, she denies that hinges are be-
liefs at all. But I hold that hinge beliefs  are beliefs, albeit dispositional
ones. If we hold a hinge belief that  p, this means interacting with the
world as if p were true. 
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activities we act as if the world were structured in a particular way. When
it comes to hinge beliefs, in other words, practice is primary. We acquire
such beliefs (if we need to acquire them1) by taking part in a ‘form of life’
(to use the Wittgensteinian phrase). The role of such beliefs, writes Wit-
tgenstein, ‘is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned
purely practically, without learning any explicit rules’.2 Im Anfang war die
Tat,  ‘in  the  beginning  was  the  deed’,  as  Wittgenstein  writes  (using  a
phrase from Goethe).3 Our belief  that  other  people  have minds,  for in-
stance, underlies the practice of social life. It is expressed in our ability to
interact with other people. The practice of social life comes before any ar-
ticulation of the belief. 
It follows that the certainty with which we hold such beliefs is, in the
first place, a certainty about how to act, rather than a reflective certainty
about a proposition that we have before our minds. It involves taking cer-
tain aspects of the world, whether real or imagined, ‘on trust’. But this is
what Danièle Moyal-Sharrock calls a ‘non-evaluative’ trust, a kind of ‘ur-
confidence’ that precedes any process of evaluation. As she writes,
the difference between nonevaluative and evaluative trust is similar to
that between walking on a smooth, wide road, and walking a tightrope.
In  the  first  instance,  I  do  not  think  about  the  road  being  there  or
whether I will be able to walk. I walk thoughtlessly, and do so expertly.
In the second instance, every movement is calculated, and precarious.4
1 At least some of these assumptions may be ‘hard-wired’ into our cognitive
apparatus: they may be part of the mental endowment that all humans
share. Such tacit beliefs become active, early in infancy, as a result of per-
ceptual experience and motor activity, but they are not derived from such
experience. See, for example, E. S.  Spelke, K. Breinlinger, J. Macomber,
and K. Jacobson, ‘Origins of Knowledge’, Psychological Review, 99 (1992),
pp. 605–32, on p. 628.
2 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 95.
3 Wittgenstein,  On  Certainty,  §  402;  the  phrase  is  from  Faust:  Der
Tragödie erster Teil, by J. W. von Goethe (1749–1832), line 1237. 
4 Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, p. 194.
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The trust in question, in other words, does not arise from any process of
reflective judgement; it forms part of my engaging in a particular activity.5
Can such beliefs become explicit, so that we do not simply know how to
perform certain activities, but become aware of the assumptions underly-
ing our actions? Yes, but only in rather unusual circumstances. Hinge be-
liefs are made explicit only when we are reflecting on their status (as in
the case of  a philosophical discussion),  or in contexts in which they no
longer function as hinges.2 One of Wittgenstein’s aphorisms highlights the
first of these possibilities.
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again
‘I know that that’s a tree’, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone
else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: ‘This fellow isn’t insane. We
are only doing philosophy’.3
Once a sceptical  philosopher asks an awkward question – ‘How do you
know there is a tree there? Could it not be a hallucination?’ – we can be-
come  aware  that  we  have  such  beliefs  and  that  they  lack  evidential
grounding.  But  even  in  these  circumstance,  we  do  not  seriously  doubt
them, since doubting them would force us to abandon practices that are
essential to our everyday activities. In order to function at all, I must con-
sider that my senses are generally trustworthy, even though they are oc-
casionally deceived. If every time I thought I saw an object, I had to seri-
ously consider I might be hallucinating, everyday tasks would become un-
manageable. (I am riding my bicycle along the road and see a car coming.
But wait, is it really a car, or are my eyes deceiving me?) Even when dis-
cussing the reliability of the senses with my students, I assume that I ac-
tually see them, sitting there before me. Hinge beliefs, in other words, con-
tinue to function as hinges even when we are considering the arguments
that can be offered against them. 
5 Moyal-Sharrock (Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, p. 194) goes
so far as to  say that ‘the  moment I  do give the  object  of  my trust  a
thought is the moment I no longer trust’. But this seems wrong. We can
reflect on the hinge beliefs, as philosophers do regularly, without ceasing
to rely on them. (I am grateful to Daniel Wee for alerting me to this fact.)
2 Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, p. 65.
3 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 467.
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There are other contexts in which such beliefs are made explicit, but in
these contexts they are no longer functioning as hinges. Wittgenstein him-
self  admits that the status of  such beliefs can alter.  As he writes,  ‘the
same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by ex-
perience,  at  another as  a  rule  of  testing’.1 After  a  terrible  accident,  in
which my arms were severely injured, I could watch as medical staff re-
move the bandages and say, with surprise and relief, ‘I have two hands’.
But in this context my utterance no longer expresses a hinge belief. It is
something I can (and have) doubted, and must now test, by means of my
senses.
For the most part, however, such beliefs are not made explicit at all. We
never reflect on them and would never dream of making them the object of
a ‘profession of faith’. If this is the case, should they be called beliefs at
all? Pritchard himself argues that they should not, since they are ‘unre-
sponsive to reasons’.2 This has the surprising implication that if belief in
God is a hinge belief, then it should not, strictly speaking, be regarded as
a belief at all. I find this suggestion unconvincing. These ‘hinge commit-
ments’ (as Pritchard calls them) are assumptions about the way the world
is that shape our behaviour. While some of these cannot be abandoned,
others can.3 While the latter may be resistant to evidence, they are not en-
tirely ‘unresponsive to reasons’. So I prefer to think of such commitments
as beliefs, albeit tacit or intuitive beliefs. They could also be thought of as
‘dispositional’ beliefs, in the sense that they dispose us to act in certain
ways.4 
1 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 98.
2 D. Pritchard, ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability, and
Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, in S. D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Re-
lativism, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2011), pp. 266–85, on p. 282.
3 See ‘The Hinge Beliefs of Science’, below.
4 I am thinking of a dispositional belief as a tendency to act in a certain
way – to act  as if  the world were structured in a particular manner –
rather than simply a tendency to affirm the truth of a certain proposition
(although the latter is, of course, itself a kind of action).
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Like other beliefs, such commitments may be mistaken. I may fail to
achieve some goal because the world is not structured in the way my ac-
tions take for granted. In this situation I can be said to have a false hinge
belief, an idea that Wittgenstein himself seems reluctant to concede.1 In
this situation, one would expect my course of action to be (sooner or later)
unsuccessful: it will fail to achieve its goal. Even when it does, however, I
may remain unaware of why it fails to achieve its goal: I may remain un-
aware of the false hinge belief in question.
8.1.4  Belief in God and Hinge Beliefs
So is Pritchard right? Can belief in God be thought of as a kind of hinge
commitment, comparable to those we employ in our other belief-forming
practices? I shall shortly address the suggestion that scientists also make
acts of faith by relying on the hinge beliefs of science. My argument there
will be that hinge beliefs fall into several quite different categories and
that those employed by scientists are relatively unproblematic.2 If there
are any non-negotiable assumptions within science, they belong to a class
of hinge beliefs that we cannot give up without ceasing to function as ra-
tional agents. Since religious beliefs are not of this kind, there is no paral-
lel between religion and science in this respect. But what I am arguing for
here  is  a  more radical  claim.  It  is  that  religious beliefs  should  not  be
thought of as hinge beliefs at all.
There are, of course, certain similarities between religious beliefs and
hinge beliefs. Religious beliefs, like hinge beliefs, are associated with cer-
tain collective ‘forms of life’. Here, too, those forms of life would not be pos-
sible if one did not accept the propositions in question. Like hinge beliefs,
they are also held with a high degree of confidence, which means they are
resistant to criticism. They can, however, be doubted. Pritchard suggests,
as we have seen, that a person who ceases to believe in God in the fact of
atheistic objections never really believed at all.3 But while on can  define
religious faith as ‘a commitment that is never abandoned’, the definition
1 Moyal-Sharrock,  Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty,  pp. 33–51.
It may be that certain hinge beliefs cannot be demonstrated to be true or
false, given their foundational role, but they can be  false: they can rep-
resent the world in ways that do not correspond to the way it actually is..
2 See chap. 9, ‘The Hinge Beliefs of Science’.
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seems arbitrary. Aquinas is certainly clear that a person can cease to be-
lieve in God, although he regards the wilful loss of faith as a grievous sin,
that of apostasy. So while faith in God is resistant to criticism, this does
not mean that we cannot abandon it. 
What distinguishes belief in God from hinge beliefs has to do with its
origins.  Hinge  beliefs  are  embedded  in our practices,  in  the  context  of
which they are simply taken for granted. They are rarely made explicit, at
least while continuing to function as hinges. In other words, they originate
as, and almost always remain,  intuitive  beliefs. Religious beliefs, on the
other hand, are acquired by transmission. They originate as, and normally
remain, reflective beliefs.
As the reader may recall, this distinction comes from the work of Dan
Sperber. Intuitive beliefs are those we typically hold without any reflec-
tion on how we arrived at them or the evidence that might lend support to
them.1 They are automatically treated as ‘data’, being employed in making
spontaneous inferences.2 Such inferences are important for various reas-
ons, one of which is that they underlie our perceptual beliefs. As Sperber
writes,
you see autumn leaves under a bare tree, and you spontaneously form
the beliefs:
[1] There are leaves under this tree.
[2] This tree has lost its leaves. 
You see your friend Martha frowning, and you spontaneously form the
beliefs:
[1] Martha is frowning.
[2] Martha is worried about something.3
What Sperber describes as the ‘spontaneous forming of beliefs’ can also be
thought of as a process of ‘unconscious inference’.4 Such inferences depend
on intuitive beliefs. We spontaneously judge that Martha is worried be-
cause we know, intuitively, what facial expressions signify. We spontan-
3 Pritchard, ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, p. 145.
1 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, p. 68.
2 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, p. 82.
3 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, pp. 77–78.
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eously judge that the tree has lost its leaves because of our background
knowledge  about  trees.  Those  items of  knowledge  are  intuitive  beliefs,
which make possible our everyday inferences. Wittgenstein’s hinge beliefs
also seem to be paradigmatic instances of intuitive beliefs, although (of
course) the category of intuitive (or ‘tacit’) beliefs is much wider.
By way of contrast, reflective beliefs are ‘explicitly held, often stored in
a linguistic format, and their transmission requires deliberate teaching’.1
As we saw earlier,2 such beliefs are held in association with what Sperber
calls a ‘validating context’.3 This might involve reference to some authority
who guarantees the truth of this belief or it  might involve reference to
some line of argument that lends support to it.  An example from a reli-
gious context would be: 
The Bible teaches that Jesus rose from the dead.
The phrase ‘the Bible teaches that’ places the proposition believed in a
validating context. In more general terms, a reflective belief has the form
V(R), where R is its content (a ‘representation’, in Sperber’s terminology)
and V is the validating context.
My argument is that Wittgensteinian hinge beliefs are initially intuit-
ive beliefs. They  may become reflective beliefs, in the sense that we be-
come aware of them and of the role that they play in our actions. But they
may not. Unless we are philosophers, there is a fair chance that they will
never cease to be merely intuitive. By way of contrast, we acquire religious
beliefs  as reflective beliefs. Belief in God is not a taken for granted as-
sumption underlying a set of practices that are almost always regarded as
4 The idea that  there  exist  unconscious  inferences,  or  judgements,  was
first put forward by Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–94): see H. von Hel-
moltz,  Helmholtz’s Treatise on Physiological Optics (1910),  tr.  J.  P.  C.
Southall; Classics of Ophthalmology Library (Birmingham, AL: The Op-
tical Society of America, 1925), vol. 3,  § 26. It was later developed by
Irvin Rock (1922–95), most particularly in I. Rock,  The Logic of Percep-
tion, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 240–82.
1 H. De Cruz, ‘Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological
Concepts’, Topoi 33 (2014), pp. 487–97, on p. 488.
2 See chap. 4, ‘Our Knowledge of the Literal Sense’.
3 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, p. 71.
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unproblematic. It is something the believer consciously affirms, having ac-
quired the belief in question from a particular community. 
There is some recent research in social psychology that may appear to
cast doubt on these claims. Such research has highlighted the existence of
what are sometimes called ‘intuitive religious beliefs’. A few years ago, for
instance, Deborah Kelemen proposed that children might be ‘intuitive the-
ists’. The phrase has become familiar to scholars of religion, but it is, per-
haps, misleading. A closer reading of Kelemen’s work shows that her con-
clusion was more cautious than this phrase might suggest. What Kelemen
argues is that ‘children make sense of the world in a manner superficially
approximating adult theism’.1 What this means is that children (a) can
reason accurately about superhuman minds shortly after acquiring the ca-
pacity to reason about human minds, (b) are over-inclined to detect agency
and purpose in the natural world, (c) make a clear distinction between
‘mind-stuff’ and matter, and (d) are disposed to believe in fantastical be-
ings and magical powers. Such ways of thinking may well be intuitive.
They certainly predispose us towards the acceptance of culturally acquired
religious ideas. But they ‘are not themselves religious in nature and will
not produce religious cognition in the absence of other psychological and
environmental factors’.2 
So while there may be intuitive religious beliefs, in some broad sense of
the term ‘religious’, they must be distinguished from the cultural repres-
entations proposed for belief by religious communities.3 Those representa-
tions, when accepted by an individual, are consciously held reflective be-
liefs.  They  may  draw on our  intuitive  ways  of  representing  the  world
1 D. Kelemen, ‘Are Children “Intuitive Theists”? Reasoning about Purpose
and Design in Nature’, Psychological Science, 15 (2004), pp. 295–301, on
p. 297.
2 J.  Rottman  and D.  Kelemen,  ‘Is  There  Such  a  Thing  as  a  Christian
Child? Evidence of Religious Beliefs in Early Childhood’, in P. McNamara
and W. J. Wildman (eds),  Science and the World’s Religions,  vol. 2: Per-
sons and Groups,  Brain Behavior, and Evolution (Santa Barbara,  CA:
Praeger, 2012), pp. 205–38, on p.207.
3 De Cruz, ‘Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Con-
cepts’, p. 488.
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(which helps to account for their appeal),1 but they are explicitly held in
conjunction with claims that lend them support. Traditionally, such claims
have  to  do  with  authority,  in  particular  the  authority  of  God.  Within
Christian tradition, belief in God is not seen as ‘groundless’; it is seen as
guaranteed (albeit in a circular fashion2) by the authority of God himself.
As Aquinas teaches, religious faith involves accepting something for the
sole reason that God has revealed it. But religious beliefs would also be re-
flective beliefs if they were held on the basis of a line of argument, such as
a proof of God’s existence. Knowledge of the proof would then act as a val-
idating context. This makes religious beliefs quite different in character
from hinge beliefs, which we do not reflect on or attempt to validate until
they are somehow called into question. 
Is it possible that even culturally acquired religious beliefs might be-
come intuitive beliefs, given the right circumstances? Take, for instance, a
person brought up within a religious tradition, in a social context in which
its beliefs were never questioned. An example might be the nineteenth-
century ‘Breton peasant woman’ to whom Louis Pasteur is said to have re-
ferred.3 Brought up in a devout, unquestioning Catholic community, would
her beliefs not be intuitive beliefs, of the kind that are taken for granted
and used to make spontaneous inferences? Admittedly, such a situation
would be rare today. Almost all religious believers today live in contexts in
which their beliefs are continually called into question. But is it not pos-
sible that religious beliefs could be intuitive beliefs?
1 N. Baumard and P. Boyer, ‘Religious Beliefs as Reflective Elaborations
on Intuitions: A Modified Dual-Process Model’, Current Directions in Psy-
chological Science, 22 (2013), pp. 295–300.
2 I. Pyysiäinen, ‘True Fiction: Philosophy and Psychology of Religious Be-
lief’, Philosophical Psychology, 16 (2003), pp. 109–25, on p. 116.
3 Pasteur is alleged to have said, ‘The more I know, the more nearly is my
faith that of the Breton peasant. Could I but know all I would have the
faith of a Breton peasant woman’ (cited in the article on Pasteur by J. J.
Walsh in vol.  11 of  The Catholic Encyclopedia [New York:  Robert Ap-
pleton, 1911]). There is some question regarding the authenticity of the
saying.
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Perhaps. There is certainly nothing to prevent a belief that was once re-
flective becoming intuitive (and  vice versa).1 I might, for instance, learn
from a railway employee that the last Sunday train to Oxford is at 11.45. I
would immediately form the belief
[1] The railway employee (who is to be trusted on such matters) said
that the last Sunday train to Oxford is at 11.45.
I might later forget who told me this and form a simple, intuitive belief 
[2]  The last Sunday train to Oxford is at 11.45.2
But it is unlikely this would occur in the case of culturally acquired reli-
gious beliefs. Even in the case of the Breton peasant woman, her religious
beliefs would almost certainly remain reflective beliefs.
Why is this? It is because in the practice of a religion the validating con-
text of its key beliefs is continually affirmed: religious beliefs are typically
presented in the form V(R), even within religious communities. The Bre-
ton peasant would often have heard, at the end of a reading from Scrip-
ture, the phrase Verbum Domini (the Word of the Lord), and would have
frequently been told that the authority of the Church lay behind her in-
herited beliefs. As far as belief in God is concerned, she would have expli-
citly affirmed that belief whenever she recited the Nicene Creed, at Mass
every Sunday or when her children were baptised. So at least while she
continues to practise her faith, her belief will remain a reflective belief. If,
on the other hand, she abandons the practice of her faith, it seems likely
that her sense of conviction will also disappear.3
It seems, then, that belief in God is not appropriately thought of as a
species of Wittgensteinian hinge belief. Hinge beliefs are transmitted (if
they need to be transmitted) tacitly, by learning how to engage in particu-
lar practices. They rarely, if ever, become explicit beliefs. Belief in God, by
1 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, p. 80.
2 Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, p. 81.
3 For an insightful discussion of the relation between participating in a
community’s activities and being persuaded of the truth of its beliefs, see
T. M. Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Con-
temporary England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989),
pp. 307–23.
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way of contrast, is a reflective belief, learned in ways that depend upon its
verbal expression. In the case of hinge beliefs, the deed comes first: im An-
fang war die Tat. But in the case of religion, im Anfang war das Wort (in
the beginning was the Word). It follows that belief in God is a self-con-
scious and, one might add, precarious affair, more closely analogous to the
act of tightrope walking than that of confidently setting out along a road.
It may be that religious faith is an act whereby we choose to regard a pro-
position as though it were a hinge belief. Indeed that is not a bad defini-
tion of faith. But religious beliefs are not, in fact, hinge beliefs, in the Wit-
tgensteinian sense.
8.2  Scientific Acts of Faith
So much for the idea that religious beliefs might be comparable to our
everyday hinge beliefs. There is, however, a similar argument that relates
directly to science. It suggests that even scientists make acts of faith that
are comparable to those made by religious believers. First of all, scientists
accept many theories ‘on faith’, that is to say, on the authority of those
who propose them, for they cannot investigate first-hand the evidence in
support of every theory upon which they rely. How does this differ from
the  religious  believer’s  act  of  faith?  Secondly,  there  are  assumptions
without which science would not seem to be possible at all, such that there
is an external world or that nature acts in a uniform and predictable man-
ner. Science itself cannot provide evidence for such assumptions, so they,
too, might seem to be matters of faith.
Such observations sometimes form part of a tu quoque (‘you, too’) argu-
ment against the atheist. ‘You accuse us of making acts of faith’, says the
religious believer, ‘but so do you’. An influential example can be found in
John Whitcomb and Henry Morris’s best-selling  The Genesis Flood,  the
foundational text of modern young-earth creationism. Whitcomb and Mor-
ris  protest  against  what  they  see  as  the uniformitarian assumption of
modern geology: the idea that ‘existing physical processes, acting essen-
tially as at present, are sufficient to account for all past changes’ that we
see in the geological record.1 They contrast this with what they take to be
1 J. C. Whitcomb, and H. M. Morris,  The Genesis Flood: The Biblical Re-
cord and Its Scientific Implications (1961; Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian
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the biblical view, which appeals to divine intervention and a catastrophic
flood.  Neither  of  these,  they  argue,  is  ‘susceptible  of  genuine  scientific
proof’.1 Both approaches are ‘matters of faith’.2 I shall not address this par-
ticular argument, except to note that modern geology is by no means as
uniformitarian as Whitcomb and Morris suppose.3 My aim here is merely
to make some general remarks on arguments of this kind.
8.2.1  Accepting Theories on Authority
A first way in which science can be said to rest on acts of faith has to do
with the role of authority and tradition. One becomes a scientist, first of
all, by embracing a certain tradition. The ethos of science may be one of
‘organized scepticism’,4 but someone wanting to become a scientist would
make little progress if she doubted everything her teachers were telling
her. Tradition is particularly important in learning those skills that are
part of any art, including the art of scientific research. The contents of sci-
ence could (in principle) be learned from textbooks, but the art of science
can be learned only from a kind of apprenticeship, following the example
of those who have already mastered it. As Michael Polanyi writes,
by watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his
example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, in-
cluding those which are  not  explicitly  known by the master  himself.
These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders
himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another. A society
which wants to preserve a fund of knowledge must submit to tradition.5
and Reformed Publishing Company, 1998), p. xx n. 1.
1 Whitcomb and Morris, The Genesis Flood, p. xxi.
2 Whitcomb and Morris, The Genesis Flood, p. xxvi.
3 Stephen Jay Gould,  for instance,  makes a  helpful distinction between
‘methodological’ and ‘substantive’ uniformitarianism and argues that the
latter can no longer be defended. See S. J. Gould, ‘Is Uniformitarianism
Necessary?’,  American Journal of Science, 263 (1965), pp. 223–28, on p.
226.
4 Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’, p. 277.
5 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 53.
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It is this that accounts for the importance of laboratory practice in the
teaching of many of the sciences. Note, however, Polanyi’s careful qualific-
ation: the apprentice must surrender himself  to some extent uncritically.
Any good teacher of science will hope that her students may one day out-
perform her, perhaps by pioneering new methods of research.
Even among those who are already scientists, authority plays an im-
portant role in the dissemination and acceptance of scientific results. The
age of the polymath, the Renaissance man who could claim competence in
all significant fields of human learning, has long past. Scientists who can
question the results achieved in their own field must, in practice, rely on
the judgement of those who have expertise in other fields. But of course
the reason they have this confidence lies in the ethos and procedures of
the scientific community as a whole. While far from infallible, the proced-
ures of open criticism, peer review, and the replication of experiments are
at least intended to weed out error. When they fail to do so, this is recog-
nized as a failing and attempts are made to improve the procedures in
question. 
So there is a sense in which scientists are dependent on the judgements
of their peers, which they must take on trust. But this is even more strik-
ingly true for non-scientists. There are many scientific theories that most
of us accept, not  because we understand the reasoning behind them, but
on the authority of the scientific community. To return to my earlier ex-
ample, that the formula  e = mc2 represents the relation between matter
and energy is a fact I accept on authority. It is, for me, a matter of faith,
since I lack the ability in both mathematics and physics needed to under-
stand the reasoning behind it. Do I note accept this formula in the same
way as a Catholic, for instance, might accept the teaching of the Church? 
No, I do not. I may take it on faith, but the faith in question is different
from that involved in accepting religious doctrines. The truth of the for-
mula e = mc2 is a matter of faith for me, but it is not a matter of faith for
everyone. Within the community of physicists, the reasoning that lies be-
hind it is well known. I, too, could understand the reasons if I had studied
the required mathematics and physics. But this is not true of many key
religious beliefs. Take, for instance, Christian belief regarding the trin-
itarian nature of God. The fact to which this refers, if it is a fact, can be
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known only by way of an act of faith. There are no arguments that can
be proposed, other than exegetical ones, which could persuade someone to
accept the truth of this doctrine.1 It is, therefore, in principle a matter of
faith in the way a scientific theory is not.2
8.2.2  The Hinge Beliefs of Science
I freely admit, then, that scientists are heirs to a tradition of scientific
reasoning and to this extent accept certain theories ‘on faith’, that is to
say, on the authority of those who propose them. But if this constitutes an
act of faith, it is very different from that made by religious believers. Yet
there is a deeper sense in which science may seem to rest on acts of faith,
for there are assumptions scientists must make in order to do science at
all.  The practice  of  science,  for  instance,  assumes that  there is  an ‘ex-
ternal’ world, that sense perception puts us directly or indirectly in touch
with that world, and that the fundamental laws of nature will not vary in
some arbitrary way through time and space. Are these not scientific acts
of faith, comparable to those made by religious believers?
Given my extensive discussion of ‘hinge beliefs’ earlier in this chapter, a
brief response to this question should suffice. The response will take the
form of pointing out that there are different kinds of hinge commitment.
This fact is recognized by Wittgenstein himself. Comparing the proposi-
tion, ‘the water in the kettle on the gas-flame will not freeze but boil’ with
a second proposition, namely ‘the person sitting opposite me is my old
friend so-and-so’, he remarks that
1 Abelard, as we have seen, would disagree – see chap. 6, ‘Religion and
Criticism’ – but his view was not the mainstream, orthodox one. Even
Gordon Kaufman (In Face of Mystery, p. 419) admits that the normative
character of trinitarian doctrine is ‘essentially a faith-claim, not … some-
thing that can be established by evidence and proof’.
2 D. Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Black-
well, 1996), p. 91. Similar remarks could be made about many other reli-
gious doctrines, such as the belief that it was the angel Gabriel (Jibrīl)
through whom the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. If
this is true, it, too, can be known to be true only by accepting the author-
ity of the traditions that bear witness to it.
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there  is  a  difference  between  the  cases.  If  the  water  over  the  gas
freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume
some factor I don’t know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists
to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is
N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag
everything with it and plunge it into chaos. … If I were contradicted no
all sides and told that this person’s name as not what I  had always
known it was..., then in that case the foundation of all judging would be
taken away from me.1
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not develop this insight and produce a
classification of hinge beliefs. But others have.
Differing classifications are possible. Crispin Wright, for instance, pro-
duces a particularly insightful one.2 But the one I shall use is that offered
by Moyal-Sharrock, who distinguishes between (a) linguistic  hinges, (b)
personal  hinges,  (c)  local  hinges,  and  (d)  universal  hinges.3 Linguistic
hinges offer us rules that define our use of words and numbers. ‘This col-
our is called blue (in English)’ would be one such hinge belief, as would ‘2
+ 2 = 4’. (The latter offers us a paradigmatic instance of how to use num-
bers.) Personal hinges represent knowledge that relates to our individual
lives, such as ‘I am now sitting in a chair’ or ‘I am presently in New Zeal-
and’. Local hinges represent assumptions shared only by particular groups
of people at a particular time, such as ‘The earth is a planet’ or ‘There is a
country  called  Australia’.  Universal  hinges are  assumptions apparently
shared by all human beings, and perhaps some other animals as well. Ex-
amples would be ‘the earth exists’, ‘physical objects continue to exist when
not being perceived’, or ‘human beings have minds’.
These not only represent different categories of belief; they also differ in
the degree to which they are able to be abandoned or renounced. It may be
that some of these beliefs could not be abandoned without our ceasing to
function as rational agents. If they were abandoned, no reasoning would
be possible, for the fundamental principles by which we reason would be
called into question. If I doubted that the earth exists or the principles by
1 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 613–14.
2 Wright, ‘Wittgensteinian Certainties’, pp. 42, 48–49.
3 Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, pp. 102–3.
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which 2 + 2 = 4, I could hardly find my way around the world. (Philosoph-
ers may  claim to doubt such things, but they continue to act  as if these
propositions were true.) As Wittgenstein remarks, if I did doubt such mat-
ters,  my  thinking  would  be  plunged  into  chaos:  ‘the  foundation  of  all
judging  would  be  taken  away  from  me’.1 Indeed  I  might  even  be
threatened with madness.
Other hinge beliefs, on the other hand, are open to question. They are
not normally questioned, but if they were, the results would not be cata-
strophic. If I assume, in an absent-minded moment, that I am sitting on a
chair and then become aware that I am sitting on a wall, nothing serious
would  follow.  (I  may be  mildly  concerned about  my  increasing  absent-
mindedness, but I could continue to function as a rational agent.) Wittgen-
stein recognizes this with his example of the water that froze rather than
boiled over a gas flame. He would be astonished to see such a thing, but
content to leave it to scientists to figure out why it happened. Wittgen-
stein notes, too, that what is a hinge belief at one moment may become
subject to explicit evaluation later, an idea nicely expressed in his image
of the river and its bed. ‘The river-bed of thought may shift’, he writes. But
I distinguish between the movement of waters on the river bed and the
shift of the bed itself, though there is not a sharp distinction of the one
from the other. … The same proposition may get treated at one time as
something to test by experience, and another as a rule of testing.2
The same idea is expressed in the related image of the river and its bank.
The bank, Wittgenstein writes, ‘consists partly of hard rock, subject to no
alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in
one place gets washed away, or deposited’.3
It can be difficult to know which beliefs belong to the category of ‘un-
give-up-able’ beliefs and which do not. A striking fact about modern sci-
ence, from Galileo onwards, has been its willingness to abandon our most
common-sense assumptions.4 Given this fact,  I  am reluctant  to  suggest
any particular hinge commitment is immune to revision. But it is hard to
imagine how one could abandon the most fundamental assumptions of the
1 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 614.
2 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 97–98.
3 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 99.
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sciences – such as the general reliability of sense perception or the uni-
formity of laws of nature – without catastrophic consequences. In this re-
spect, such commitments differ from religious beliefs. I have argued above
that religious beliefs should not be thought of as hinge beliefs at all. But
even if they were, they would belong to a category of beliefs that are able
to be given up. We know this because many people do so.1 
A critical attitude to knowledge will recognize that we cannot question
everything at once.2 We may even have to recognize that there are things
we cannot, in practice, question at all, since they are what allow us to
function as rational agents. To ask if we are entitled to hold such beliefs is
akin to asking if we are entitled to the air we breathe.3 Even if this is true,
however, we can distinguish between those hinge beliefs that we are able
to question and those that we cannot. Crispin Wright ends his discussion
of these matters with a variation on the well-known ‘serenity prayer’. The
original reads:
God, grant me
the Serenity to accept the things I cannot change
the Courage to change the things I can
and the Wisdom to know the difference.
If we reword Wright’s version so it has the same form, it would read:
Let us hope to be granted
the Discipline to take responsibility for what we can be responsible
the Trust to accept what we must merely presuppose
and the Wisdom to know the difference.4
4 E. S. Spelke and K. D. Kinzler, ‘Core Knowledge’, Developmental Science,
10 (2007), pp. 89–96, on p. 93.
1 J. Gill (‘Tacit Knowing and Religious Belief’, p. 85) suggests that those
who claim to  have  given up religious  belief  remain religious  at  some
deeper level.  But even if  this were true,  such people would still  have
given up their explicit, culturally acquired religious beliefs.
2 See chap. 6, ‘Modern Science’.
3 J.  Bishop  and  I.  Aijaz,  ‘How  to  Answer  the  de  jure  Question  about
Christian  Belief’,  International  Journal  for  Philosophy  of  Religion,  56
(2004), pp. 109–29, on p. 121.
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There is a certain irony in ending this discussion of religious faith with an
adaptation of a prayer, but I can think of no better way to do so.
4 Wright, ‘Wittgensteinian Certainties’, p. 53.
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My argument so far has been that the epistemic norms shaping religious
claims to knowledge differ from those operative within science. Scriptur-
ally based religions not only claim a source of knowledge distinct from hu-
man reason. They are also bound by tradition, insist upon the certainty of
their beliefs, and are resistant to radical criticism in ways in which the sci-
ences are not. This attitude rests on a claim to know certain matters ‘by
faith’, a form of knowing that leads to a higher degree of certainty than
any ‘merely human’ reason.
I hope I have succeeded in showing that this attitude is characteristic of
religion alone. Science does not rest on any comparable acts of faith. But
despite my arguments, many readers will want to insist that my view of
science is naïve. I am treating science, they will say, as though it were a
disinterested activity engaged in by superhuman agents, somehow raised
above the messy realities of human history. I am assuming there is a dis-
tinctive scientific method that ensures objectivity, which makes science a
‘clearing of rationality in a jungle of muddle, prejudice, and superstition’.1 
The problem here, my critics will continue, is that this view of science is
clearly false. In recent decades, historians, sociologists, and philosophers
have shown that there is no scientific method, no set of objective canons
that are considered binding by all scientists. Even if there were, there is
no reason to think its employment would lead to scientific progress. Fur-
thermore, in accepting particular scientific theories, scientists are motiv-
ated by much more than a disinterested love for truth. Their views are
shaped by social and political factors, as well as by the available evidence. 
Some writers have gone so far as to argue that science itself functions
as a religion.2 Already in 1951 Horace Kallen wrote bitterly about the in-
tolerance sometimes displayed by the scientific establishment. 
There is a widespread and dangerous disposition to consider science as
in some sense holy, and to attribute to it that assurance of salvation
greater than any other which defines the supernatural. In the life of the
1 P.  Kitcher,  The Advancement  of  Science:  Science  without  Legend,  Ob-
jectivity without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.
3–4. The quotation is from Bruno Latour, who is speaking ironically.
2 Kitcher, The Advancement of Science, p. 7.
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mind the communicants of such a religion of science figure as so many
more dogmatists of another intolerant cult, with observatories or labor-
atories for churches and with their formulas as infallible revelations or-
daining the rites and liturgies of their respective specialties. Such reli-
gions of science insist on their own orthodoxies, exercise their own cen-
sorships, maintain their own Index, and impose their own Imprimatur.1
He illustrates this by the reception accorded to the work of Immanuel Ve-
likovsky, who put forward a deeply ‘heretical’ view of earth’s history. 
I shall return to the Velikovsky case shortly. For the moment, let me
try to spell out the charge more clearly. There are two ways in which sci-
ence can be said to resemble a religion. Firstly, the scientific community can
appear as authoritarian as religious communities.  It  can seem to have its
own orthodoxy and to be equally intolerant of heretics.  (This was Kallen’s
complaint.) Secondly, major scientific theories are often presented as more
than simple statements of fact. They are presented as grand narratives,
structuring our view of ourselves and our place in the universe. They func-
tion, in other words, in ways comparable to the ‘myths’ of religious tradi-
tions. 
It is time to address such claims. I shall accept that there is some truth
in what is being alleged. There are certain parallels between religious and
scientific communities. But I shall also argue that these parallels are often
overstated. They do nothing to undermine my central argument: that the
norms and procedures of characteristic of these communities embody con-
trasting attitudes to knowledge.
9.1  Authority within Science
Let me begin with the first objection: that I have embraced an unrealistic
picture of the scientific community. Is that community not just as author-
itarian as religious communities? Does it not have its own orthodoxy? Is it
not equally intolerant of dissent?
1 H. M. Kallen, ‘Democracy’s True Religion’,  The Saturday Review (July
28, 1951), pp. 6–7, 29–30’, on p. 7.
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One could, perhaps, appeal to Robert Merton’s critics in support of this
idea. Merton, you may recall, argued that the ethos of science is shaped by
four norms: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized
scepticism.1 But Ian Mitroff has argued that these collective norms are of-
ten counter-balanced by very different imperatives. The communal norm
of scepticism, for instance, is counter-balanced by an individual attitude of
dogmatism. As Mitroff writes, ‘the scientist must believe in his own find-
ings  with  utter  conviction  while  doubting  those  of  others  with  all  his
worth’.2 In fact,  however,  this  insight  merely complements  the  point
Merton is making. After all, it is the attitude of doubting the claims of oth-
ers that gives rise to the organized scepticism of which Merton speaks. 
Other critics have noted that when faced with radically new ideas, sci-
entists have been reluctant to criticise their existing beliefs. They will not
allow established views to be questioned.  When in 1950 Immanuel Ve-
likovsky published his highly controversial book Worlds in Collision, the
response of many scientists was (to say the least) intemperate.3 The book
drew upon both documentary evidence (including the Hebrew Bible) and
geological and astronomical findings to speak of a series of catastrophes in
historical times caused by the close approach of a comet. That comet, the
book continued, later became the planet Venus. Despite its scholarly ap-
paratus and extensive documentation,  Worlds in Collision was immedi-
ately rejected by the scientific community. How can this be said to exem-
plify the ‘Mertonian’ norms of science?
The problem here is that such criticisms fail to make a key distinction.
They fail to distinguish between the attitudes and actions of  individual
scientists and the collective norms and procedures of scientific communit-
ies.4 Merton’s description of the ethos of science refers to the latter rather
1 See chap. 6, ‘Science and Criticism’.
2 I. I. Mitroff, ‘Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo
Moon Scientists’,  American Sociological Review,  39 (1974), pp. 579–95,
on p. 592. 
3 M. J.  Mulkay,   ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sci-
ences’. Social Research, 36 (1969), pp. 22–52, on p. 32.
4 Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’, pp. 275–76.
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than to the former: it involves an institutional rather than a motivational
level of analysis.1 A distinction of this kind is central to the more recent
work of David Hull and Philip Kitcher. Both thinkers recognize that the
attitudes of individual scientists may fall short of the scientific ideal.2 But
they argue that within the scientific community even these attitudes can
contribute to the growth of knowledge.3 What accounts for this apparently
paradoxical outcome? The answer lies in the collective procedures that sci-
entific communities employ.4
An illustration of how this works has to do with the problem of bias.
Human beings are much prone to cognitive bias, a distorted view of the
available evidence and what it warrants. By rewarding credit for original
discoveries, the sciences might appear to make this problem worse, for sci-
entists have a strong motivation to favour that view of the evidence which
supports their own theories. Unsurprisingly, there is plenty of bias among
scientists. But when the curiosity of individuals is coupled with the collect-
ive practices of assigning credit and checking results,5 this partiality can
be largely overcome.6 As Hull writes, science ‘does not require that scient-
1 D. L. Hull,  Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social
and  Conceptual  Development  of  Science,  Science  and  Its  Conceptual
Foundations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 366, 392–
93.
2 D. L. Hull, ‘Altruism in Science: A Sociobiological Model of Co-operative
Behaviour among Scientists’, Animal Behaviour, 26 (1978), pp. 685–697,
on p. 690; D. L. Hull, ‘Openness and Secrecy in Science: Their Origins
and Limitations’,  Science, Technology, & Human Values, 10 (1985), pp.
4–13, on p. 9.
3 P. Kitcher, ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’, The Journal of Philosophy,
87 (1990), pp. 5–22, on p. 22.
4 This is not the say that such procedures could not be improved; indeed
Kitcher’s aim is to understand them in order to be able to improve them.
5 Hull, Science as a Process, p. 305.
6 More precisely, it can be overcome when communities share a common
set of normative standards and procedures against which to assess rival
views; see  R. J. MacCoun, ‘Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Re-
search Results’,  Annual Review of Psychology, 49 (1998), pp. 259–87, on
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ists be unbiased, only that different scientists have different biases’.1 The
combination of their biases can lead to results that approach the goal of
objective knowledge. 
Similar remarks may be made about the dogmatism of individual sci-
entists of which Mitroff writes: their wholehearted commitment to their
own theories. This is more than counterbalanced by the collective proced-
ures of their community. In Hull’s words,
the objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a char-
acteristic of individual scientists, but of scientific communities. Scient-
ists rarely refute their own pet hypotheses, especially after they have
appeared in print, but that is all right. Their fellow scientists will be
happy to expose these hypotheses to severe testing.2
Similar observations can be made about the Velikovsky case. The intoler-
ance of some scientists towards Velikovsky’s ideas was counterbalanced by
the  insistence  by  others  (including  Albert  Einstein)  that  he  should  be
given a  hearing.3 Indeed,  Velikovsky  was given a hearing,  at  a  special
meeting of the American Philosophical Society in 1952,4 and at a meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1974.5
9.1.2  Scientific Revolutions
A more serious challenge to my view of science comes from work by histor-
ians and sociologists.  The foundational thinker within this tradition was
Thomas Kuhn, whose work  has been enormously influential, not just in
the philosophy of science, but also in the wider culture. (Every time you
pp. 278–79.
1 Hull, Science as a Process, p. 22.
2 Hull, Science as a Process, p. 4.
3 M. D.  Gordin,  The Pseudoscience Wars:  Immanuel Velikovsky and the
Birth of the Modern Fringe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012),
chap. 4 (§§ 13.39 and 13.57).
4 Mulkay, ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences’, pp.
33–34.
5 The papers responding to Velikovsky are published in D. Goldsmith (ed.),
Scientists  Confront  Velikovsky (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,
1977).
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hear the phrase ‘paradigm shift’, think of Kuhn.) Kuhn’s best known book
appeared more than forty years ago, so discussing his work might appear
to be ‘flogging a dead horse’. But defenders of religion have sometimes ap-
pealed to Kuhn’s views in order to lend support to religious belief. Ian Bar-
bour does this, outlining some of the parallels that exist between the be-
liever’s acceptance of a particular faith and the scientist’s acceptance of a
particular research tradition.1 I myself once took a similar line, as a way of
defending the place of theology in a secular university.2 So it may be use-
ful to examine Kuhn’s ideas a little more closely.
Kuhn’s interest was in what he called – in the title of his most famous
book – ‘the structure of scientific revolutions’. At the heart of Kuhn’s un-
derstanding such revolutions is his conception of a paradigm. What unites
the practitioners of what he calls ‘normal’ science (science in a non-revolu-
tionary period) is the acceptance of a common paradigm. What character-
ises a scientific revolution, on the other hand, is the shift from the existing
paradigm to a new one. The Copernican revolution that led to the Galileo
affair was Kuhn’s chief model of a scientific revolution, one on which he
had written an earlier (and excellent) book.
A first problem arises with this term ‘paradigm’, for Kuhn’s use of this
word was notoriously vague.3 It can refer, for example, to particular exem-
plars of  scientific  practice,  such as  Isaac  Newton’s  Mathematical  Prin-
ciples of Natural Philosophy, or to entire disciplines, with their character-
istic assumptions. But let me set that issue aside. Whatever Kuhn meant
by  the  term  ‘paradigm’,  his  suggestion  was  that  successive  scientific
paradigms are ‘incommensurable’: they employ radically different criteria
of assessment. It follows that the decision between them cannot be made
on strictly rational grounds. External considerations, of the kind studied
by  sociologists,  must  enter  into  the  choice.  Indeed  Kuhn  lays  great
emphasis on the role  of scientific communities, to  the point of  defining
1 Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, pp. 133–37.
2 G. W. Dawes, ‘Theology and Religious Studies in the University: “Some
Ambiguities” Revisited’, Religion, 26 (1996), pp. 49–68.
3 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Chicago:  University of  Chicago
Press, 1970), p. 181.
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scientific disciplines sociologically. They consist of groups of researchers
united by education, professional interaction and means of communication
(such as journals and conferences). Each such community will consist of
individuals interested in problems of a certain sort, who also share a view
of the kind of solutions that are acceptable.
On Kuhn’s  view,  then,  a  scientist  adheres  to  a  particular  paradigm
because he has been initiated  into  a  particular  community.  The choice
between competing paradigms, he writes, ‘proves to be a choice between
incompatible  modes  of  community  life’.1 Within  each  community,
arguments  in  support  of  the  paradigm  are  necessarily  circular:  the
paradigm itself is used to argue in its own defence. Defenders of the new
paradigm can only invite others to imagine what the world would look like
if they shifted their position. Kuhn notoriously compares the shift from
one paradigm to another to a religious conversion. It is a choice that some
scientists will choose to make, although they are not rationally compelled
to  do  so.  Indeed  Kuhn  suggests  that  the  general  adoption  of  a  new
paradigm may have to await the death of the last defenders of the old.2
If  this  is  true,  in  what  sense  can  science  be  said  to  be  a  rational
enterprise? Is science itself not a form of religion, a church that one enters
by way of a conversion experience, with an orthodoxy that one accepts on
faith?  If  this were true,  one could argue that scientific theories should be
treated in the same way as the beliefs of (other) religious communities. We
could,  for  example,  that  our  school  children  be  free  to  opt  out  of  science
classes, just as they are free to opt out of religious instruction.3 To assess
such claims, we need to look more closely at the vexed issue of the alleged
incommensurabilty of competing paradigms.
It is here that we discover the weakness of Kuhn’s view of the history of
science. Kuhn overestimates both the consensus which must exist among
1 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 94.
2 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 152.
3 The suggestion was made,  perhaps tongue in cheek, by the self-styled
‘epistemological anarchist’ Paul Feyerabend (1924–94): see  P. K. Feye-
rabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge
(London: NLB, 1975), p. 301 and P. K. Feyerabend, Science in a Free So-
ciety (London: Verso/NLB, 1978), p. 106.
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scientists at any one time and the discontinuity involved in a ‘paradigm
shift’:  the  movement  from  one  research  programme  to  another.1 Even
within periods of so-called ‘normal’ science, there can exist fundamental
disagreements about  the  assumptions underlying  a  particular  research
programme.  Nor  is  it  true  that  each  research  programme  contains  a
single, self-contained set of assumptions. Some of the assumptions under-
lying normal science are shared by scientists pursuing quite different re-
search programmes. So paradigms cannot be as sharply distinguished as
Kuhn’s initial presentation suggested.2 
It  follows  that  there  is  no  need  to  regard  the  movement  from  one
paradigm to the next as an irrational choice, comparable to a religious
conversion.  Choices  between  competing  paradigms  can  be  made  by
reference  to  what  Kuhn  himself  admits  are  widely  shared  scientific
values.3 In  assessing  the  comparative  merit  of  competing  theories,
scientists  have  long  made  reference  to  what  are  called  ‘explanatory
virtues’: qualities such as simplicity, economy, precision, informativeness,
and elegance. It was, of course, the relative simplicity of the Copernican
theory – the fact that it could explain many aspects of the phenomena by
reference to a few principles – that first made it attractive, even before
there was observational evidence in its support.4 These criteria of theory
choice are accepted by adherents of differing research programmes:5 even
1 A.  Musgrave,  ‘Kuhn’s  Second  Thoughts’,  The  British  Journal  for  the
Philosophy of Science, 22 (1971), pp. 287–97, on pp. 290–92.
2 Rachel Laudan, for instance, notes that Kuhn’s description of scientific
revolutions fails to provide an accurate description of the apparently re-
volutionary changes that occurred in twentieth-century geology. See R.
Laudan, ‘The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn's Theory of Sci-
entific Change’,  PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philo-
sophy of Science Association, 1978: vol. 2: Symposia and Invited Papers,
pp. 227–39, on pp. 232, 235.
3 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 184–86.
4 See chap. 2, ‘Arguments in Support of Copernicus’.
5 Lakatos’s talk of ‘research programmes’ offers an alternative to Kuhn’s
talk of ‘paradigms’; see I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of
Scientific Research Programmes’, in  I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds),
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a Ptolemaic astronomer could recognize the advantages of the Copernican
scheme. So there is no need to regard the movement from one programme
to another as comparable to a religious conversion.
9.1.3  Why Religion is Different
These points are familiar to any philosopher of science. But even if we set
these criticisms aside, the alleged parallel between scientific and religious
communities does not extend very far. Kuhn’s book was motivated by his
discovery that the history of science did not involve a steady, cumulative
growth in knowledge, but involved a series of revolutions. The completion
of each revolution may occur only with the demise of the  ancien régime.
(As is sometimes remarked, science advances funeral by funeral.1) But
the new order does eventually  triumph. The point to  note here is that
there are no revolutions of this kind in religious thought.  An individual
may leave one religious community and join another, but religious com-
munities themselves do not radically overhaul their fundamental beliefs. 
It is worth spelling this out in more detail, for it is a point that I myself
overlooked. On Kuhn’s view, the gradual accumulation of anomalous data
– facts that cannot be easily fitted within the existing paradigm – will
gradually lead the scientific community into a state of crisis. It is that
state of crisis that motivates a paradigm shift. Religious traditions also
face anomalous data, facts that cannot easily be fitted into their founda-
tional  narratives.  (The  problem of  apparently  gratuitous  evil  has  long
bothered Christian thinkers.) But this does not prompt a paradigm shift,
that is to say, the abandonment of that community’s foundational beliefs. .
(Individuals may abandon them, but the community as a whole does
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceedings of the International
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1970), pp. 91–106.
1 This saying seems to be a paraphrase of a remark made by physicist Max
Planck (1858–1947), who wrote that ‘a new scientific truth does not tri-
umph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but
rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows
up that is familiar with it’; see M. Planck, Scientific Autobiography and
Other Papers, tr. F. Gaynor (London: Williams & Norgate, 1950), pp. 33–
34.
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not.) Those beliefs may be reinterpreted, but there are limits to that pro-
cess, ‘a point beyond which religion may not go’.1 The continued identity of
a religious community depends on adherence to its foundational narrat-
ives, which cannot be simply rejected.
In my 1996 paper, I assumed that religious thought could, and should,
undergo revolutionary changes comparable to those found within science.
As I wrote, ‘any theology worthy of the name will be prepared, if neces-
sary, to abandon its particular framework of belief, if it has proved want-
ing and if a more comprehensive alternative is available’.2 But I now real-
ize that such an option is not permitted within theology, for the epistemic
norms of religious communities do not allow such radical revision. The act
of faith is not a commitment made pro tem, until a better alternative be-
comes available. It  is a commitment that is intended to be permanent.
Abandonment of that commitment in the light of new evidence is not a
mark of  epistemic virtue, as it  would be in science. It  is a sin, that of
apostasy, which entirely separates a person from God.3
It  is true that some religious thinkers have questioned these norms.
Only a few years ago, Gordon Kaufman suggested that theologians should
be  prepared  to  abandon ‘the  Christian  framework’  if  it  was  no  longer
serving its intended purpose.4 But even if church authorities were to ac-
cept this proposal, a theology that abandoned its basic framework would
lose its identity. It may be true, as Kaufman suggests, that a similar form
of inquiry could still be conducted, one that would search for ‘an ultimate
point of reference’ for our understanding of the world.5 But such an inquiry
would no longer be theology, which (as the name suggests) has God as its
focus. Theologians would have to find new jobs, or at least a new name for
their new form of inquiry. Scientific communities, by way of contrast, can
1 C. Strug, ‘Kuhn’s Paradigm Thesis: A Two-Edged Sword for the Philo-
sophy of Religion’, Religious Studies, 20 (1984), pp. 269–79, on p. 278.
2 Dawes, ‘Theology and Religious Studies in the University’, p. 60.
3 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, qu. 12, art. 2, ad 2; see also chap. 7,
‘The Sinfulness of Unbelief’.
4 Kaufman, In Face of Mystery, p. 47.
5 Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, p. 21.
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survive radical changes in their underlying assumptions because they are
not bound to any particular set of doctrines.
9.2  Grand Narratives and Dodgy Metaphors
So much for the alleged dogmatism of scientific communities. A more in-
teresting claim regarding the way science  can function as a  religion is
made by philosopher Mary Midgley. Her particular interest is Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection and its contemporary defenders.
As she writes on the first page of her book  Evolution as a Religion, this
theory is ‘not just an inert piece of biological science’. It is also ‘a powerful
folk-tale about human origins’ which will inevitably have symbolic force.1
In other words, it not only tells us the bare facts regarding human origins;
it also shapes our understanding of what human beings are like and how
they can and ought to live.
9.2.1  Narratives and Science
At first sight, this might seem entirely appropriate. Surely ethical discus-
sions  ought to  be  shaped  by  our  best  available  science?  The  problem
Midgley highlights is that the broader narratives we construct are ‘under-
determined’, as philosophers say, by the scientific evidence. There is more
than one story that can be told on the basis of the scientific theories in
question. It follows that if we favour one story rather than another, it will
not be on strictly evidential grounds; other factors will come into play. In
these circumstances it is important to ask what those other factors are.
After all, we could be favouring a particular story not so much because of
the scientific evidence in its favour (which is at best ambiguous), but be-
cause  it  lends  support  to  those  social  and political  arrangements  from
which we ourselves would benefit.
9.2.2  Selfish Genes and Free Markets
Midgley takes this discussion further by identifying some of the wider nar-
ratives associated with the theory of evolution. A clear example is what
she calls the ‘Social Darwinist’ idea that science has proven human beings
to be essentially selfish. On this view, relations between living beings are
1 M. Midgley,  Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears
(London: Methuen & Co., 1985), p. 1.
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deeply competitive, so that all social feelings and all instances of apparent
altruism are  illusory.  Apparently  altruistic  actions are  merely  cunning
ways for the individual to attain his own goals. Midgley’s particular target
here is Richard Dawkins’s  The Selfish Gene.  While the  book is,  in  one
sense,  simply an introduction to evolutionary biology,  it  makes it  clear
that the science has implications for how we think about human beings.
Dawkins says, for instance, that 
if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate
generously  and  unselfishly  towards  a  common good,  you  can  expect
little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and al-
truism, because we are born selfish.1
This is a grim conclusion. If we are indeed ‘born selfish’, any attempt to
construct  ‘a  society  in  which  individuals  cooperate  generously  and  un-
selfishly’ will be an uphill struggle. 
Fortunately, as Midgley points out, this particular narrative is not sup-
ported by the biological evidence. Indeed it arises from a series of confu-
sions.  The  first  is  that  between  genes  and  the  organism that  is  their
vehicle.2 To say that genes are (in some highly metaphorical sense) ‘selfish’
does not entail that the organism will act selfishly. To suggest that it does
would involve a second confusion: that between the evolutionary and the
psychological  concepts of altruism. An organism behaves altruistically in
the evolutionary sense if it reduces its own fitness while increasing that of
others.3 This is a matter of biological function, not of conscious motivation.
Psychological altruism, on the other hand, is a matter of conscious motiva-
tion. A third confusion at work here is that between proximate and  ulti-
mate causes.4 A genuinely altruistic impulse, such as one born of empathy,
1 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p. 3.
2 Despite his initial rejection of Midgley’s criticisms, Dawkins (The Selfish
Gene, p. ix) has recently admitted to this confusion.
3 Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, p. 199.
4 F.  B.  M.  De  Waal,  ‘Putting  the  Altruism  Back  into  Altruism:  The
Evolution of Empathy’, Annual Review of Psychology, 59 (2008), pp 279–
300, on pp. 280–81. The distinction was first introduced by Ernst Mayr;
see E. Mayr, ‘Cause and Effect in Biology’,  Science, N.S. 134 (1961), pp.
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could be the immediate motive (and thus the proximate cause) of the be-
haviour in question, even if the impulse itself is ultimately the result of
natural selection.  To take a  simple example,  parents’  feelings for their
children can be genuinely altruistic – truly directed towards their chil-
dren’s welfare – even if the prevalence of such feelings can be explained by
their role in aiding the transmission of genes. The point is that if one fo-
cuses on the proximate cause of the behaviour rather than its biological
function, altruism can seem just as natural as selfishness.
Dawkins’s comment regarding selfishness could be regarded as a mo-
mentary lapse. After all, he does urge readers of a later edition to ignore
it.1 But it is hard to regard as a momentary lapse the attitude taken by
biologist Michael Ghiselin. After a chapter that discusses the social beha-
viour of bees, Ghiselin ends with the following sweeping claims regarding
human society.
The evolution of society fits the Darwinian paradigm in its most indi-
vidualistic form. ...  The economy of nature is competitive from begin-
ning to end. Understand that economy, and how it works, and the un-
derlying  reasons  for  social  phenomena  are  manifest.  They  are  the
means by which one organism gains some advantage to the detriment of
another. No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society,
once sentimentalism has been laid aside. What passes for co-operation
turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation. ... Where it is
in his own interest, every organism may reasonably be expected to aid
his fellows. Where he has no alternative, he submits to the yoke of com-
munal servitude. Yet given a full chance to act in his own interest, noth-
ing but expediency will restrain him from brutalizing, from maiming,
from murdering – his brother, his mate, his parent, or his child. Scratch
an ‘altruist’, and watch a ‘hypocrite’ bleed.2 
One is struck by the similarity of this description to the crude capitalist
ideal of unhindered economic competition. But since Ghiselin begins by
1501–6, on p. 1503.
1 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, p. ix.
2 M. T. Ghiselin, The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex (Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), p. 247.
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taking ‘classical economics’ as a model for biology,1 the similarity is hardly
surprising. What he seems to have forgotten is that while bees (presum-
ably) have no motives, humans do. To suggest that those motives may in-
clude impulses to ‘genuine charity’ is not to deny the possibility of an evol-
utionary explanation of our moral sentiments. Heaven help us if the study
of ethics were handed over to biologists, as one of their number has sug-
gested.2
Incidentally, it is easy for supporters of science to ridicule those reli-
gious believers who reject the theory of evolution. But they often overlook
what motivates their opposition to the science. This may be not so much
the science itself as some larger narrative about human beings in which it
is embodied. Take, for instance, William Jennings Bryan, who was the cre-
ationist prosecutor at the 1925 Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee. Bryan
argued against evolution not only because it contradicted – in his view –
the teachings of the Bible, but because he regarded it as destructive of
morality.3 He might have been wrong, but he certainly had some evidence
for this belief. The high school textbook that provoked the trial, George
William Hunter’s  A Civic Biology,  not  only  taught  the well-established
facts regarding human evolution. It  also taught that some humans are
merely ‘parasites’ on society. If they were ‘lower animals’, it argued, we
would probably exterminate them to prevent their influence from spread-
ing. While ‘humanity’ prevents us from doing this, it doesn’t prevent us
from segregating the members of this ‘low and degenerate race’ and pre-
venting them from breeding.4 
1 Ghiselin, The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex, pp. 11–12.
2 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1975), p. 562.
3 E. J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Con-
tinuing Debate over Science and Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1997), p. 40.
4 G.  W.  Hunter, A  Civic  Biology,  Presented  in  Problems (New  York:
American Book Company,  1924),  p.  263. In a  later,  co-authored work
(Science in Our World of Progress, p. 484), Hunter would point approv-
ingly to the laws being implemented in Nazi Germany for the steriliza-
tion of  the  unfit;  see  S. Selden,  ‘Selective  Traditions  and the  Science
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 I am not, of course, attributing such attitudes to today’s evolutionary
biologists. Many are rightly embarrassed by the crude social Darwinism of
their predecessors. But we would be naïve to believe that ethical and polit-
ical convictions play no role in the choice of the larger stories they tell. We
need to be careful about this. The history of modern biology offers sobering
examples  of  what  can  happen  when science  becomes  embodied  in  the
wrong kind of narrative.1 
9.2.3  A Purified Science or Eternal Vigilance?
What is to be done about these broader narratives and dodgy metaphors?
It may be that evolutionary theory has gradually liberated itself from such
grand narratives, becoming more responsive to strictly evidential norms.2
But it is not clear that we can simply eliminate the narratives and meta-
phors that surround the science. Indeed some of the  metaphors seem in-
Curriculum:  Eugenics  and  the  Biology  Textbook,  1914–1949’, Science
Education 75 (1991), pp. 493–512, on p. 502.
1 See,  for  instance,  G.  J.  Stein,  ‘Biological  Science  and  the  Roots  of
Nazism’, American Scientist, 76 (1988), pp. 50–58, on p. 52. I am not, of
course, endorsing the idea of any necessary link between Darwinism and
Nazism. Here, too, the political ideology is underdetermined by the sci-
ence. To arrive at such ethically abhorrent conclusions, one had to as-
sume (inter alia) that the laws governing social life should be the same
as those governing nature, as did Darwin’s foremost German defender,
Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919); see E. Haeckel,  The Riddle of the Universe
(1899), tr.  J.  McCabe, The Thinker’s Library 3 (London: Watts & Co.,
1929), p. 285. But this assumption was vigorously rejected by Darwin’s
foremost English advocate, T. H. Huxley. ‘Let us understand, once for
all’, Huxley wrote, ‘that the ethical progress of society depends, not on
imitating the cosmic process...,  but in combating it’;  see T. H. Huxley,
‘Evolution and Ethics’ (1893), in Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays,
Collected Essays 9 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1906), pp. 46–116, on p.
83. To his credit, Dawkins follows Huxley rather than Haeckel in this re-
spect;  see  R.  Dawkins,  A  Devil’s  Chaplain:  Selected  Essays (London:
Phoenix, 2004), p. 12.
2 M. Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 237.
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separable  from evolutionary  theorizing.  Think,  for  instance,  of  phrases
such as ‘struggle for existence, natural selection, sexual selection, adaptive
landscape, dynamic equilibrium, [and] arms race’.1 The elimination of such
metaphors would impoverish the science.2 Midgley seems to agree. She,
too, holds that metaphors and grand narratives are not merely ‘a nuisance
to be got rid of’,3 but an inevitable and essential part of scientific theoriz-
ing. But we do need to bring them ‘out into the open’ in order to examine
them critically and see what truth, if any, they embody.4 
It is important to note, in this regard, that such metaphors and narrat-
ives are not matters of faith, which must be simply accepted on authority.
They are testable scientifically and can be criticised. With regard to the
metaphors, once they  are translated into the mathematical formulations
of population genetics they become testable in a way that mere metaphors
are not. With regard to the grand narratives, these, too, can be criticized
for the extent to which they go beyond the evidence. 
Take, for example, the claims sometimes made by evolutionary biolo-
gists regarding gender and gender roles. I shall not dwell on Ghiselin’s
suggestion that ‘the ideal female would be an entirely passive organism’,5
since he does not attempt to spell out its political consequences. But Mi-
chael Ruse’s enthusiasm for evolutionary explanations leads him into the
very trap against which he has warned. In a recent book, he insists that
any study of gender roles must take into account the fact that females, not
males, give birth to children. Since sophisticated organisms require a long
period of gestation and after-birth care, ‘females are stuck with doing this,
whether they want to or not’.6 Nor are they merely ‘stuck with’ the child-
care role; given our evolutionary history, we might expect they will want
to undertake it. It follows, writes Ruse, that we ‘should be cautious about
1 Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries, p. 239.
2 Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries, p. 241.
3 Midgley, Evolution as a Religion, p. 3.
4 Midgley, Evolution as a Religion, p. 4.
5 Ghiselin, The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex, p. 102.
6 Michael Ruse, The Philosophy of Human Evolution, Cambridge Introduc-
tions  to  Philosophy  and  Biology  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University
Press, 2012), p. 194.
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utopian proposals for complete sexual identity’.1 Our evolutionary history
imposes constraints on how we can live.
Almost thirty years ago Philip Kitcher showed the foolishness of such
talk.2 How are we to understand the claim that women will, in general,
‘want to spend time with their young children in ways that men do not’?3
It cannot plausibly be understood as an expression of genetic determin-
ism: the idea that it is women’s genes alone that decide what they want.
Our dispositions to behave in certain ways are the product of both genetic
endowment  and environmental influence, and that environmental influ-
ence includes cultural factors. So Ruse’s view assumes that there is  no
achievable  social  and  political  environment in  which  men  and  women
would want to share childcare. How could any biologist, or philosopher,
possibly  know this  proposition to  be  true?  A scientist  who makes such
claims is simply practising bad science (and a philosopher ought to know
better).
9.3  Is Science a Religion?
So is it true that science is itself a kind of religion? If one defines ‘a reli-
gion’ broadly enough, then yes, there are certain parallels. Midgley, for in-
stance, remarks that 
a faith is not primarily a factual belief, the acceptance of a few extra
propositions like ‘God exists’ or ‘there will be a revolution’. It is rather
the sense of having one’s place within a whole greater than oneself, one
whose larger aims so enclose one’s own and give them point that sacri-
fice for it may be entirely proper. 4 
It is easy to imagine some scientists regarding the scientific enterprise in
this way: as a grand achievement of the human species which gives point
to one’s own, small efforts as an individual. Even Richard Dawkins can
1 Ruse, The Philosophy of Human Evolution, p. 196.
2 P. Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition:  Sociobiology and the Quest for Human
Nature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 26–29.
3 Ruse, The Philosophy of Human Evolution, p. 196.
4 Midgley, Evolution as a Religion, p. 14.
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write that ‘science … has a higher aesthetic. Science can be poetry. Science
can be spiritual, even religious in a non-supernatural sense of the word’.5
We have seen, too, that scientific results are often presented in the con-
text of a grand narrative about human beings and their place in the uni-
verse. Such narratives are more than merely factual claims, since they are
used to offer suggestions regarding how we ought to live. The problem is
that these narratives are underdetermined by the science itself: there are
many different narratives that could be constructed on the basis of the
same theories. Sometimes, too, they are based on a confused understand-
ing of the science, as in the case of the idea that human beings are ‘basic-
ally’ selfish. But that such narratives exist seems beyond doubt and they
sometimes function in ways that approximate the roles played by religious
beliefs. There is good reason to be cautious when scientists begin to speak
like priests and to subject their claims to particular scrutiny.
All of this, however, has no implications for my central thesis, which is
that the norms and procedures of the religious and scientific communities
embody very different attitudes to knowledge. After all, even the grand
narratives  and  dodgy  metaphors  of  contemporary  science  claim to  be
based upon evidence. They are, therefore, able to be criticized. Scripturally
based religions, on the other hand, claim an extra source of knowledge,
which goes beyond what fallible human reason can deliver. This alleged
knowledge, based on faith, enjoys a degree of certainty that scientists have
long ceased to claim for their science (if, indeed, they ever did). It is for
this reason that religious belief is considered immune to criticism. So to
my critics who say that science itself functions in the manner of a religion,
I would respond, ‘Yes. In some respects it does, and we need to be careful
about this. But so what?’ The parallels that exist do not undermine what I
have argued regarding the deep divide between scientific and religious at-
titudes to knowledge.
5 Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain, p. 31.
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At what conclusion, then, have I arrived? Historians complain that, des-
pite their best efforts, the idea of a conflict between religion and science
has refused to die.1 But they might want to ask why the idea is so resili-
ent. My answer will come as no surprise: it persists because it is true. It
may be that by sheer good luck the teachings of religion and those of sci-
ence do not, for the moment, come into conflict. But adherents of scriptur-
ally  based  religions  are  ‘epistemological  dualists’.  Alongside  human
reason, they claim a second source of knowledge accessed by faith. Since
the matters known by faith overlap those known by science, substantive
conflict is always possible. 
When such conflicts occur, it is easy to see which side will claim preced-
ence. Since religious claims are based on an alleged divine revelation, they
have traditionally been thought to trump all ‘merely human’ reasoning.
This is particularly likely to occur today, when the sciences have aban-
doned all pretence to offer certain knowledge. Galileo could hope to offer
demonstrative  proof  of  the  Copernican  theory,  which  would  force  the
Church  to  reinterpret  the  Bible.  Modern  scientists  could  not  hope  to
achieve such a goal.
The Galileo affair represented a conflict on the level of doctrine, namely
what is believed. But even if one can avoid such – on the level of what is
believed – there is always a conflict regarding  the way in which it is be-
lieved. One might argue that this difference does not, in itself, constitute a
conflict; it is merely a difference. Could the two views not be reconciled
within some larger conception of  human knowledge? The problem is
that  it  is difficult  to see how a reconciliation could be achieved.2 When
dealing  with  religion  and  science,  we  are  faced  with  stark  choices.  Is
1 J. H. Roberts, ‘“The Idea that Wouldn’t Die”: The Warfare between Sci-
ence and Christianity’, Historically Speaking, 4:3 (Feb. 2003), pp. 21–24,
on p. 21.
2 As Richard Blackwell writes, ‘the institutionalized authorities behind sci-
ence and behind Scripturally based religion have very different, indeed to
some degree opposed,  characteristics’ (emphasis mine); see R. J.  Black-
well,  Science,  Religion and Authority:  Lessons from the Galileo Affair,




human reason our only means of attaining knowledge?  The sciences as-
sume it is; scripturally based religions insist it is not. Are some authorities
sacred and unquestionable? Religions insist they are; the sciences assume
they are not. Are all our beliefs open to revision? The sciences affirm they
are; religions insist they are not. If these do not represent contrasting atti-
tudes to knowledge, I do not know what would. 
This  is  not  merely  a modern  conflict,  which  emerges  only  in  the
seventeenth century. The roots of modern science are to be found in the
ancient  Greek tradition  of  critical  thinking,  a  tradition  revived  in  the
twelfth century. From the very beginning, this tradition of critical thought
ran into conflict with religion. In the fifth century  BC it led to a series of
trials  for  ‘impiety’,  of  which  the  trial  of  Socrates  is  merely  the  most
famous,  and  in  the  thirteenth century  it  led  to  a  conflict  between the
Church and  Aristotelian philosophy,  which led  to  the  subordination  of
philosophy to theology (and thus science to religion).  The Galileo affair
was merely the high point, or (if you prefer) low point, of this long history.
My examples have been drawn largely from the history of Christian
thought, since it  is what I  know best. But my reference to ‘scripturally
based  religions’  is  intended  to  embrace  any  religious  tradition  that  is
based  on  an  alleged  divine  revelation.  Similar  tensions  have  certainly
arisen within the history of Islam, tensions between religious authorities
and free-thinking philosophers.  Here,  too,  the  believer’s  dependence on
what is considered an infallible authority stands in clear contrast to the
spirit  of  free  inquiry  characteristic  of  the  sciences.1 Indeed  since  such
tensions can arise even in apparently tolerant, polytheistic religions, such
as that of Athens in the fifth century BC., I feel justified in speaking more
generally about ‘religion’ and science.
In making these points, I am not endorsing the sweeping claims and
overblown rhetoric  of  Andrew Dickson White or John William Draper.2
The revisionist historians who have criticized their work were right to in-
sist that more nuance is needed. But rather than entirely rejecting the
1 M. G. S.  Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a
World Civilization, vol.1: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 431.
2 On Draper and White, see my Introduction, ‘The Old Conflict Thesis’.
250
 Conclusion
idea of a conflict between religion and science, we should try to uncover
what forms such a conflict could take. It is not enough to describe the rela-
tion between religion and science as one of ‘rich complexity’.1 Such an ob-
servation ought to be the starting point of a discussion, not its conclusion.
Our task is to unravel this complexity, to understand the various ways in
which  religion  and  science  are related.  It  is  this  task  that  I  have
undertaken, taking as my starting point the most famous of all encounters
between religion and science.
If my revised conflict thesis is correct, why does it matter? It matters
because  the  continued  existence  of  religions  of  this  kind  constitutes  a
potential  threat  to  the  scientific  enterprise.  If  believers  holding  a
traditional view of religious faith were to gain political power, the threat
could  easily  become  real.  If  such  believers  were  to  perceive  a  clash
between what their faith tells them and the findings of modern science,
they would be likely to do what the Church authorities did in Galileo’s
time. They would attempt to close down the science. Acting in accordance
with the logic of their beliefs, they would insist that the authority of God’s
word trumps that of any merely human knowledge. Those of us who value
the freedom of scientific research should take care to ensure this never
happens.
Philosopher  Del  Ratzsch  once  asked  why  we  should  assume  that
scientific reasoning is our only path to knowledge.2 Well, we should not as-
sume that,  nor do  I.  As  John Dupré writes,  ‘there  are  surely  paths to
knowledge very different from those currently sanctioned by the leading
scientific  academies’.3 I  have already distanced myself  from the view –
often  called  ‘scientism’  –  that  would  restrict  knowledge  to  scientific
1 W. R. Shea and D. A. Yerxa, ‘Current Work on the History of Science and
Religion’,  Historically Speaking,  4:3 (Feb. 2003), pp. 24–26, on p. 24; D.
B. Wilson, ‘The Historiography of Science and Religion’, in G. Ferngren
(ed.),  Science  and Religion:  A  Historical  Introduction (Baltimore,  MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 13–29, on pp. 23–26.
2 J. Worrall and D. Ratzsch, ‘Does Science Discredit Religion?’, in M. L.
Peterson and R.  J.  Vanarragon (eds),  Contemporary Debates in Philo-
sophy of Religion, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 1 (Oxford: Black-
well, 2004), pp. 60–94, on pp. 90–91.
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knowledge.1 But the contrast I have drawn is not between differing forms
of our human capacity to know. It is a contrast between the attitude that
sees human reason (in its various forms) as our only source of knowledge,
and an attitude that claims that religious faith is a separate and superior
source of knowledge, alongside reason. 
As  it  happens,  I  cannot  accept  that  idea.  There  may  be  paths  to
knowledge other than those offered by the  sciences. But I can make no
sense  of  the  idea  that  there  are  paths  to  knowledge  other  than  those
offered by  reason, however broadly the latter is construed.  I do not deny
that there could exist a divine revelation. Perhaps one of the existing sets
of Sacred Scriptures embodies such a revelation. What I would reject is
the  idea  that  faith  represents  a  shortcut  to  knowledge:  a  way  of
identifying  this  divine  revelation  that  bypasses  our  own  powers  of
reflection. If my suspicions are correct, then John Locke was right: ‘reason
must be our last judge and guide in everything’.2 I also think that the only
form of reasoning worthy of the name is  critical reasoning, which is pre-
pared to abandon its most cherished assumptions when these have been
shown wanting. 
I  have  not,  however,  attempted to  argue for  those  conclusions here.
Even  if  I  am  wrong,  even  if  religious  faith  is,  in  fact,  a  distinct  and
superior source of knowledge, the contrast I have drawn would still hold
good. Religion and science would still represent contrasting attitudes to
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